A National Political Armistice?


THE returns of the nation-wide election of 1930 reveal two almost equally matched political armies, preparing to contest through chosen leaders for national approval in the twin arenas of the Seventy-second Congress. That Congress, unless earlier summoned into special session by the President, will first assemble in December 1931. Its present indicated roll call discloses: in the Senate, 48 Republicans, 47 Democrats, 1 Farmer-Labor member; in the House, 218 Republicans, 216 Democrats, and 1 Farmer-Labor member. Allowing for natural shifts in votes, which may be expected from individual independence, not to mention death, it is obvious that Presidential leadership in that Congress, whether assembled in special or regular session, faces definite embarrassment and imminent danger of defeat on any legislative measures which lack the commanding wisdom and irresistible drawing power of statesmanlike constructiveness.

Confronted by this possible legislative deadlock, not in the short Congressional session now in progress in Washington, but in the next special or regular session, seven nationally distinguished Democrats — James M. Cox, John W. Davis, and Alfred E. Smith, former candidates for the Presidency; Joseph T. Robinson and John N. Garner, the present respective Democratic leaders of Senate and House; John J. Raskob, National Committee Chairman, and Jouett Shouse, Chairman of the National Executive Committee — issued on November 7, on the heels of last November’s election, a sweeping declaration of Democratic purpose not to ‘ seek to embarrass the President of the United States, but . . , to coöperate with him and with the members of the opposite party in the Llouse and Senate on every measure that conduces to the welfare of the country.’

Possibly controlling this announcement of national Democratic policy was the hope that, by advocating cooperative action in the session of Congress which normally will not meet until the end of the better part of another year, the fires of partisan rivalry might burn low during the present short session. This being done, noncontroversial legislative measures for ‘the welfare of the country’ would presumably be agreed upon at this critical time with less than the usual debate, and with possible resulting credit to Democratic leadership for its disinterested attitude. At any rate, Mr. Shouse publicly said, in eflect, that the statement contemplated an adjournment of politics.

So construed, the offer of Democratic leaders, and its rather novel expression of political policy, at once challenged nation-wide attention and, according to the various constructions placed on it, aroused alternately warm commendation and slashing disapproval. Various leaders of public opinion hailed it as the forerunner of a new ‘Era of Good Feeling,’ Senator Glass of Virginia, however, repudiated the programme as, in substance, an apology for Democracy’s victory at the polls last November, and Senator Borah of Idaho, speaking as a Progressive, termed the implication that Progressives are less vividly alive to their public responsibilities than regulars ‘an act of superlative impudence.’ It is evident, from either point of view, as well as in the national interest, that the statement deserves more than momentary examination.

The praiseworthy motives which doubtless inspired this striking afterelection utterance are universally understandable. Fighting merely for the sake of fighting is more enthralling to participants than to onlookers. Obstructionist tactics, where public business is involved, must be justified by larger prizes than obstruction. In the field of statesmanship, general welfare comes first. True leadership demands that the public good shall always be visible, not only to those who direct the contest, but also, and more, to those who crowd the side lines and whose fate is widely involved in the outcome. If the ruling judge is hostile, it is the more necessary to persuade the jury that such hostility is unmerited; that it deplorably springs from prejudice, partiality, or other unworthy influences; and that the defended cause is none the less wholly just.

A merely turbulent Congress, ineffective because unable to force into the open issues which clearly divide it from the President, may speedily alienate sympathy to the opposition and thus become unpopular. Voters — indifferent to party strategy; weary of vocal wrestling, however brilliant; seeking only results, particularly in a period, like the present, imperatively calling for immediate public relief—instinctively incline to welcome any indicated subordination of political strategy to national and human-welfare ends. More and more an alert electorate resents the surrender to party of ‘what was meant for mankind.’

Intensely persuasive also, our times, beyond any in our generation outside of war, summon us to united action in the general interest. Our Ship of State, with its cargo wealth of immense natural resources, organizing skill, and productive and trade possibilities, but also unhappy millions of idle and impoverished human beings, has badly listed in the world’s economic waters, and limps almost helplessly toward unknown ports. Woe, then, betide him who does not stand at his post of duty ready to do and dare all for the public good! It is an hour of peril. Anxiety is hysterical. Human hopes are dimmed; human fears master. Relief measures are indispensable, and must be enacted without delay.


