The Western Front and Political Strategy

I TRUST that I have shown in my earlier articles in this magazine, first, that the strategy of the Allies ought, like that of the Germans, to be a strategy of the political sciences, under penalty of remaining in a dangerous condition of inferiority; second, that action on the part of the Allies confined to the Western Front is not enough to make their victory certain, but that, to be effective, their action must embrace the whole theatre of war now represented by Pan-Germany in its entirety.

The partisans of the Western Front theory believe that every effort put forth elsewhere must work to the disadvantage of that front. The exact contrary is true, on condition that the field of action far away from the Western theatre is wisely chosen.

Strong evidence of this is seen in the consideration that the German offensive in the West would have been impossible if the Allies had been sagacious enough to replace the vanished Russian front by an insurrectionary front extending from the Baltic to their lines in Macedonia — which is what the Germans would inevitably have done had they been in the place of the Allies.

I have already indicated the broad outlines of the plan based on this conception. 1

The object of the present paper is to find for the Allies three of the unknown quantities of the strategical equation which they must necessarily solve. We shall see that the working out of the ethnographical, national-psychological, and geographical unknown quantities (the last in its relation with the first two) is sufficient to bring out clearly possibilities of complete and comparatively speedy victory which have never as yet been distinctly envisaged by the Allies.


It is the purpose of this analysis to disclose, first, the nature of the peoples embraced in Pan-Germany, considered as a whole; second, how far the geographical distribution of such of these peoples as are anti-Pangermanist would enable them (in case certain conditions as to providing them with arms should be fulfilled) to manifest their sentiments to good purpose.

The total population of Pan-Germany amounts to 180,000,000 souls, made up of two sharply contrasted elements.

1. The Germans and their vassals, — or pro-Germans, — numbering, say, 94,000,000.

2. The slaves — say, 86,000,000.

There are, in fact, confined in Pan-

Germany against their will, the enormous number of 86,000,000 Slavs, Latins, and Semites, belonging to fourteen different nationalities.

This fact is of preponderating importance: for this vast aggregation of French, Belgians, Alsace-Lorrainers, Danes, Poles, Lithuanians, Letts, Ruthenians (with a reservation to be indicated below), Czechs, Jugo-Slavs, Roumanians, Italians, Armenians, Greeks, and Arabs, are anti-German by conviction. They are well aware that only the decisive victory of the Entente can put an end to their slavery.

Having studied most of these oppressed peoples on the spot for more than twenty years, being familiar with their interests and their sentiments, I assert that here is a psychological situation of supreme interest to the Allies. Furthermore, I maintain that these 86,000,000 Slavs, Latins, and Semites, by reason of the strategic importance of the regions they occupy, represent — on the single condition that they are supplied with means of effective action closely adapted to their peculiar situation — a force capable of affording infinitely more valuable assistance in bringing about victory than any that the 182,000,000 inhabitants of the former Empire of the Tsars could ever have contributed.

The immense advantage that the Allies can derive from this state of affairs will appear fully in the light of the deductions which can be drawn from the following analysis of the various peoples of Pan-Germany. The essential object of this analysis is to determine the numbers, in each of the main groups which make up the population of Pan-Germany, — that is to say, the Germans and pro-Germans on the one hand, and their slaves on the other, — (1) of men and of women, respectively; (2) of men mobilized in the armies of Pan-Germany; (3) of men not mobilized, who, therefore, have remained at home or are employed in munition factories.

How the ethnological analysis is worked out. — From these various points of view, it would manifestly be impossible to derive figures which are rigorously accurate; but it is proper to observe that even approximate accuracy is sufficient to make our deductions of very practical value. And it is possible to reach that point by starting from these three bases of reckoning: —

(a) In respect to those whom we term the slaves, we shall distinguish between subjects of the Entente countries and subjects of the Central Powers. The latter alone can be regularly mobilized in the armies of Pan-Germany.

(b) We shall assume that females make up half of the total population of a country. In many countries the number of females is slightly above fifty per cent; but the difference is generally so small that it could not cause a serious error in the deductions which serve as a basis of our argument.

(c) We shall assume that the Germans have mobilized twenty per cent of their subjects and of the subjects of their vassal-allies, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey. This proportion is large enough to do away with any danger of an estimate below the facts. Indeed this figure of twenty in one hundred of the whole population — consequently including women— is the highest among known results of the various mobilizations. Moreover it corresponds with the results of the German mobilization so far as the information gleaned in three years enables us to determine it. Lastly, this figure embraces practically all the physically sound men between 15 and 60 years. In selecting it as a basis, therefore, we may be assured that we do not underestimate the mobilized forces of PanGermany.


