Pacifism as an Auxiliary of Pangermanism

I HAVE already shown in these pages that Pangermanism, and the concrete plan resulting from it, constitute the fundamental, deep-rooted, and remote cause of the war. I propose now to explain why Pacifism has powerfully served the most vital German ambitions, and why it is to-day an effective cause of the prolongation of the war.

Such a demonstration is most essential. From the Russian Revolution of March, 1917, down to the beginning of the German offensive against, the Western Front in March, 1918, a current of pacifism, feeble and uncertain at the outset, has rushed with constantly increasing violence through the Entente countries. The pacifists who are conducting this movement are not really very numerous; but they make a great noise. They have considerable resources at their disposal, and are incontestably hard at work in influential circles among all the Allied nations.

They have already shown themselves to be so audacious, despite the many events which enjoin silence upon them, that we are justified in thinking that they will become active again if the slackening of the German offensive supplies them with an excuse. It is indispensable, therefore, at so critical and decisive a juncture, to take precautions against the tremendous danger that may result from their action, by making a more complete acquaintance with it.

While I now attack pacifism, it is impossible, I hope, for any one to attribute to me any hidden motive. For twenty years I did all that lay in my power to give warning of the danger, and thus to avoid war. If I take the pacifists to task now, it is because I am firmly convinced that, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, they are in reality, as I hope to prove, extremely dangerous enemies of Peace.


The chief result secured by the pacifists before the original German aggression was to bring about in the countries now in alliance, a critical scrutiny of the foreign policy, characterized by unending concessions to the threatening demands of the governing powers at Berlin and Vienna, which had followed one another in quick succession, especially since 1890. Unquestionably, in the minds of those responsible for them, these concessions were made with the object of maintaining peace; but for the reasons set forth below, which are even now but little known, these concessions, despite the laudable intentions of those who urged them, were so unreasonable that they resulted in encouraging Austria and Germany to pursue the most immeasurably ambitious projects imaginable.

Let us observe first of all that, in the twenty-five years before the war, two apparently opposed currents of thought were rife in Europe. On the one hand, the government of Berlin, carrying to its extreme limit the application of the Prussian militaristic theory, completed all material preparations for the creation of Pan-Germany, and by means of an energetic propaganda, made the whole German people morally ready to accept the various eventualities which should assure Prussianized Germany of universal domination. On the other hand, during precisely the same period, a powerful current of pacifism pressed the policy of disarmament in Great Britain, Russia, and France, with the result that the task of the Pangermanists was facilitated to an extraordinary degree.

We must note that pacifism broke loose irrespective of the political character of the states concerned; no less in constitutional monarchies like Great Britain, than in a republic like France and an autocratic empire like that of the Tsars. And we must note further, that in each of the present Allied countries in Europe, pacifism was not a monopoly of the party in opposition, for it infected in greater or less degree sections of all parties. Pacifists were numerous even among members of the governments of the Entente countries: Lord Lansdowne, for instance, and Sir Edward Grey, who through so many years were in control of the foreign affairs of Great Britain, were notorious pacifists. Tsar Nicholas II, also, was a very active pacifist. Indeed, it was he who was the persistent organizer of the Hague Conferences, the results of which have been far different from those anticipated by their founder.

Under the influence of pacifist ideas, the various acts which, in the view of the now Allied European governments, were concessions made to Germany with the object of assuring peace, but which in Berlin were regarded as moral surrenders inviting a progressive amplification of Pangermanist demands, became so numerous, that I can mention only the more important instances.

1.The facility with which the Russia of 1890 to 1904 allowed herself to be diverted by German diplomacy from her traditional policy in the Balkans, and to become involved, at the suggestion of Berlin, in the Far East and finally to be drawn into a disastrous war with Japan, so that in Eastern Europe the field was left open to Germany.