Alas, however, for human generalizations! The mere description of the economic tragedy which has overtaken America modifies our outlook, and compels more than a respectful hearing for the criticism voiced by Senators Glass and Borah. It is always the crisis which tries men’s souls. Conciliation must not degenerate into surrender of principle. Patriotism must not be lured into false paths. United action must not involve weakness. Such a result would defeat the whole purpose of the national Democratic offer. Surely the seven Democratic leaders did not intend by their statement to excite sympathy for policies dictated by incapacity or by hostility to necessary human-welfare and other enactments of Congress.

Moreover, since the voters of America have served nation-wide notice of the withdrawal of their certificate of confidence, given the Administration two years ago, the new popular mandate should receive prompt expression at the first Congressional opportunity. Indeed, no criticism of our Congressional system in recent years has sunk deeper in the popular mind than the unresponsiveness of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of our government to registered indications of deliberate public opinion. Surely business is neither so timid nor so unadaptable that it must always be coddled, lest changing public opinion cause it, like a sensitive plant, to shrink from any slightest outside contact. If so, popular government and modern business are fundamentally hostile, for periodic records of public opinion are necessary to government of, by, and for the people. Indeed, under our system of government, Congress and the President exist to register and execute the public will when definitely voiced through elections.

No one, in fact, has been quicker than Senator Robinson of Arkansas, who signed the Democratic pronouncement, to note and reject certain unwarranted implications read into the offer of cooperation. On November 24, on the eve of the present short session of Congress, and subsequent to the statement of policy in which he joined, Senator Robinson declared: —

Readiness to coöperate in the passage of the appropriation bills and emergency measures in no sense implies support on my part of the policies of the Republican Party, or approval of its record.

Further elaborating this important qualification, Senator Robinson added:—

The Congress was in extraordinary session throughout the spring and summer of 1929. We dealt principally with the agricultural problem and with the tariff in relation to the farm relief.

The Hawley-Smoot Act gave impetus to economic depression. It did more harm than good.

The Farm Marketing Act has not been effective to reverse the downward tendency of agriculture.

Conditions have been steadily growing worse until in many parts of the country economic and business distress is appalling.

In my judgment it is imperative that measures of an emergency character be acted upon as speedily as possible.

While no doubt other important subjects will also require attention by the Congress, I regard it as indispensable to the public welfare that all cooperate in the passage of measures for relief in the drouth-stricken areas.

The unemployment situation is acute and demands consideration.

Similarly on November 24, Chairman Shouse, speaking at Newark, New Jersey, said of the earlier truce statement: —

It did not mean, as some have sought to read it, that Democratic principles would be sacrificed, or that the organization would become a party of yes-men for the President.

Doubtless these after-reflections on the harmony offer were given a more forceful turn by the inhospitable reception of that, off er by the Administration and its spokesmen. The President’s acknowledgment of the opposition’s tender contained a gratuitous reference to ‘the fear and apprehension which have been expressed over reports that delay or filibustering would be resorted to to force an extra session of the Congress.’ Senator Watson of Indiana, while professing acceptance of the Democratic suggestion ‘with full faith and credit,’ made an unnecessarily slurring reference to ‘ the obvious political propaganda’ accompanying it, and left the impression that, without it, the Democratic Party would be supporting ‘disturbing legislation.’ Senator Moses of New Hampshire, Republican leader, with his unfailing talent for tauntingly upsetting a delicate balance, ‘feared the Democrats bearing gifts.’

Senator Fess of Ohio, Republican party whip, went further with the remark: ‘Controverted subjects, that have been before Congress for a long time especially, should be voted on if it would prevent a special session.’ Least conciliatory of all, however. Congressman Reece of Tennessee, who was the one Republican supported in the primaries by President Hoover, because of the Muscle Shoals issue, and who later was conclusively rejected on that issue by his Congressional district, gave apparent point to Senator Fess’s comment by reporting, after a White House conference, that, if again passed by Congress, the Muscle Shoals bill of Senator Norris, providing for government operation of the nation’s power plant, would be promptly vetoed by the President.