An analysis of the first group, the 94,000,000 Germans and pro-Germans would result as follows: —

Mobilized males 18,800,000
Non-mobilized males 28,200,000
Females 47,000,000
Total 94,000,000

Now, if we study the situation, we shall notice that the Germans and proGermans are disadvantageously grouped. The Germans in Germany alone form a solid block. They touch the Magyars only on the West. The loyalty of the Magyar proletariat to the German alliance might be seriously shaken for the reasons set forth hereafter. The Bulgarians are entirely surrounded by foes except on their Ottoman frontiers. As for the Turks, aside from the small still-existing fraction of Turkey in Europe, adjoining Bulgaria, — Anatolia and the Kurd country, — the people throughout all the rest of the Ottoman Empire are hostile to them.

Possibilities of insurrection among the Germans and their vassals, (a) German Workmen in Germany. — An effective uprising of German workmen in Germany, like that which the Allied Socialists have hoped for and expected, has never been possible, for the following fundamental reason. Even if they do not accept the term ‘Pangermanists,’ a large majority of them are Pangermanists in fact. They have, indeed, long been convinced supporters of an economic Pan-Germany, that is to say, of Central Pan-Germany at least, the immense advantage of which from the standpoint of their material interest, the years-old propaganda directed from Berlin had proved to them long before the war. The German Social Democrats are so bent upon supporting Central Pan-Germany that they are not willing even to consider the liberation of the down-trodden Slavs of Austria-Hungary, because their servitude is indispensable to the maintenance of Central Pan-Germany. Indeed, this was most explicitly expressed by the Vorwärts of February 28, 1918; which went so far as to declare flatly that the demands of the Interallied Socialist Conference at London would never be accepted by the Central Powers. Furthermore, the majority of the German Socialists, by reason of their Teutonic mental habit and their unchangeable atavism, are profoundly gratified by the military successes of Germany and the resultant enormous booty.

(b) German Workmen in Austria. — They are anti-Slav. They have, to be sure, organized some strikes, but these movements cannot be regarded as opposed to the policy of Vienna, for they took place, by a strange coincidence, early in 1918, at the very moment when Count Czernin was multiplying his pacifist manœuvres, intended especially to deceive Great Britain and the United States. Moreover, these German Socialists in Austria have never taken sides against the Hapsburgs. So that their attitude, therefore, is not distinctively democratic. We can place no more reliance on them than on the Social Democrats of the German Empire.

(c) Bulgarians. — It is impossible to think for an instant of their separation from the Central Empires, which had never been practicable. The Bulgarians concluded their pact with Berlin long before the war, with the very distinct and premeditated determination to acquire the hegemony of the Balkans; and it is theirs, for the moment. On many points, indeed, the Bulgarian dreams are surpassed. Now, they understand very clearly that they will be able to retain their present conquests only with the assistance of Austria-Germany. Moreover, they are very proud to serve as a bridge between Germany and the Ottoman Empire. We must regard the Bulgarians as absolutely devoted to the maintenance of Pan-Germany.

(d) Among the Magyars, on the contrary, there is a condition of affairs, not generally realized by the Allies, which might, however, be made to forward materially the cause of the Entente. The fact is that, if the necessary steps were taken by the Allies, the majority of the Magyars might well be led to revolt against the Pangermanist yoke of Berlin and the feudal yoke of Budapest.

Among the ten million Magyars, there are six millions of agricultural laborers and two millions of industrial workmen — say, in all, eight, millions (male and female) of proletarians by birth, who possess absolutely nothing, who sell their physical strength for pitifully low wages which they are compelled to accept, and who are cynically exploited by the two millions of nobles, priests, and office-holders, who are the only real partisans of Germany in Hungary.

This deep social division may be made to serve as the basis of a powerful revolutionary manœuvre on the part of the Allies. These eight millions of Magyar proletarians, who are beyond question ruthlessly oppressed by the Magyar nobles, fall into three categories: (a) mobilized men (20 per cent of the whole), say, 1,600,000; (b) males not mobilized, who have remained in Hungary, 2,400,000; and (c) females in Hungary, 4,000,000.

The net figures of these three categories, as estimated a little further on, might play a very important part in the anti-Pangermanist revolution whose organization we are discussing. The concurrence of the Magyar proletariat would contribute notably to the dissolution of Pan-Germany, for it would assure the geographical connecting link between the insurrection of the Polish-Czech regions in the north and that of the Jugo-Slav regions in the South. Thus by favor of the revolution of the Magyar proletariat, the insurrection would extend in a straight line from the Baltic to the Saloniki front, which would be a great advantage in every aspect.

These eight millions of Magyar proletarians are genuinely desirous of peace, and are not accessible to the imperialistic seductions which induce the German Socialists to play the game of the Berlin General Staff. As they certainly did not want war, they bitterly detest those who forced it upon them: the great Magyar landed proprietors who exploit them without pity, and whose feudal spirit is identical with that of the Prussian Junkers — with whom, indeed, these Magyar nobles act in close association for the preservation of their privileges, the continuance of which would make certain the perpetuation of the servitude of the Magyar proletariat.

