The study comes at a critical time for the future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons. On December 22, Donald Trump confused and alarmed the world when he tweeted that he would both strengthen and expand America’s nuclear weapons capability. But there was less new in the announcement than might actually appear. In fact, the Obama Administration was already working to fullfill the “strengthening” part of that same promise, having already put the United States on track to spend more than $1 trillion on modernization of U.S. nuclear weapons.
For the United States Air Force, the modernization list includes replacing LGM-30 Minuteman with a new intercontinental ballistic missile (also called a ground-based strategic deterrent), developing a controversial nuclear-armed cruise missile called the long-range standoff weapon, or LRSO, to building and deploying an entirely new B-21 stealth bomber.
What are “surety concerns?” Read that to mean how do you make sure that your fancy networked nuclear warfare control system can’t be hijacked or go off accidentally.
Before the United States can modernize its nuclear weapons it must first make certain it understands everything that can possibly go wrong. Think back to the classic film (and book) Dr. Strangelove, a story very much about surety failure. A crazed Air Force general sends his B-52 wing to destroy their targets in the Soviet Union. Of course, only the President is supposed to be able to call for a nuclear strike, but an obscure contingency plan (Wing Attack Plan R) allows a lower level commander to issue the order in the event that the normal command and control has been disrupted.
The Pentagon can’t call back the wing because the B-52s can no longer receive transmissions unless preceded by specific three-letter code that only the general knows, part of a poorly thought-out safety scheme to protect the airmen from false orders. Even after the recall code is issued and most of the plans abort their missions, one continues on to a new tertiary target, as the plane’s radio has been damaged in combat. (Somehow, the drafters of Wing Attack Plan R forgot to insert a rule ordering pilots back to base when their radios are damaged, rather than continue to target.) The lone B-52 hits its target and sets in motion the end of the world.
Surety failure squared.
According to Defense Department Directive 3150.02, which outlines the Air Force’s Nuclear Surety Program. The directive assigns “responsibilities for DoD Nuclear Weapons Surety for the oversight of safety, security, and control of U.S. nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon systems in DoD custody.”
“We have formal Air Force documents that detail the formal certification process for nuclear weapons. To what extent do the current models for certifying nuclear systems carry over into these modern, network enabled systems and how would you re-conceptualize certification for systems that are likely to come out of these recap programs?” asked Dahm. The 2017 Air Force Scientific Advisory Board study will attempt to answer those questions. The board consists of 50 members that are appointed by the Secretary of Defense and are drawn from academia, industry, and elsewhere. Members serve for four years.