This anti-progressive declaration of national Republican policy, which remains undenied by the White House, appears to be the President’s answer to the announcement of Senator MeNary that the latter will steadfastly urge the enactment of the Norris measure in the present session of Congress. Thus what promised to bo a straight line of happy cooperation for the public good, regardlass of party, curves back, on the outer rim of an old circle, to the start ing point of apparently irreconcilable controversy. During the exchange of compliments the general sensitiveness was evidenced by an almost total lack of humor, one exception being a press cartoon on ‘Harmony,’ picturing personified Democracy and Republicanism, each blissfully smiling, slanting shoulder to shoulder from opposite banks above and across a wide chasm, below which yawns a bottomless abyss.


It becomes necessary, without more ado, to analyze the major issues of the campaign of 1930, in order to determine whether any friendly reconciliation of opposed political forces is permanently feasible at this stage of America’s development. That campaign was conducted in the shadows of economic paralysis. For fifteen months millions of our steady and self-respecting people in excess of our normally idle — the precise number being unknown for lack of adequate fact-gathering agencies — have faced the deepening want and despair of prolonged unemployment. In the same period, farm foreclosures have exceeded those of any equal time in our history. Bank failures have been so frequent and excessive that the press has generally glossed over the rapidly mounting totals. Our domestic industries have slowed down. Our foreign commerce has tragically dwindled. Business, so far as it has survived, has painfully marked time, receiving, with lessening confidence, the reckless and unfulfilled promises of returning prosperity. Commodity prices, especially of farm products, have dropped to unimaginably low levels. A widening toll of poverty is being exacted in our land of matchless wealth. Corporation dividends chiefly survive, paid, by the grace of foresight, from the vast storehouse of past surplus accumulations. For example, according to the New York Journal of Commerce, during eleven months of the panic year, 1930, in which, broadly speaking, dividends were not earned, certain selected corporations nevertheless distributed dividends totaling $2,668,000,000, which represented an increase of $297,000,000 over the far more prosperous similar period of 1929.

Of course, the acute economic conditions of 1930 might have been accepted with relative complacency had it not been for the background of years which prefaced the collapse of October 1929. Underneath the superficial and feverish prosperity which preceded that crash, economic maladjustments, which long ago should have brought into play the constructive and remedial resources of our government, were glaringly evident. Outstanding industries — notably textiles, coal, and, farthest-reaching of all, agriculture — have been, as we have seen, not for fifteen months, but for years, permitted to drift toward evcr-Iower levels of disorganization.

During the years immediately preceding the panic, America was so beguiled by the dazzling growth of earnings of dominant corporations that the unhappy plight of industrial workers, our farm population, and moderate business was treated by Administration leaders for the most part with indifference. The steady decrease in employment was noted, then forgotten. Diminishing pay rolls were overshadowed by increasing machine production. For example, as Senator Shipstead of Minnesota recently pointed out, the volume of wages of workers declined more than 30 per cent between 1920 and 1926, and during the same years the workers’ output increased about 34 per cent.

Statisticians report that during approximately ten years the control of some 60 per cent of the nation’s wealth had shifted from two to about one per cent of our population; that in 1926 corporation dividends on common stock were about 40 per cent larger than in 1923; that during the years after 1920 increasing numbers of workers of gradually lowering ages were cast on the scrap heap of unemployment; that child laborers numbered nearly two million; that two thirds of our population have been doomed to die propertyless; that the value of farm lands and farm buildings in America in a decade shrank in excess of twenty-one billion dollars; that in seven of those years the value ol farm crops diminished some 40 per cent; that in the last four of those years one out of every twelve farms in the United States was permanently lost to farm owners through tax and foreclosure sales and agricultural bankruptcy; that farm tenantry has rapidly replaced farm ownership; and that an endless procession of our farm population, driven by changing conditions from lost homes in the country, merged with and further burdened the already overcrowded ranks of city industrial workers.

The central indictment against the party in power in the last campaign was, therefore, one of barren statesmanship during a long period of growing economic evils, which openly threatened and finally sapped the foundations of superficial prosperity. Under three successive Republican administrations, those in power not only did not halt, but rather accelerated, the unfortunate economic tendencies which finally culminated in our present chaos. Presidents Harding and Coolidge merely toyed with the tides which have engulfed President Hoover. Until this indictment against the party in power is confessed, with an ‘about face’ programme of constructive legislation which strikes at the roots of our industrial ills, no compromise with the Administration can have more than trivial significance.


