What About the Philippines?
TRUST-BUSTING has been a favorite sport in America. And at the beginning of the twentieth century, we attempted to break up Europe’s monopoly of ‘imperialism.’ Under the ægis of the Monroe Doctrine we gradually extended our control over the republics of Central America, and under the pressure of strategic necessity, we established an American sphere of influence over the Caribbean. But neither a Monroe Doctrine nor strategic necessity led us into the Philippines in 1898.
This, the most troublesome of our possessions, was acquired in a ‘fit of absence of mind.’ Nobody thought of annexing the Philippines when the war with Spain broke out. But when they fell into our hands, we were afraid to get rid of them. We could not return them to Spain because she was too weak and too incompetent to govern them, as the Filipino revolts of 1814, 1896, and 1898 had proved. We were afraid to grant the Philippines immediate independence, believing that they would certainly fall into the greedy hands of the Powers who at that time were scrambling for a foothold in China. Add to this Senator Lodge’s insistence on the ‘vast commercial and trade interests, which I believe we have a right to guard and a duty to foster,’ made in a speech to the Fiftyfifth Congress, and you have an explanation why we have stayed in the Philippines until the present day.
History perhaps will justify this annexation. The people of these islands have been given an orderly government, in a part of the world where, with the exception of an oligarchic Japan, disorder is the rule. Under the guidance of the United States, the Filipinos have developed a national life and demonstrated that the Oriental is really able to govern himself. Unlike the old style imperialism, American policy in the Philippines, to quote the instructions of President McKinley to the American Commission in 1900, has not been designed ‘for our satisfaction, or for the expression of our theoretical views, but for the happiness, peace, and prosperity’ of the Filipinos themselves.
This idea that the government of backward peoples is a ‘sacred trust’ is not new. It was enunciated by the European Powers in regard to their African possessions, in the General Acts of Berlin and of Brussels in 1885 and 1890. But the United States has gone further perhaps than any other power in the world to carry this principle of ‘trusteeship’ or ‘guardianship’ into effect. About fifteen per cent of the annual revenues of the Philippines are expended on education, compared with similar expenditures ranging from only two to four per cent in the most enlightened French and British colonies in Africa. In building up this system, the United States has placed increasing reliance upon Philippine teachers, the number of which has increased from 1914 in 1898 to 20,601 in 1920. Whether in the matter of health, public works, or roads, the United States has conscientiously cared for the natives’ needs. From the political standpoint, we have also recognized our obligation to the Filipinos, by establishing a legislature in 1907, the lower house of which was elected by the Philippine people, and by passing the Jones Act of 1916, which placed both houses in native hands, with the exception of two senators and nine representatives, appointed by the American Governor-General to represent the non-Christian tribes.
Ordinarily, the relation of guardian to ward is a temporary one — the child grows up. And our policy in the Philippines has always kept in view the ultimate termination of American control. In 1898 General Aguinaldo interpreted the statements of the American Consul-General at Singapore to mean that if the Filipinos supported the American troops in their campaign against Manila, immediate independence would be their reward. But our promises to the Philippines rest upon a much more tangible basis than the shadowy remarks of Mr. Pratt, which the State Department later disavowed. At the Republican Convention of 1904, Elihu Root said that the Philippines might eventually be given the same status as Cuba. Dr. J. G. Schurman, president of the first Philippine Commission, said that American policy in the Philippines would ‘issue in independence.’ In 1908 President Roosevelt expressed the hope that within a generation the Philippines could ‘decide for themselves whether it is well for them to become independent.’ When secretary of war, Mr. Taft said that the American policy ‘must logically reduce and finally end the sovereignty of the United States’ in the Islands. In a message to the Philippine people in October 1913, President Wilson said, ‘Every step we take will be taken with a view to the ultimate independence of the Islands, and as a preparation for that independence.’ The most solemn promise of all, embodied in the preamble of the Jones Act of 1916, declared that ‘it was never the intention of the people of the United States in the incipiency of the War with Spain to make it a war of conquest or for territorial aggrandizement,’ and that ‘it is, as it has always been, the purpose of the people of the United States to withdraw their sovereignty over the Philippine Islands and to recognize their independence as soon as a stable government can be established.’ Although the late President Harding did not believe in immediate independence, he declared to the Philippines Independence Alission in June 1922 that ‘whether wisely or not, our disavowal of permanent retention was made in the very beginning, and a reversal of that, attitude will come, if ever, only at your request.’