2. The Franco-German treaty of November 4, 1911, by virtue of which France ceded 275,000 square kilometres of the French Congo to Germany, whereas, for all practical purposes, this treaty confirmed so irrevocably the German economic mortgage upon Morocco, that on November 9, 1911, the treaty being signed, Herr von BethmannHollweg was able to announce, with perfect truth, in the Reichstag: —

‘We have given up nothing in Morocco that we had not already given up, and we have secured an enlargement of our colonial domain.'

The fact is that France was so fast bound by this treaty, that it needed nothing less than the world-war to enable her to construct in Morocco the telegraph lines and railways which the treaty forbade her to undertake without the assent of Berlin, both to the actual construction of these works and even to the order of their construction.

3. The lack of comprehension, truly extraordinary in its persistence, manifested alike by France, Great Britain, and Russia, of the matter of the Bagdad Railway. And yet, as early as 1900, it was obvious that that railway was destined to become the keystone of the whole German scheme of universal domination.

Now, at the Potsdam interview in November, 1910, Nicholas II definitively assented to the construction of German railways in Turkey and their connection with those that Russia might build in Persia.

On the other hand, in his sensational memoirs Prince Lichnowsky has disclosed the fact that in 1912 and 1913 Sir E. Grey made the immense concession of consenting benevolently to allow the construction of German railway lines in the Ottoman Empire. By virtue of this Anglo-German agreement, the British economic zone of influence was defined on the shore of the Persian Gulf and in the district of the Smyrna-Aidin railway. The French zone of influence comprised Syria and Russian Armenia. But the whole of Mesopotamia as far as Bassorah, — that is, the choice morsel the possession of which assured the domination of the rest of the Ottoman Empire, — was recognized by Great Britain as the zone of German influence. Thus Sir E. Grey gratified to the full the Pangermanist ambition by consenting to the building of the Hamburg—Bagdad line.

It is plain, that, in acting thus, Sir E. Grey was guided by his insistent pacifism, and by the belief that, if the East were abandoned to Germany, she would leave the rest of the world at peace. Moreover, this conviction was widespread among the pacifist Socialists of the East, with whom, as Prince Lichnowsky says, Sir E. Grey was sympathetic. Now, these pacifist Socialists were generally of the opinion, with Sir E. Grey, that the best way to avoid war was to bow unresistingly to the will of Berlin. That is why many of them assented in advance, and quite explicitly, to the German scheme of laying violent hands upon Central Europe and to the Hamburg-Persian Gulf line.

Nothing could prove more conclusively the existence of this opinion than the following extract from a book published in 1913 by a prominent French Socialist, M. Marcel Sembat. This work, which has the curious title, Make a King; if not, Make Peace, deserves very special attention for two reasons. In the first place, M. Sembat discusses the gravest questions with a knowledge and perspicacity whose mediocre extent is sufficiently indicated by this epigram: ‘ A twentieth-century war is decided in a week!’ Secondly, this book was in such entire accord with the wishes of the French pacifists, that, by August of the year of publication, it had reached its eighteenth edition — an unprecedented success for a work of this sort.

M. Sembat’s wonderful scheme for avoiding war may be summarized as an anticipatory, complete, and graceful surrender to the demands of Germany on all essential points. He therefore advised the French to abandon definitively all claim to Alsace-Lorraine. Moreover, he declares, on page 145, —

Bismarck left to Austria the famous watchword: ‘Drang nach Osten! On to the East!’ As a matter of elementary foresight, we should have congratulated ourselves on it. To the East? That will divert the German current from us. Would you prefer that it should flow toward the West? Bismarck points us to Tunis and Africa; he points the German people to the East; we are lucky not to come into collision with them. Are we satisfied? We are exasperated. mad with rage! For my part, I can imagine nothing more foolish than the frenzy that seizes us when Germany forms plans about Anatolia, or the road to Bagdad, or all Asia Minor. I would say to her with all my heart, ‘Bon voyage!’