American statesmanship, in the name of individual initiative, has practically ignored the overwhelmingly significant facts of our industrial life ever since Woodrow Wilson left and Warren G. Harding entered the White House. The two classes of statutory remedies offered by successive Republican administrations — the Tariff Acts of 1922 and 1930, and the Agricultural Marketing Act — merely emphasize what has been said. Instead of relieving, they have for the most part aggravated, existing conditions, to the special detriment of average business, industrial workers, and our farm population.

Some of the factors which have contributed to the breakdown should perhaps be briefly sketched. The Tariff Act of 1922, not to mention the more incredible Tariff Act of 1930, contributed to produce strange consequences. The Act of 1922 was calculated to intensify unhappy developing economic tendencies in the period following the World War. Informed persons now realize that, coupled with the demand for the payment of European war debts, heightened tariff walls raised by the Act of 1922 first diverted huge amounts of gold to this country, since the payment of foreign obligations through customary commercial shipments was largely barred by our tariffs. These gold imports resulted in easy credit and low money rates in this country, sanctioned by the Federal Reserve Board because of extraordinary gold holdings. Cheaper money, due in part to our needlessly rigorous tariffs, opened the way, with the hearty approval of American bankers, for extensive foreign loans, which wore increasingly sought by Europe in order to obtain purchasing credit in American markets, otherwise largely impossible as a result of our substantially isolationist tariff attitude.

The Federal Reserve Board at times indicated that one advantage of cheaper money favored by it was the open door thus afforded for the sale of foreign securities in this country. Had the movement ended there, the results would have been less disastrous. Instead, the easy credit at hand was turned toward the stock market, and thus stimulated feverish stock speculation, the mad trail of which, with its seemingly endless possibilities of gain, eventually affected the whole country. Its enormous profits made ordinary investments unattractive. It drained credit from deserving industries in all directions, and passed beyond the belated efforts of the Federal Reserve Board to check and control it. The tardy warnings and credit contractions of the Board were in the main disregarded because of the confident expectation that easy credit, as in times past, would again be available.

The crash in the fall of 1929 ended the drama, and in no small degree the failure of the Federal Reserve Board to use its powers wisely and effectively for the elimination of foolhardy speculation must be blamed for much of the shocking and far-reaching individual and industrial suffering which resulted. Shortsighted Wall Street leadership must bear its share of responsibility for these events. Throughout, Administration leaders, including Secretary of the Treasury Mellon, whose expertness was taken for granted, let the slowly massing avalanche gather and plunge to its predictable end, without lifting an effectively saving finger.

In other words, America demanded the payment of foreign war debts; substantially closed the markets of this country by tariffs to the trade of debtor nations; drew a flood of foreign gold to America from abroad; found it desirable to use part of our surplus money to aid foreign countries by everincreasing foreign loans; and, because still supplied with easy credit, opened our financial gates to the stock orgy which calamitously crashed in the fall of 1929. Behind the Federal Reserve Board’s failures, of course, lie our unnecessarily severe tariff and foreign policies.

What we confront, then, are maladjusted economic conditions everywhere, largely precipitated by the blindness of three successive national administrations. Surely all who have examined the development of mass production in America and observed the relation between our tariff barriers and the retaliatory tariff walls of other nations must ha ve moments of vision in which they realize that more liberal commerce with other nations, and higher standards of living both at home and abroad, are intimately related and even preliminary to the larger economic welfare and contentment of mankind toward which our civilization should be directed.

Other results of our tariff legislation of the last decade have been more closely familiar. The tariff duties of the Act of 1922 were admittedly placed unduly high with the purpose of later reductions under the so-called ‘flexible’ tariff powers, presumably to meet business fear of disturbed after-war competitive conditions, largely because of Europe’s then highly inflated currency. That particular dread of Europe disappeared, but unfortunately the promised reductions were never made, though, as long ago as 1910, President Taft — speaking the accepted language of moderate Republican tariff policy — had said: —

The truth is that under the old protective idea the only purpose was to make the tariff high enough to protect the home industry. The excess of the tariff over the differences in the cost of production here and abroad was not regarded as objectionable, because it was supposed that competition between those who enjoyed high protection would keep the price for the consumer down to what was reasonable for the manufacturers. The evil of excessive tariff rates, however, showed itself in the temptation of manufacturers to combine and suppress competition, and then to maintain the prices so as to take advantage of the excess of the tariff rate over the difference between the cost of production abroad and here.

To add to our trade complications, the Tariff Act of 1930 has once more unscientifically lifted, not lowered, the general tariff level.