These promises have not been empty words. The Filipinos have been given almost complete control over local and provincial government. The governors of the provinces and the presidents of municipalities are elected by the people. The representative Legislature, established by the Jones Act of 1916, has ‘general legislative power,’ except that it cannot pass laws violating the Bill of Rights, regulating the trade relations with the United States, or creating a bonded indebtedness beyond ten per cent of the aggregate tax-valuation of real property, and so forth. But the United States still retains direct control of the executive branch of the central government through a GovernorGeneral appointed for an indefinite term by the President of the United States. This official has ‘supreme executive power’ and ‘general supervision and control of all the departments and bureaus of the government in the Philippine Islands.’ He may veto any act of the Legislature, including individual items in appropriation bills. If the Legislature passes the bill over his head, it is referred to the President of the United States, whose decision is final. Congress may likewise annul laws passed by the Philippine Legislature, and the United States Supreme Court may set them aside for constitutional reasons. If the Philippine Legislature refuses to vote the budget recommended by the Governor-General, the previous year’s appropriations automatically continue in force. But no such way is provided to break deadlocks over appointments, which must be confirmed by the Philippine Senate before they can become effective. In short, the Jones Act established a government which is representative of, but not responsible to, the people of the Philippines.
Under the administration of Governor-General F. B. Harrison, the gulf created by the Jones Act between the Governor-General and the Legislature was bridged by an institution called the Council of State. This body, established by an executive order in November 1918, so as ‘to aid and advise the Governor-General on matters of public importance,’ was composed of the presiding officers of the House of Representatives and the Senate and the heads of the executive departments. Since most of the members of the Council of State were also members of the Legislature, this body worked out a system of coöperation between the Governor-General and the Legislature, which avoided deadlocks and established a semi-responsible government in which native leaders gained some control over administration.
For the first time in the history of our relations with the Philippines, we have now adopted a policy of curtailing the autonomy which they have been allowed to exercise in the past. The reason for this change was forecast by the Wood-Forbes Commission, sent out by President Harding to study the Philippine question in 1921. According to this commission, the period of ‘Filipinization,’ extending from 1916 to 1921, had been marked by a ‘deterioration in the quality of public service, by the creation of a top-heavy personnel, the too frequent placing of influence above efficiency, by the beginning of a political bureaucracy’ — a description applicable to almost any American city! Because of this tendency, the Commission recommended that the American Congress declare null and void legislation enacted by the Philippine Legislature diminishing, limiting, or dividing the authority granted the GovernorGeneral under the Jones Act. This idea of absolute executive independence has also been proclaimed by General Wood in his messages to the Philippine Legislature. Literally interpreting the Jones Act, he is exercising the powers of his office in entire disregard of the wishes of the Legislature, subject only to the War Department at Washington, which, of course, will give him whole-hearted support.
While he did not abolish the Council of State because so many administrative duties had been imposed upon it by law, General Wood vigorously used his veto power to kill twenty-one bills passed in the first two sessions of the Legislature, compared with the veto of five bills during the whole administration of Governor-General Harrison. Six of these bills, General Wood vetoed on the ground that they infringed upon his power. The remainder concerned purely domestic affairs. It was the contention of Philippine leaders that the application of the veto powder to matters of local concern was an exercise of legislative power vested in the Philippine Legislature alone. But this attempt to restrict General Wood was summarily set aside by the communication of Secretary-of-War Weeks, in October 1923, which declared that the ‘veto power is applicable to all legislation, whether it be local or otherwise.'