As a result of this social condition of affairs, the pacifist manifestations at Budapest on several occasions have assumed a really serious aspect. For all these reasons, it is rational to conclude that these eight millions of proletarians are capable of rising in revolt against their masters, the feudal Magyars, at the same time with, or shortly after, the Slavs and Latins of Central Europe. But such an uprising on their part assumes one explicit condition, namely, that the Allies fully understand the really horrible social conditions under which they live, and assure them beforehand, formally and with an absolute purpose to keep their promise, that the first certain result of the triumph of the Entente will be to put an end to the agrarian and feudal régime in Hungary, which keeps the proletariat in a state of slavery. Thus the movement to be undertaken in the Magyar portion of Hungary is, in essence, a social movement based upon an agrarian revolt.


Analysis of the second group, consisting of 86,000,000 anti-Pangermanist slaves

In order to obtain from our analysis results corresponding so far as possible to the probabilities, let us divide these slaves into two categories, based on the degree of effectiveness of their future action, by virtue of their geographical distribution. In each of these categories let us then set apart the subjects of the Central Powers and the subjects of the Entente countries, the mobilized men, the non-mobilized males, and the females.

First Category.—Slaves of the Germans or of their vassals, well placed geographically to act to good purpose if they had the material means of so doing.

This group is itself made up of two geographical elements — the first being found in Turkey, the second in Central Europe.

(a) In Turkey:—

Arabs 8,000,000
Armenians 2,000,000
Total 10,000,000

The Turks are detested by the great majority of Arabs, a part of whom have already revolted under the leadership of the King of Hedjaz, or in coöperation with the Allies in Palestine. As the rest of the Arabs live at a distance from the genuinely Turkish regions, the mobilization cannot have reached them very extensively.

For these various reasons the Arab anti-Turk movement might be largely developed.

As for the Armenians, our estimate of two millions is certainly much too large if we reflect that about a million Armenians have been massacred by the Turks since the beginning of the war. However, we may retain this figure, for the vanished million is balanced by the 1,800,000 Russian subjects of the Caucasus, many of whom have already fought with the Russian troops against the German-Turk combination. The treachery of the Bolsheviks having placed these Armenians in peril of being massacred in their turn, — especially at this time, when the Turks are aiming at taking possession of the Caucasus with the aid of the Mussulman element there,— we might well find a quite appreciable numerical support among the Armenians of the Caucasus.

(6) In Central Europe:—

Poles 20,000,000
Lithuanians 2,000.000
Letts 2,000,000
Ruthenians 5,500,000
Czech-Slovaks 8.500,000
Jugo-Slavs 11,000,000
Roumanians 10,000,000
Total 59,000,000

We must make an important reservation with respect to the Ententophil sentiments of the Ruthenians, because of the anti-Polish Ukrainian policy of the Central Powers. It is possible that the Germans will eventually set the Ruthenians against the Poles; but the Ruthenians occupy only the eastern portion of Galicia, while all the rest of the 59,000,000 people of the group under consideration inhabit the vast regions extending from the Baltic to the southern line of the Balkans (about 1500 kilometres; see the map on page 848).

Now, these regions form the most indispensable and at the same time the most vulnerable strategic base of all military Pan-Germany. In fact all the rail and water lines of communication which connect Austria and Germany with Russia, the Balkans, and Turkey, traverse these regions. Three and a half years of war have demonstrated that without the troops and diverse contributions of the Balkans and Turkey, to which are now added those of Southern Russia, Austria-Germany would long since have been powerless to continue the struggle. In reality, therefore, any serious interference with the Austro-German communications with the East (Russia and the Balkans) will be enough to make the situation very difficult, both morally and materially, for the armies concentrated on the Western front by the Berlin General Staff—and this with remarkable rapidity. We are justified, then, in saying that the vital interior districts of Pan-Germany are practically occupied by peoples favorably inclined to the Entente. This is a fact susceptible of being turned to enormous advantage.

Let us now proceed to an analysis of the first category. — The two divisions —10,000,000 in Turkey and 59,000,000 in Central Europe — form a total of 69,000,000 of people who are anti-Pangermanist by conviction. Divided into its constituent elements, this total gives the following result: —

(a) Male subjects of the C entral Powers, mobilized against their will—therefore armed 8,300,000
(b) Male subjects of the Central Powers, not mobilized (including children) 12,450,000
(c) Male subjects of invaded districts of the Entente in Central Europe, not mobilized (including children) 13,750,000
Total males 34,500,000
(а) Female subjects of the Entente 13,750,000
(b) Female subjects of the Central Powers 20,750,000
Total females 34,500,000

Alongside of this, let us place an analysis of the second category — slaves of the Germans, or of their vassals, who are to-day incapable of action because they are too near the military lines; but who might act most effectively if serious disturbances should arise in Central Europe.