To be sure, there has been an accompanying increase in the general range of agricultural as well as manufacturing duties, but with foreseen results. All informed men and women now know that most manufacturing tariffs are effective, most agricultural tariffs ineffective. The reasons need not be repeated here. Enough to say that our tariff acts have generally increased the prices of most necessary farm purchases, without increasing the market returns from the great bulk of farm sales. The long-promised parity between farmers and manufacturers has, therefore, been hindered, not promoted, by our tariff laws. Successive Republican administrations have continued to sacrifice agriculture on the altar of industry. Year after year, heedless of growing farm suffering and resentment, agriculture — the backbone of America — has been broken on the industrial wheel. Furthermore the tariff beneficiaries, who have selfishly influenced our foreign trade policies, have steadily denied farm owners escape by either of two obvious paths: lower duties on the manufactured goods farmers must buy, or some effective form of agricultural subsidies, substantially corresponding to the indirect tariff subsidies extended to manufacturers. Most informed persons agree that the first was and is the more logical and scientific way to lasting farm relief, but, with that possibility persistently flouted and defeated by logrolling tariff beneficiaries and other conservatives, the subsidy alternative has come to be, more and more reasonably, regarded as the most immediately available avenue of practical farm relief. Here again, however, conservative opposition has been adamant.

Two carefully considered proposals of farm leaders— the equalization fee programme and the export debenture for surplus agricultural exports — have been contemptuously set aside by the same administrations which fostered and accepted with complacency the radical excesses of the Fordney-McCumber and Joe Grundy tariff laws. Nor is this the whole story. The suggestions of farm leaders were dismissed on the ostensible ground that they involved governmental subsidies, as if our general tariff legislation did not tax consumers every hour, in order to procure indirect but effective subsidies for manufacturers of the country, including Secretary Mellon, a member of the President’s Cabinet. For years, too, Republican administrations, in one way or another, have substantially subsidized our inland transportation interests, our shipping industry, and our bankers, while steadily resisting all efforts to erect and maintain like safeguards, not only for farmers, but also for workers and moderate business men. At the same time those administrations have appeared determined to place in private hands, for individual profit, regardless of public welfare, the remaining unappropriated natural resources of America, including nationally needed oil reserves and nationally owned electric power resources, strikingly exemplified by such government-built and incalculably valuable governmentowned properties as Muscle Shoals, which will doubtless furnish the precedent for our ultimate treatment of Boulder Dam.


Assuredly such facts, and others impressively illustrating the same regrettable tendencies, point their own moral. The essential contest over government to-day, as in the long past, is between those who use it to enlarge the profits and privileges of the few, and those who demand approximate equality of rights and opportunities, safeguarded by government, for the many. The campaign of 1930 was fought and won by Democrats and other progressives on the public side of that issue. Present professions must be judged by past conduct, and it is the view, alike of progressive Democrats, Republicans, and Farmer-Laborites, that, until the party now nationally in power repudiates its established practices, its attitude and that of the liberal opposition are and must remain fundamentally hostile. Temporary relief measures may be stipulated, but the real conflict goes deeper.

The Administration, by its blind, persistent, ten-year policies, has proved itself committed to profiteers and devoted to privilege. Progressive coalition with such a programme is impossible. Of course, all men and women seek to uphold the hands of the President, but only on the assumption that the President will uphold the hands of the people. So far as conditions permitted, the mandate given in 1930 by the voters of America was for a new governmental order, dictated by age-old democratic principles, adapted to and dominating our changing civilization. The demand is for a people’s, not a profiteer’s, sovereignty; a people’s education, literature, financial system, tariff, and life; a people’s electric age; a people’s government in all branches, executive, legislative, and judicial; a people’s prosperity; a people’s peace, and a people’s end of wars, which, in the long run, chiefly benefit profiteers.

To illustrate western American sentiment by Colorado, the recent election results may reasonably be regarded as directing remedial action, through Federal laws and executive leadership, designed: —

1. To diminish unemployment by an elastic programme of Federal works; increasingly effective employment agencies; enlarged restraints on immigration in periods of depression; the substitution of adult for child labor; and a scientific advance in the direction of old age and unemployment insurance, and of shorter working hours without reduced pay.