This summer the Conley affair threw into bold relief General Wood’s conception of his office. Conley was a member of the Manila secret service who was suspended from office by the Mayor of Manila, because he was charged with bribery. Although he was tried and acquitted three times in the courts for tins charge, the Mayor of Manila, supported by the Secretary of the Interior, José P. Laurel, refused to reinstate Conley because, during the trial, he had refused to answer certain questions on the ground that they might incriminate him. Believing that an injustice had been done, GovernorGeneral Wood ordered that Conley be reinstated, — an act which led to the resignation of the Mayor of Manila and the members of the Council of State. Whether or not Conley was a victim of a political frame-up, General Wood’s action violated the Philippines Administrative Code, which invested final power of removal of such officers in the Secretary of the Interior. He justified the violation of this provision in the code on the ground that it was unconstitutional because it curtailed the ‘supreme executive power’ granted the Governor-General by the Jones Act. Curiously enough, there is no provision in the Jones Act for amendments. Since the Philippine Legislature is given ‘general legislative power,’ it might be argued that the Legislature may amend the Jones Act, subject to the veto of the Governor-General and to repeal by Congress. But the administrative code had been duly approved, and the present GovernorGeneral was therefore obliged to obey it. The strongest argument of all against General Wood’s position was that the determination of constitutional questions was in the hands of the courts, and not of the GovernorGeneral. Yet how can a court declare a law unconstitutional unless it is violated? And who else can violate such a law except the executive? Such was the dilemma in which Andrew Johnson was placed when he decided to violate the Tenure of Office Act of 1867. Both Presidents Wilson and Harding refused similarly to obey provisions in the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, directing the abrogation of about thirty commercial treaties, on the ground that the act infringed upon their constitutional power over foreign relations. While these precedents may support General Wood in the Conley affair, the executive interpretation of constitutional questions anywhere is a very dangerous principle, violating the very doctrine of ‘separation of powers’ upon which General Wood so strongly insists. In the Philippines this principle is more dangerous than in the United States, because the Governor-General is subject to none of the political checks which control the President, and because nothing is said about the power to amend the Organic Act.
With the possible exception of the Conley incident, none of the actions of General Wood has been illegal. He is simply construing the Jones Act literally, while his predecessor construed it liberally. In the legal sense, he stands on firmer ground than Mr. Harrison, because the strict construction of grants of sovereign power is a wellestablished principle of American public law. The Philippine assertion that it was the ‘ intention ‘ of the framers of the Jones Act to give the Philippines local self-government, in which the Governor-General would be a figurehead, has no foundation in fact. When Canada was given responsible government, it was only after express instructions to that effect had been issued by the Colonial Office at London. When Southern Rhodesia was granted responsible government in 1923, it was done by Letters Patent and express instructions to the British Governor there. When the provinces of India were granted semi-responsible government in 1919, an Act of the British Parliament was necessary. But the Jones Act of 1916 contains no similar provisions for responsible government in the Philippines. On the contrary, ‘supreme executive power’ is reserved for an American Governor-General. The final defeat of the Clarke amendment to the Jones Act, providing for independence within four years, is another indication that the framers of the present system of government in the Philippines contemplated neither full self-government nor immediate independence.
While General Wood has acted ‘legally,’ and while the Jones Act has been desirable as a transitory measure, the permanent retention of the present system of government in the Philippines is bound to be thoroughly unsatisfactory, because it is based on the doctrine of ‘separation of powers.’ Good patriots will shout ‘heresy’ when this typically American principle is attacked. But whatever advantages it may have at home, — and they are precious few, — it works very badly when tried abroad. In the United States, Congress and the President are both responsible to the people at election time, although they are presumably independent of each other while in office. But in the Philippines, the Governor-General and the Legislature are responsible to two different authorities — the first to the United States, and the second to the Philippines. A representative legislature, such as established by the Jones Act, gives the Filipinos a forum for criticism which becomes the more violent because they are not obliged, and in fact are unable, to carry into effect the policies which they advocate. As long as this type of separation of powers exists, a successful government in the Philippines will be impossible. The Legislature may refuse to pass legislation or to confirm appointments requested by the Governor-General, while he may refuse to carry out the laws passed by the Legislature.
Many years ago, the British Empire learned the dangers of a representative but an irresponsible government in its colonies. In 1866 it abolished the representative constitution of Jamaica because that constitution had produced so many deadlocks between the local Legislature and the British Governor. In most of its Crown colonies, the British Empire has now established legislatures with ‘official majorities,’ controlled, when necessary, by the British governor. More advanced colonies such as India and Malta have been given representative legislatures with control over a few ministerial departments, a system called ‘diarchy.’ Colonics fully able to govern themselves have been given responsible government — a local ministry responsible to a local parliament, the Crown being represented by a Governor or GovernorGeneral who is now a figurehead as far as domestic affairs are concerned. This policy is followed in the five Dominions, the Irish Free State, and Southern Rhodesia. Wherever possible, British colonial policy has avoided the type of government set up by the United States in the Jones Act. This is likewise true of French colonial policy, for in only two French colonies—Cochin-China and Senegal — is a representative legislature to be found.