In his state of virgin ignorance, geographical, ethnographical, economic, and psychological, M. Sembat did not. suspect, any more than Sir E. Grey, that to give the East to Germany was to furnish her with the means of enslaving the West as well. Nor did the idea that the German seizure of Central Europe and the Balkans might very well reduce to slavery democratic peoples entitled to be free, give M. Sembat pause. Speaking of Russian interests in the Balkans, he assured the Tsar’s government beforehand that France ‘refuses to draw the sword for Bosnia and Herzegovina, for the Serbian pig.’

Now, as we shall see, M. Sembat, in 1913, expressed opinions leading to practically the same results as those urged by M. Caillaux in 1916. In the speech for the prosecution made by the Military Governor of Paris on December 10, 1917, against the former President of the Council, the following language is attributed to M. Caillaux when he was in Italy, in December, 1916, striving to induce France and Italy to make peace.

All the costs of the war [he said] should be paid by Russia and the Balkans. Serbia will disappear and will have only what she deserves. Roumania, too, will disappear; that is unfortunate, but it is better that she should pay for the crash, than we.

Thus, in 1916, in the midst of the war, M. Caillaux, to the intense indignation of France, recommended the same solution, to which the outgivings of M. Sembat, in 1913, in the midst of peace, actually pointed. Now at that precise time, in 1913, Sir E. Grey was working to gratify M. Sembat’s aspirations, since he graciously abandoned to Germany Mesopotamia as an exclusive sphere of influence. Thus Socialists like M. Sembat, who represented truly the dominant opinions of their party, and governing statesmen like Sir E. Grey, were absolutely agreed as to the general line of conduct to be followed.

In view of the incontestable facts established by the Lichnowsky memoirs, we can form our conclusions without fear of going astray. Before the war, thinking thus to avoid it, and as a result of their profound ignorance of actualities and of the consequences of their concessions, the Allied Socialists and pacifists drew Pan-Germany’s chestnuts out of the fire — unknowingly, no doubt, but most persistently.


The German aggression broke forth in 1914, under conditions so manifestly execrable that one was justified in thinking that any offensive renewal of pacifism in the Allied countries would be impossible. Unhappily it has turned out otherwise.

The Kienthalians and the Zimmervaldians — I use these names to designate a large number of pacifists who were present at the meetings at Kienthal and Zimmervald in Switzerland — were, after August, 1914, the depositories of the theory of an immediate peace. During the first two years of the war they exerted only a very feeble influence among the Western Allies; but their action was abruptly encouraged by the Russian Revolution, in exploiting the various possibilities of which the German agents showed remarkable cleverness. These agents set to work first of all upon the Russians, who were overdone with the war. Next, the representatives of Boche propaganda cynically ‘bought,’ in order to enlist them on their side, a part of that intellectual crew which, in all countries, claims to have advanced ideas, but whose so-called social ideal is a readily purchasable subject of speculation . Lastly, the sincere pacifists, who had held their peace during the first two years of the war, were relieved to find themselves set free from a silence which was a heavy burden to them, when the Russian revolutionists declared before the world that pacifism of the Bolshevik brand, thanks to the effect it must have on the German workingman, would ensure peace very shortly, under conditions involving the downfall of Prussian militarism.

Under the concomitant influence of these various causes, after March, 1917, the pacifist current made such progress in Russia, Italy, France, and Great Britain, that, until the German offensive against the Western Front in March, 1918, there was actually far more discussion in the Allied newspapers as to how peace could be brought about, than as to the surest methods of winning the war. The project of a conference at Stockholm, suggested by the Boches, was an especial subject of endless discussions, whereas that German trap was so clumsily constructed, that it should have been thrust aside with contempt and without explanations.

In 1917 and 1918 the pacifist aberration reached such a point that, while Germany had substantially fastened her grip upon all Central and Eastern Europe and was extending her hegemony over the vast spaces of European Russia, the pacifists declared freely that the war-map was of no importance. In a number of Allied newspapers they went so far as to ask, as did Le Pays, a paper of Socialist-pacifist tendencies, in an editorial in February, 1918, ‘Does this mean that victory is to be sought by military action alone? That would be an extraordinary misconception.'

