A few weeks ago, Mitt Romney drew a circle in the sand and stood inside of it, declaring his opposition to the START treaty on the grounds that it jeopardized national security and conceded too much to Russia. The op-ed was torn to shreds the next day by the Washington consensus, which very much supports a bilateral, mutually beneficial approach to arms control, an approach that was President Reagan's greatest legacy to the world. A few days ago, Romney all but announced that he disagreed with the consensus entirely.
Twenty plus years of nuclear diplomacy is not in his consciousness. He wants an entirely new approach, a radical approach that marks a return to a world that dissolved 20 years ago but is still alive intellectually, in some circles.
The new "START's preamble not only references missile defense, it accedes to Russia's insistence that there is an interrelationship between strategic offensive weapons and missile defense. While the Bush administration steadfastly refused to accept this Russian position, the Obama administration bows to it. The statement of interrelationship in the preamble, in addition to the specific missile-defense measures in the body of the treaty, amount to a major concession to Russia."
Well. What Romney sees as a concession is seen by the consensus as a fact: there is a relationship between offense and defense. If country A has one missile (offense) and country B has a system that can shoot down one missile (defense), then country A's offensive capability has been negated. And if it wants to retain such a capability, it will have to build at least one more missile (offense); at which time, Country B, should it want to maintain its defensive capability, will have to build a bigger system (defense). This is not rocket science. This is one of the most elementary concepts in warfare. ("Arms control 101," says Slate's Fred Kaplan.)