2. To assist agriculture by reductions of excessive tariff rates on manufactured articles, or, lacking such reductions, by legislative support for the marketing abroad of surplus staple form products. Also by further legislation, aimed, for example, to improve market conditions for farm crops; establish juster taxes and freight rates; stabilize prices of farm products; give farmers public-spirited and able representation in the various Federal agencies devoted to form welfare; strike at farm tenancy and assist farm ownership, in the interest alike of justice and of public well-being, by farm loans payable over a considerably extended period of time, carrying interest at the lowest feasible rates; and postpone, as need arises, with proper safeguards for the banks, the foreclosure of mortgages held by intermediate credit, joint stock, and Federal land banks.

3. To secure the reduction of present excessive tariff duties, beginning with monopoly-controlled and other privately price-fixed manufactured articles — new tariff duties to be tested, not by the demands of tariff lobbyists, as at present, but by the national interest and by impartial fact-finding. And, in so doing, to improve general business; widen the average business man’s market; increase production and the purchasing power of the farmers’, workers’, and other consumers’ dollars; discourage monopolies; suppress unfair trade practices; liberalize helpful commerce between the United States and foreign countries; and deepen proper international goodwill and friendliness.

4. To regulate hereafter far more effectively, justly, and wisely the expansion and contraction of credit.

5. To conserve our unappropriated, nationally owned natural resources, and, as part of that programme, to operate by the government our government-owned investments at Muscle Shoals and Boulder Dam in order to produce electric power for the benefit of municipalities and the public.

6. To strengthen, and make more justly effective, governmental control over transportation, communication, and other public utilities.

7. To improve industrial conditions and avoid costly industrial disturbances by legislation recognizing the rights and dignity of labor; tending to establish and maintain harmonious labor relations; and eliminating unnecessary and at times inhumane abuses by courts of injunctions and contempt proceedings, often exclusively directed against workers.

8. To secure and preserve the friendliest disposition between the United States and foreign countries.

9. To uphold genuine, impartial, and thoroughgoing law enforcement.

10. To support governmental economy, subject to the imperative demands of the public welfare; and to promote governmental efficiency.


Such indications as the foregoing, which are illustrative rather than allinclusive, of a liberally Democratic legislative and executive programme, in contrast with present Administration suggestions, reveal the cjuicksands which underlie any present plan of coalition government. It must be evident that no immediate hopes may now be indulged of any permanent union of the Administration with Democratic and other progressive opposition. Life and government are not yet so simple. The progressive and conservative forces of America at this hour are in sharp disagreement, even over such preliminary questions as the right to use government for the general good, not to mention the promotion of economic liberty and justice for all citizens. Many conservatives still timidly urge that such activities be left to the whims of charity or the lawlessness of chance.

Summing up what has been said, the after-election declaration of national Democratic policy has the striking merit of emphasizing the value, in peace as in war, of patriotic unity, regardless of party, to remove the economic distress now gripping farmers, city workers, and general American business. The outstanding demand of the hour is relief which really relieves, genuinely and promptly extended to stricken farmers and unemployed workers, as first steps to general prosperity. The tree of prosperity must bo watered at the roots if it is to cease dying at the top. On the other hand, coöperation, to be worth while, must be mutual, not one-sided. The true public rule continues to be: in essentials, unity, provided public welfare determines the essentials. Sound legislative proposals of the Administration should, of course, be supported by the opposition, but the Administration in return must refrain from insistence on an unsound programme. It must even be prepared, where necessary, to retrace mistaken steps, and correct national and international policies which have helped to precipitate lost confidence and disaster. Above all it must unite with all forwardlooking thinkers in recognizing that men, women, and children are more important than machines, farmers than speculators, consumers than monopolists, and that human beings must increasingly be given security in work, life, and happiness, corresponding to the safeguards enjoyed by capital.

Finally, it should be said that ageold issues between autocracy and democracy, on which peace, war, disaster, and prosperity depend, will not now be solved through armistice government. Eternal vigilance remains necessary, because ancient contests in ever-changing guise return to plague us. Beneath professions of friendly cooperation, unlimited private profit continues to resist the advance of fair play and public service. Privilege for the most part yields to equality inch by inch, and only in response to the resistless pressure and major strength of government. A coalition, therefore, of these unyieldingly opposed forces merely offers a momentary breathing space in the continuing struggle for justice. If this were not so, and general welfare were the common goal, government would be the easiest, instead of the most difficult, of human sciences, arts, and adventures.