Now, by other than military action, Le Pays and the pacifists mean the negotiation of a compromise peace. Thus, at the very moment when the AustroGermans were cynically violating the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, of which they themselves imposed the terms upon the Russian pseudo-negotiators; when the Turks were proceeding methodically to destroy the Armenians; when the Bulgarians were destroying the Serbians; when the Austro-Hungarian government was systematically causing famine in the Czech and Jugo-Slav districts, the pacifists of the Entente were guilty of the unpardonable aberration of recommending a peace by conciliation, the execution and observance of which would be dependent solely on the good faith of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey!

The pacifist infection has been propagated in the Entente countries during the war by men belonging to the most diverse classes. Early in 1916, when he was a member of the Asquith Cabinet, then declining to its fall, Lord Lansdowne, a peer of the United Kingdom, formerly Governor General of Canada and of India, and former Secretary for Foreign Affairs, put forth a memorandum in which he advised immediate peace. On November 19, 1917, just when the Austro-Germans were proceeding to parcel out Russia, he published a letter in the Daily Telegraph in which he publicly urged a peace by conciliation. Finally, on March 5,1918, he returned to the charge, still in the Daily Telegraph, at a time when the General Staff at Berlin was concentrating on the Western Front all the forces at the disposal of Pan-Germany.

But there is no question that the pacifists were most numerous from March, 1917, to March, 1918, among the Socialist politicians of Russia, Italy, France, and Great Britain. These politicians have manifested an incomprehensible failure to grasp the situation. In proportion as the Germans enlarged their enormous war-map, which at the end of 1917 already extended considerably beyond the boundaries of PanGermany as conceived in the project of 1895-1911, the Allied pacifist-Socialist politicians considered that the reasons for ‘conversing’ with the German Socialists increased in force. The argument to which they have constantly resorted is that their influence over the Social Democrats of Germany would bring about an uprising on their part, from which there would result, at one and the same time, peace and the end of Prussian militarism.

As a matter of fact, this conviction was never justified in even the slightest degree. It has never been possible to harbor any illusion as to the real sentiments of the Social Democrats. It is not fair to say, as is so often done, that before the war the German Socialists tried to make the French and English Socialists believe that they would revolt in case of war. The exact contrary is true. On various occasions, in fact, authorized representatives of the German Socialists have issued pronouncements entirely free from ambiguity. On July 29, 1911, Molkenbuhr, a Socialist member of the Reichstag, said to the newspaper Le Matin, ‘I do not believe that the German Labor party can prevent war. ... It must not be forgotten that the Socialist party in Germany has never yet succeeded in winning more than a third of the electoral seats in the Empire.’ L’Humanité having published, late in January, 1912, an interview with Karl Liebknecht in which he was made to say that war would be warded off by the German Socialist party, Liebknecht formally disavowed this interview in the Prussian Chamber on February 1; and to make the disavowal as explicit as possible, another Socialist Deputy, Stroehl, said, ‘We are patriots, and we do not propose to disarm the Fatherland when confronting the foreigner.’

In reality, then, if the Socialist politicians among the Western Allies were led astray, before the war and during the first three years of its continuance, as to the attitude of the Kaiser’s Socialists, it was because they themselves had created the state of mind which predisposed them to go astray. As to the rôle of the German Socialists during the war, and the hopes which it has been possible to base on their pacifistic tendencies, there is a document of exceptional interest which summarizes their attitude with equal vigor and truth.

It is very interesting to follow the course of the leading French Socialist newspaper, L’Humanité. Side by side with articles crammed with wrongheaded theories, in which French pacifists declare that the war-map is of no importance, and that the only guaranty of peace that we need is Germany’s promise not to begin again, L’Humanité occasionally prints articles, or documents, which, while conforming absolutely to Socialist principles and interests, are certainly sincere and of unquestionable value. These articles and documents are generally contributed by a Swiss correspondent who uses the pen-name Homo, — his real name is Grumbach, — and who has constantly proved himself to be exceedingly well informed concerning Germany.