In view of the defective principle upon which the present government of the Philippines is based, it must sooner or later be changed. The United States must either cripple the present powers of the Philippine Legislature or give it control over the administration of domestic affairs. This fact was recognized by the Wood-Forbes Commission which recommended that in case of deadlock between the Governor-General and the Philippine Senate over appointments, final decision should rest with the President of the United States — which in effect would mean the Governor-General. This fact has also been recognized by the Manila Times, an American newspaper, which has adopted the slogan, ‘Govern or Go,’ and by the Philippines Chamber of Commerce which, in resolutions of August 1920, and November 1923, advocated the repeal of the Jones Act and the placing of the Philippines under a territorial form of government.
Great pressure is being exercised by business interests in the United States and the Philippines to abolish the autonomy granted in 1916. This pressure will increase with the deadlocks which are bound to arise in the future. But in determining whether the United States should reverse its Philippine policy, the promises which we have made to these islands cannot be ignored. We cannot afford to add the sin of hypocrisy to that of imperialism. Before 1914 England had made some seven promises to get out of Egypt — promises which she failed to keep. She finally recognized the independence of Egypt in February 1922, but only after a revolution which made her position there intolerable. As President Roosevelt said in 1915, we cannot taint our work in the Philippines with bad faith. In June 1922 President Harding promised the Philippines that ‘no backward step is contemplated, no diminution of your domestic control is to be sought.’
Neither can we postpone the fulfillment of our obligations by saying that the Filipinos do not want self-government and that their leaders do not represent the wishes of the people. Aguinaldo’s three-year resistance to American troops in a war where 11,000 Filipinos lost their lives, showed their original attitude toward our rule. One of the first acts of the Philippine Assembly, created in 1907, was to express a desire for independence. All of the Philippine commissioners sent to the United States have advocated independence. Since the war, three independence missions have been sent, to America. So strong did independence sentiment become that the Federal party gave up its demand for eventual statehood in 1907, while the party itself disappeared in 1914. Although the Democrata party opposes bitterly the present coalition of Nacionalistas and Colectivistas, all three parties are pledged to immediate independence. The sentiment of the people was shown in the senatorial election this October in Manila, where a Nacionalista candidate won a 15,000 majority over a Democrata candidate on a pro-Wood platform, although Manila is ordinarily a Democrata city. This sentiment was also shown by the unanimous adoption of a resolution of the House of Representatives, supporting the action of the Philippine leaders in the Conley affair. Perhaps the most effective answer to those who believe that the politicos do not represent the wishes of the people was given by the WoodForbes Commission, itself unfavorable to independence, when it declared. ' We find everywhere among the Christian Filipinos the desire for independence, generally under the protection of the United States.’
As stated in the Jones Act, the United States is under no obligation to grant the Philippines independence until a ‘stable’ government is established there. But there is a great danger that in determining this question, we exact a test in the Philippines which we do not apply to ourselves. Some people regard the failure of the Philippine National Bank, with losses of $37,000,000 during six years, as proof that a stable government does not exist in the Philippines. While undoubtedly the bank was mismanaged, mismanaged banks have been known to exist in the most ‘stable’ governments in Europe and America. In the case of the Philippine bank, some money was embezzled, but the guilty officials have been punished, three members of the Concepcion family now being in jail. It is only fair to say that Americans were as responsible for the management of the bank as Filipinos and that the loans were made to Americans as well as to Philippine business men. The great losses of the bank were due to the rapid economic readjustments following the World War, winch adversely affected banks the world over. This October GeneralManager Fullington, of the bank, declared that it had made a profit of a million dollars in the last three months and that it was in better condition than it had been for many years.
In addition to entering the banking business, the Philippine Legislature has also purchased the Manila Railway, chartered the National Coal Company, the National Iron Company, the National Cement Company and organized the National Development Company, for the purpose of engaging in any commercial or agricultural enterprise necessary for the public welfare. Aroused by these activities, GovernorGeneral Wood and Secretary-of-War Weeks have demanded that the Philippine Government ‘get out of business.’ While as a general rule government management may be less efficient than private management, the Philippine people are confronted with an entirely different situation than the people of the United States. Foreign capitalists and entrepreneurs may have developed the resources of China, Persia, and Turkey more ‘efficiently’ than the domestic governments. But this type of exploitation has inevitably led to foreign political and economic control, the rewards of which have gone to foreign bondholders. If GovernorGeneral Wood should succeed in getting the Philippine Government ‘out of business,’ and if he should succeed in securing the repeal of the Public Lands Act of 1919, which limits agricultural leases by Americans to 1024 hectares of land, Americans would inevitably gain control of the great resources of the islands, because individual Filipinos do not now possess the capital necessary to develop these resources. Once American capital becomes entrenched, the prospects for Philippine independence will become more remote than ever.
