Though the Bush Administration denies that it employs torture as part of its anti-terror arsenal, evidence to the contrary continues to surface. Most recently it has come to light that secret legal opinions issued by the Justice Department in 2005 may have authorized harsh interrogation tactics that the White House publicly denounced as "abhorrent." While some argue that the kinds of extreme measures approved by the Justice Department memos might be justifiable if the stakes are high enough, others contend that torture is flat-out wrong and always inexcusable. As this collection of Atlantic writings suggests, the question of what kinds of interrogation tactics are appropriate in what situations is often murky.
"The Ploy" (May 2007)
The inside story of how the interrogators of Task Force 145 cracked Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's inner circle—without resorting to torture—and hunted down al-Qaeda's man in Iraq. By Mark Bowden
"A Nasty Business" (January 2002)
Gathering "good intelligence" against terrorists is an inherently brutish enterprise, involving methods a civics class might not condone. Should we care? By Mark Bowden
In “The Dark Art of Interrogation” (October 2003), Mark Bowden, the author of Black Hawk Down and Killing Pablo, suggested that torture may be the most powerful tool the American military has in the fight against terrorism. But he argued that the public’s understanding of torture is too simplistic. He explained that there are different gradations of torture, the appropriateness of which varies with the situation, victim, and interrogator. The word “torture,” for example, should not necessarily apply when moderate physical or psychological abuse—such as sleep deprivation, drugs or rough treatment (slapping or shaking)—are used to obtain life-saving information. In such cases, he argued, the word “coercion” is more appropriate. Likewise, threatening to harm a prisoner’s family members or friends—with no intention of actually following through on those threats—should not necessarily be classified as torture either. Yet he pointed out that there have been a number of incidences in which those who have made such threats have subsequently been accused of torture for inflicting severe psychological stress.
Bowden began his argument with a discussion of Sheik Mohammed, an al-Qaeda member involved in a number of major terror plots, including 9/11 and the slaughter of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl. Bowden argued that professional terrorists like Sheik Mohammed “pose one of the strongest arguments in modern times for the use of torture.” While he conceded that “torture is repulsive” and expressed sympathy for those who are innocent victims of torture, he emphasized that professional terrorists pose a more difficult question:
They are lockboxes containing potentially life-saving information. Sheikh Mohammed has his own political and religious reasons for plotting mass murder, and there are those who would applaud his principled defiance in captivity. But we pay for his silence in blood.
Bowden revisited the subject a year later in “Lessons of Abu Ghraib” (July/August, 2004). The Abu Ghraib scandal had made it clear that even if coercive methods are sometimes justified, abusive treatment can easily become the norm. “The photos from Abu Ghraib prison,” Bowden observed, “portray Americans as exactly the sexually obsessed, crude, arrogant, godless occupiers that our enemies say we are.” The Americans’ smiling faces in the photographs, he noted, indicate that the perpetrators, besides lacking moral judgment, “felt licensed to abuse.” The only way to prevent interrogators from feeling this license would be to make them individually responsible for their behavior:
If I lean on an insurgent leader who knows where surface-to-air missiles are stockpiled, then I can offer the defense of necessity if charges are brought against me…. But when a prison, an army, or a government tacitly approves coercive measures as a matter of course, widespread and indefensible human rights abuses become inevitable. Such approval unleashes the sadists.
Finally, in June 2005, Stephen Budiansky’s article “Truth Extraction” offered an alternative perspective—suggesting that the effectiveness of torture may be overrated. In 1943, Budiansky explained, Marine Major Sherwood F. Moran had published a report, now considered a classic among military interrogators. Based on a study of efforts to get Japanese POWs to talk during World War II, it reached a surprising conclusion: “successful interrogators all had one thing in common in the way they approached their subject. They were nice to them.” Despite dealing with hostile subjects and alien cultures, the interrogators Moran studied had been able to successfully extract information without torturing their prisoners.
Budiansky extracted an excerpt from the report, in which Moran outlined the type of rapport an interrogator should maintain with a prisoner:
Begin by asking him things about himself. Make him and his troubles the center of the stage, not you and your questions of war problems. If he is not wounded or tired out, you can ask him if he has been getting enough to eat… You can ask if he has had cigarettes, if he is being treated all right, etc. If he is wounded you have a rare chance. Begin to talk about his wounds. Ask if the doctor or corpsman has attended to him. Have him show you his wounds or burns. (They will like to do this!)
Interrogators who try to “break down the morale” of prisoners, Moran suggested, are actually those with the most fear and insecurity. Indeed, the most important characteristic of an interrogator, he posited, is “temperament” and his “character.” As he saw it, each soldier “has a story he desperately wants to tell. The interrogator’s job is to provide the atmosphere that allows the prisoner to tell it.”