Now, Homo caused to be reprinted, in L’Humanité of March 13, 1918, an article which appeared at Petrograd in the Novaia Jizm, Gorky’s International organ, on January 11 (24), 1918. This article, from the pen of one of the rare Minority German Socialists who have eluded the grasp of Prussian militarism, was printed without signature, in order to safeguard its author against reprisals; but it is clear that it is the work of a man perfectly familiar with actual conditions. It contains observations which seem to come as near as possible to the truth concerning the procedure of the German Social Democrats, the state of mind of the German workingmen, and the projects of the most audacious of all pacifists, the Bolsheviks. I propose to quote certain passages from this article, which I regard as a very important document.

In German military circles, the success of the negotiations with Russia is frankly explained by the fact that all those persons who were needed have been ‘ fixed.’ No one in Germany can refuse to admit that the Bolsheviks are sincerely convinced of the logical revolutionary trend of their policy. . . . There is no hope that the German proletariat will follow the example of the Russian Revolution; and the one thing of which we are least of all justified in dreaming is that they will organize a revolution of the Bolshevist type. For three and a half years the German proletariat has been in a state of the most absolute intellectual atrophy and political degradation. The workingmen babble of war-profits, of the shortage of food-crops, but this does not prevent their frittering their time away, passive in their exhaustion, stripped of every shred of idealism. If certain individuals think otherwise, aspire to something different, their number is always less than that of those proletarians who sympathize with nationalities and of the annexationists. . . .

The Bolsheviks are not so ignorant that they do not see quite clearly that, whatever masks the German diplomats assume, the military party, which is on top in Germany, can in no case seriously desire a democratic peace, or even resign themselves to the possibility of such a peace. They would sacrifice the last soldier rather than abandon the conquests with which the war began.

The writer proceeds to explain how the Brest-Litovsk negotiations were so handled as to pave the way for the great German offensive on the Western Front.

The article from which I quote was published at Petrograd in January, 1918. In view of the slowness of communication with Germany, it is practically certain that it was written, at the latest, in December, 1917, and probably in November. Now, inasmuch as the facts fully justify the following suggestions and forecasts, the value of the Minority Socialist author’s sources of information and of his judgment is demonstrated. He continues thus: —

The German delegation gave to their pourparlers with our Bolshevist friends [at Brest-Litovsk] a tone of mocking cynicism which they scarcely took pains to disguise. It was not enough for them to be able, during the suspension of hostilities, to transfer troops, at their pleasure, to the Western Front: they also forced the inclusion in the terms of the armistice of a sentence which permitted them to carry through any transfer of troops that had already begun.

Thus the first object of the pourparlers on the Eastern Front was attained — the transfer en masse of troops to the Western Front; for these manœuvres aimed, not only at the conclusion of peace, but at reaching a military decision of the conflict.

In January, a great offensive will be begun on the West, by which they expect to forestall the aid which may be looked for from the United States, and to effect at the last moment of the war what was prevented in 1914 by the situation on the Marne — namely, the subjugation of France by a whirlwind assault.

No less serious is the fact that the Bolsheviks have agreed also to concur in Germany’s second object. By the phrase relating to the immediate resumption of economic relations, Germany secures the means of renewing, thanks to the resources of Russia, her reserves of food-supplies and of raw materials, which are in danger of exhaustion. The food-supplies are not sufficient to outlast the spring. The danger was great. At this critical moment the Bolsheviks came to the rescue.

Lastly, the Bolsheviks have assisted in the third step of the German policy. These most uncompromising of all revolutionaries of history, who would fain realize the whole Socialist scheme at a single stroke, have the face to declare, — presuming with unheardof audacity upon the stupidity of the people, — that the principles of their peaceprogramme and of the programme of the military authorities of the Central Empires so far coincide as to serve as a common basis for the conclusion of a general democratic peace. By this declaration alone they have lent their aid to the German intrigues which, through the instrumentality of the pacifist dodge and the skillful exploitation of the formula of a peace ‘without annexations or indemnities,’ aim not unsuccessfully at weakening the military morale of the Entente nations, who thirst for peace. On the other hand, the Bolsheviks have fostered the intrigues which seek to maintain and strengthen among the German peoples the determination to continue the war with the Entente, which is accused of spurning the so-called peace.