In interpreting too rigidly the term ‘stable government,’ a great injustice may be done to the Philippine people. Upon a number of occasions, General Wood has frankly defined such a government as ‘one under which capital seeks investments at normal rates of interest.’ In a capitalistic age, this definition may be reluctantly accepted. But when he goes further and implies, as he did in an address before the Philippine Columbian Association in June 1921, that a stable government must be capable of defending the Philippines against attack, he is exacting a standard which few governments in the world could meet. That such a standard should be exacted was implied also by the Wood-Forbes Commission when it stated, ‘We find that the people are not organized economically or from the standpoint of national defense to maintain an independent government, and ‘that the experienceunder the Jones Act did not justify withdrawing the Army and Navy of the United States’ and ‘leaving the Islands a prey to any powerful nation coveting their rich soil and potential commercial advantages.’ According to such a test, the existence of Belgium, Greece, or Switzerland would not be justified. If the Philippines are required to meet this typically military standard, it is safe to say that they will always remain an appanage of the United States,
At the Washington Conference, the United States expressly repudiated this standard when it agreed, in the naval treaty, not to increase its fortifications in its Pacific possessions. This promise leaves the Philippines without adequate bases and fortifications — defenseless from attack. But in place of these military guaranties, the United States accepted a moral guaranty that neither Japan, Great Britain, nor France would attack these islands. In the Four Power treaty these governments agreed to ‘respect their rights in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean.’ Of course, this treaty would not protect the Philippines should they become independent. But there is no reason why the four Powers should not renew their promise in the case of an independent Philippines, by means of a joint neutralization agreement, such as the Democratic platform of 1912 proposed, or such as Senator LaFollette suggested as an amendment to the Four Power treaty. Failing such a treaty, a declaration by the United States that it ‘will consider any aggression against the territory’ of the Philippines as an act to be repelled with all the means at its command, would safeguard the independence of the Philippines more effectively than an oceanful of battleships.
In the face of the promises made by the United States to the Philippine people and in the face of the wishes of these people, there is only one important reason why so many Americans are now demanding that we cling to these islands: that is, in order to advance the interests of a limited number of American business men. The American people as a whole have derived no material advantage from our occupation of these islands. The Philippines have not contributed a cent to the treasury of the United States. We have sunk at least $700,000,000 in military and naval expenditures arising out of the occupation. And we even turned back to the Philippine treasury the duties collected before 1913 on rice, sugar, and tobacco, imported into the United States from the Philippines. In 1920 the United States returned to the Philippines internal-revenue taxes amounting to more than one and a half million dollars, collected on Philippine products. Whatever profit has arisen out of this colonial venture has gone to a few business interests.
Under free competition, the American consumer would be benefited by the activities of American business abroad. But in case this business is a monopoly, the consumer loses more than he gains. The worst feature of our Philippine policy is that it has tended to establish an American trade monopoly, by following the policy of the ‘closed door.’ The treaty of 1898 guaranteed to Spain the ‘open door’ in these islands for a period of ten years. And in his instructions to the American commissioners, President McKinley said, ‘We will seek no advantages in the Orient which are not common to all. Asking only the open door for ourselves, we are ready to accord the open door to others.’ Unfortunately this promise was violated at the end of the ten-year period, and by the tariff acts of 1909 and 1913 free trade was gradually established between the United States and the Philippines, but a tariff1 was rigorously applied to all outsiders. An American business man ships his goods into the Philippines without the payment of the duty to which a Japanese merchant is subjected. Between 1902 and 1913 certain export duties were also levied on Philippine products, but these were remitted in case the products were to be consumed in. the United States. The Merchant Marine Act of 1920 empowered the President of the United States to bar foreign ships from the trade between the United States and the Philippines, a power which no President has yet exercised because of the opposition of the Philippines to this extension of the closed door.