From the moment that the Bolsheviks not only sacrifice their principles, but also, point by point, — like their friend of late date, Scheidemann, — aggravate this sudden shift of position by pretending that, in obedience to their pressure, Prussian militarism has gone over to the side of revolutionary Social-Democratic doctrines; from the moment that they act thus, — whether consciously or from stupidity makes no difference, — their role is identical with that of the German agents in foreign countries, upon whom millions are lavished without accounting, so that they may spread broadcast among the nations of the Entente and neutral peoples the theories of pacifism, of anti-militarism, of anti-capitalism, and of revolution.

By this policy the Bolsheviks are preparing the way, not for peace for Russia and for all mankind now crushed to earth by the war, but solely for the most savage triumph of Prussian militarism, which, alas! has no thought of being converted to the Bolshevist faith.

The opposition in Germany is doomed to be silent. The German masses are wearing themselves out at the front, or are being worked to death at home by excessive toil and insufficient nourishment. The venal press follows docilely the orders of the Military Press Bureau or of the managers of the metal industry. The Reichstag was prorogued before the pourparlers with Russia began. German militarism is omnipotent and marches onward unimpeded.

In reality, as everyone who really knew anything of the German spirit could have been certain beforehand, the Kaiser’s Social Democrats are thoroughly content with the German victories. The Vorwaerts of March 3, 1918, did not shrink from saying, —

To-day Germany has won a victory in the East which no one can deny, and in the West the condition of affairs is such that our previous belief in a successful defensive has come to seem downright modesty. These are wishes and hopes which extend very far: Germany absolutely triumphant over a world irreparably conquered, dictating terms of peace in the West as she has dictated them in the East. The German working class has not only desired for its fatherland its present military triumph, but has assisted materially in securing it.

Now, the overwhelming evidence of malign snares, like that of Stockholm, the Bolshevist treachery, and the formidable actualities of the war-map, have not put an end to the fantastic delusions of the Allied pacifistic Socialists. This is shown by the fact that, in the middle of March last, only a few days before the opening of the great German offensive, M. Camille Huysmans, who lives in England, a very important personage in Socialist circles by virtue of his office of Secretary of the International Socialist Bureau, had so mistaken a conception of the situation that he was actually making arrangements for the approaching international conference. In order to remove so far as possible every obstacle to this conference, M. Huysmans made it known publicly that he regarded as simple suggestions the terms of the Inter-Allied Socialist memorandum of February, 1918, which might possibly embarrass the German Socialists. According to Le Pays of March 20, he went so far as to say, ‘The Inter-Allied memorandum does not suggest as a condition of peace the creation of an Austrian confederation.’

Thus we find ourselves confronted by this extraordinary situation: Huysmans regards it as admissible to leave the Slavs and Latins of Central Europe under the German-Magyar yoke; which, moreover, amounts practically to consenting to the definitive consolidation of Mittel-Europa, and hence of PanGermany.

What makes this willingness of the Allied pacifist Socialists to ‘treat’ with the Social Democrats even more incomprehensible is that certain German Socialists, of undeniable competence to speak for their fellows, have warned the pacifist Socialists of the absolute fruitlessness of their efforts. For example, the German Socialist Emile Bruck, the former friend of Bebel and Bernste, asserted, in an interview printed in the Daily Chronicle of London early in March, 1918: —

The British Labor Party desires to meet the organized German democracy in an international congress. What is the meaning of that term? Does it mean Majority Socialists? The leaders of the British Labor Party would have as little success in inducing Herren Scheidemann, David, and Ebert to accept the sort of peace proposed by Mr. Lloyd George as they would have in inducing the German Emperor to leave his throne. ... As an old German Socialist, let me tell my English comrades that our democratic ideal cannot be realized until after the defeat of Germany on the battlefield. It is not through civilization that we shall set ourselves free from the domination of those who brought on this war.

But there is worse to come. The Vorwaerts itself did not hesitate to say, — also in the early days of March, and therefore previous to M. Huysmans’s declarations quoted above, —

The German workingmen will not enter upon a general strike, nor will they rise in revolt — in the first place, because they are not ready, and secondly, because they know that by so doing they would make themselves accomplices of the imperialists of the Entente. Moreover, the latest events prove conclusively how deplorable the Maximalist methods are, from every point of view.

When we find that the warnings of the authoritative, pure-blooded German Socialists, that even the declarations of the Kaiser’s German Socialists themselves that they will not revolt, and that three years of overwhelming evidence have not sufficed to convince the pacifist Socialists of the Entente of their error (that error consisting in their determination to set about peacemaking with the Social Democrats), it is altogether useless to attempt to convince them.

But, after the incredible sacrifice made by the Allied nations, it is not possible for them to allow themselves to be inveigled into a conference with the Boches, which could result only in a Western treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which would reduce them to servitude. The Allied pacifists, therefore, as they are impervious to all the evidence, must be regarded as extremely dangerous lunatics, against whom we have the right, as well as the bounden duty, to protect ourselves.


The deep-seated cause of pacifism, generally speaking, is the very incomplete knowledge of external affairs, — and, hence, of Germany, — which unfortunately we are obliged to recognize in the countries now allied. The result of this ignorance is that those persons who are temperamentally inclined to idealism discuss war and peace through the medium of abstract principles and a priori theories, having no knowledge of definite facts, carefully scrutinized, to save them from errors. Thus they see foreign countries as they would fain have them and not as they are.

Now, it is from this category of minds, predisposed to theory, that the pacifists are recruited. Again, it is readily understood that, while they have very little familiarity with external material facts, they are even more ignorant of external immaterial facts — notably, the psychology of the German people. And each and every pacifist error has its definite basis in this ignorance. The acts of pacifist foreign policy from 1890 to 1914 — the endless concessions made to Germany or Austria — were generally regarded in Great Britain, Russia, and France as wise and prudent and calculated to ensure peace; this estimate could proceed from nothing else than utter failure to comprehend German psychology.

Those persons in the Allied countries who believed and still believe that to make a concession to the Germans is the surest means of inducing them to respond with reciprocal concessions are absolutely mistaken. Prussianized Germany sees evidence of weakness in every voluntary concession, and is tempted thereby to demand more ere long. It is of vital importance that people in the Allied countries should become imbued with this fact, which is known to all those, who have watched Germany closely. The Germans, by reason of an ages-old atavism which cannot be suddenly changed, respect nothing save material force guided by an intellectual force which knows them through and through.

Thus the only way to persuade Germany to preserve the peace is to constrain her to do so by forcible methods more powerful than her own and always ready to be set in motion.

The facts prove clearly enough the danger of concessions to the Germans. Before the signing of the Franco-German treaty of November 4, 1911, relating to Morocco, — which at the present moment many good people in France, who know little about it, still regard as a step which contributed to the maintenance of peace, — M. Paul LeroyBeaulieu predicted, in the Économiste Français of September, 1911, that that treaty would encourage the Germans to make further claims.

To offer [said the distinguished economist] vast tracts of territory to a nation which has risked neither a single soldier nor a single cent, and which is content to subject us to constant blackmail, is to encourage the indefinite repetition of the same thing

Now, the Germans were by no means satisfied with the enormous concessions which M. Caillaux made to Germany; but they considered that, inasmuch as the threat of war had already had an important effect, the thing to do was to repeat it at the next opportunity.