As a result of this policy, America’s share in the Philippine trade has increased from thirteen per cent in 1894 to sixty-one per cent in 1921, while the share of the trade carried by American ships has increased from less than four per cent in 1909 to thirty-two per cent in 1919. If the Philippine export industries were owned by Filipinos, the Filipinos would benefit from the closed door as much as American merchants. But as a matter of fact the export trade of the Philippines is very largely in the hands of American capital, which consequently profits in two ways from the closed door. As a result of our economic policy, American business has been given a political advantage, which it is naturally afraid lest independence, bringing with it ‘most-favored nation’ treaties, may remove. If this trade were of any immediate advantage to the American people as a whole, there might be a materialistic reason why they should support the opposition of business interests to Philippine independence. But any trade carried on under the closed door tends to be a monopolistic trade, which means higher prices both to the American and to the Philippine people, for the gain of a few men. If Japan and other neighboring countries could freely trade with the Philippines, there would be no economic reason why these countries should want to annex those islands. But as long as the United States maintains the closed door, these countries are confronted with a political obstruction to very rich markets, which in the future may lead to international complications of a very serious nature. The United States cannot afford, whether from the standpoint of Mr. Man-in-the-Street, of the Filipinos, or of world peace, to have its Philippine policy dictated by the Manila Chamber of Commerce, or even by the Americans in the Philippines who constitute one tenth of one per cent of the population.
The present system of government in the Philippines must be changed one way or another. Business conditions in the Islands will always be uncertain and investments will always be deterred, until the political status is definitely fixed. If this country follows the advice of the military men — who are now handling our Philippine policy — or of a few capitalists, it will deprive the Philippine Legislature of some of its powers, if not of its existence. But we cannot take this backward step without violating the solemn promises made by every President since McKinley and without violating the preamble of the Jones Act. During the last four years, the British Empire has terminated its protectorate over Afghanistan; recognized the independence of Egypt and Mesopotamia, subject to certain restrictions on finance and foreign affairs; granted full self-government to Ireland and a less extensive responsible government to Southern Rhodesia; bestowed semiresponsible government upon India and Malta; and promulgated new constitutions in Ceylon, Burma, and Nigeria. The same development has taken place in French Tunis and in Senegal, which was given a parliament in 1920. In 1919 Italy established parliaments in Tripoli and in Cyrenaica, while in the Dutch East Indies a Volksraad has been formed, more than a third of the members of which are natives. In the face of this trend in the government of colored peoples, the United States would assume a heavy responsibility if it curtailed the rights granted the Philippines in 1916. But if it does not curtail these rights, it must extend them.
It is neither necessary nor desirable to grant the Philippines complete independence at this time. It is possible to follow the British policy of Home Rule which would encourage the formation of a Philippine ministry responsible to a Philippine parliament, the American Governor-General exercising only advisory power — except in foreign affairs. It is possible to grant a qualified independence to the Philippines, subject to American protection or to an international neutralization agreement, which the entrance of the Philippines into the League of Nations would secure, if no more definite agreement is possible. But no power will guarantee the independence of the Philippines without some assurance that it will live up to its international obligations, particularly in regard to the payment of foreign debts and to the protection of the lives and property of foreigners.
No power will accept a position toward the Philippines of ‘responsibility without authority.’
If its independence is guaranteed by international agreement, the Philippines could give this assurance by consenting, in case of default, to some type of international financial supervision, such as the League of Nations has established over Austria, and also to the employment of financial and other experts in order to prevent such defaults from occurring. If the United States undertakes to protect the Philippines alone, the most practicable way to defend our interests and to satisfy Philippine aspirations is by an agreement similar to our treaty of 1903 with Cuba. An agreement could be entered into between the United States and the Philippines in which we recognize their independence, subject to the following restrictions: the Philippines shall never make a treaty which might impair their independence; they shall not contract any debt which cannot be met by ordinary revenues; the United States may intervene for the preservation of the independence of the Philippines and the maintenance of a government capable of protecting life, liberty, and property.
Such was the solution of the Cuban problem, which we adopted in 1903. Yet we have delayed twenty years in applying the same solution to the Philippines. Of course, it would be more difficult to intervene in the Philippines 7000 miles away than in Cuba only a few hours away from our shores. Yet the physical objection to this solution is many times outweighed by the necessity of clearing up a situation which will steadily grow worse — clearing it up through a means which will maintain the honor of the American people, satisfy the wishes of the Filipinos, and at the same time protect the legitimate interests of the outside world.