Proof that any agreement with the Germans, as it is susceptible of being attributed to the fear that they will resort to force, is always interpreted by them as a surrender inviting renewed demands on their part, is supplied by the important revelation made to the Temps newspaper, in mid-September, 1917, by Mr. Iswolsky, former minister of the Tsar Nicholas II. Wilhelm II having stated in a conversation with Mr. Iswolsky that he wished to draw France into an alliance with Germany against England, the Russian statesman called the Emperor’s attention to the fact that the question of AlsaceLorraine stood between France and Germany. ' But that is settled,’ replied Wilhelm. ‘In the Morocco business I threw down the glove to France, and she declined to pick it up, that is, to fight, and consequently the AlsaceLorraine question has ceased to exist.’

Thus, according to testimony, which cannot be questioned, it is the German Emperor himself who informs us that, whenever anyone does not choose to light with Germany about a matter in dispute, this attitude is interpreted at Berlin as a surrender; and this manner of interpreting concessions is characteristic of practically all Germans, because of their peculiar psychological make-up, which clearly cannot be modified for a long time to come.

The actual truth is that, when one has the right on one’s side and the power to enforce respect for it, every concession made to Germany is a grave error, psychologically speaking, which will have to be dearly paid for, as it inevitably leads 1o a conflict much more serious, than that which one has avoided. Certain known facts enable us to verify the accuracy of this point of view.

Common sense tells us that vigorous and effective opposition could have been made, about 1900, by Russia, France, and Great Britain, to the German project of a railway to Bagdad. It should have been possible for those three powers to act together at that time, for it was perfectly evident to judicious minds that the three were threatened in equal degree in their vital interests by the Bagdad scheme. And, at that time, those powers had at their disposal forces before which Berlin would have had to withdraw, for German public opinion had not then been aroused by the Pangermanist plan.

With a comparatively feeble effort, therefore, a vastly important result might have been attained, if they had acted with steadfastness and determination. As the Pangermanist conceptions are all based on the carrying through of the Hamburg to Bagdad project, they would have been killed at the root by effective opposition to the German Bagdad Railway. The Pangermanist virus, which was then just beginning to spread, would have been destroyed before it had infected, as it has, substantially the whole German mass. The new German claims, which have been incessant since 1900, could not have been put forward in the face of such vigorous opposition to the first step in the creation of Pan-Germany, and the present catastrophe could not have occurred.

In reality, then, the endless concessions made to Germany by France, Russia, and Great Britain, with the best intentions, have simply tempted them to claim more and more. That is why it is just and reasonable to conclude that the concessions hitherto made by the present Allies, under the influence of the pacifists, have acted as a constant aggravation of German ambitions, from which the war has resulted. In the last analysis, pacifism created the peculiar atmosphere, indispensable to the growth and developmen 1. of the poisonous plant, Pangermanism.

Lastly, the downfall of Russia is a convincing proof that the pacifists — of whom the Bolsheviks are the most perfect type — have done exactly the opposite of what should have been done to bring the war speedily to an end, and to ensure the triumph of democracy. At the beginning of 1917, Central PanGermany being already a fact, its destruction was the essential preliminary to ensuring for Russia an honorable and lasting peace, which alone would have made it possible for her to effect her great democratic reforms — elections, federal organization, and agrarian reform. On the other hand, in March, 1917, Russia was well supplied with munitions furnished by the Allies, and the Russian dépôts were full of trained troops. So that, if the Russians had chosen to continue the war with energy, Prussian militarism would have been destroyed ere this, and the triumph of democracy assured. It was manifestly the determination of the Bolsheviks to have peace at any price which brought about the downfall of Russia, her present state of servitude, and the great German offensive on the Western Front.

It. can fairly be said that pacifism, in view of its manifestations taken as a whole, has brought about results diametrically opposed to those anticipated by its propagandists. Before the war, pacifism went far to encourage the development of the Pangermanist idea. Since the war began, the pacifist aberrations have unquestionably prolonged the struggle and largely increased the sacrifices that the Allies are called upon to make.

The undisputed facts prove, then, that, in order to win the war, pacifism — the propagandists of which are comparatively few in number, but as noisy as they are ill-informed — must be combatted in the Allied countries as vigorously as Pangermanism, of which it is the most potent auxiliary.