This second category is made up of two geographical elements.

(а) In Turkey, —

Ottoman Greeks 2,000,000
Levantines 2,000,000

(b) On the Western Front,—

Belgians 7,500,000
French 3,000,000
Alsace-Lorrainers 1,500,000
Italians in Austria (about) 1,000,000
Total 17,000,000

In considering this table we must remember that the number of the Italians is really much larger, for it should include the people of the recently overrun territory; but at this time of writing the data for estimating their number are insufficient.

Divided into their different elements, these figures show the following result : —

(а) Male subjects of the Central Powers, mobilized against their will,—therefore, armed 900,000
(б) Male subjects of the Central Powers not mobilized (including children) 1,350,000
(c) Male subjects of invaded districts of the Entente in the West, not mobilized (including children) 6,250,000
Total males 8,500,000
(a) Female subjects of the Central Powers, 2,250,000
(b) Female subjects of the Entente, 6,250,000
Total females, 8,500,000


If the reader has been sufficiently patient to follow me thus far, we may pass on to certain practical deductions from the ‘Political-Science’ analysis of Pan-Germany.

The foregoing analysis makes possible certain ethnographical, nationalpsychological, and geographical deductions which, taken as a whole, enable us (1) to estimate reasonably the moral make-up of the Pan-German armies; (2) to draw up a table of the different elements constituting the insurrectionary forces now latent in Pan-Germany; and (3) to compare the forces of the Entente and Pan-Germany for 1918.

1. The moral make-up of the armies of Pan-Germany. — The foregoing ethnographical and psychological analysis has enabled us to conclude that the armies directed from Berlin, considered with respect to the sentiments that inspire them, are composed of two sharply opposed elements, namely: —

Germans and pro-Germans, mobilized 18,800,000
Anti-Pangermanists, mobilized against their will 9,200,000
Total 28,000,000

or, let us say, one in five of the entire

population of the Central Powers.

From these 28,000,000, it may be said that we should deduct the losses since the war began; but the yearly losses of the Central Powers probably do not exceed their yearly military contingent, which is in the neighborhood of 1,350,000 men. We may, therefore, assume that this yearly contingent balances the losses, and that the total mobilized force of Pan-Germany remains, in round numbers, at 28,000,000.

Hence we arrive at three deductions of the highest importance.

(a) It is exceedingly important, to remember that this figure — 28,000,000 — represents the grand maximum that the Central Powers can mobilize today; that is to say, so long as they have not succeeded in organizing for military purposes the men of certain portions of the Ukraine, and the Mussulmans of Russia, Persia, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. The possibility of this addition to their strength constitutes a tremendous new peril for the future; hut it seems reasonable to assume that, by reason of the difficulty of communication, these fresh military organizations cannot be effectuated for at least eight months.

Having made these reservations, we may regard this figure of 28,000,000 as representing the maximum, that is to say, the grand total of the mobilizable forces of Pan-Germany during 1918.

(b) This number includes two groups whose sentiments are sharply opposed. The only group upon which, as a whole, Berlin can depend — the Germans, Magyars (and this element is not altogether reliable), Bulgars, and Turks — numbers at most 18,800,000 men — say, 19,000,000 in round numbers. Because of the difficulty of communication, mentioned above, with respect to the organization of troops among the new Asiatic elements, this figure would seem to represent the unelastic maximum of the genuinely Pangermanist forces for about eight months to come.

This deduction is of essential importance; for by taking it as a startingpoint, we shall comprehend clearly how it is possible for the Entente, after about six months of preparation, to subject this maximum to the overwhelming simultaneous action of an aggregation of forces so diverse and so powerful that the result must inevitably be the destruction of Pan-Germanv within a very few weeks after such action shall have been started.

(c) In the armies of Pan-Germany there are 9,200,000 troops who, albeit subjects of the Central Powers, are Slavs, Latins, or Semites, and whose real interests are undeniably anti-Pangermanist. Now, on the one hand, a considerable part of these involuntary soldiers are armed; and on the other, their state of mind, induced by their most manifest interest, inclines them to declare open rebellion against their oppressors, as soon as they shall feel that conditions will allow them to do so effectively.

It is therefore quite within bounds to say that in the armies of Pan-Germany, of every three soldiers there is one who certainly does not desire to make use of his weapons against the Entente; and one who, on the contrary, will joyfully make use of them, as soon as he shall be clearly convinced of the necessity, to assist in the destruction of PanGermany, whose continuance would perpetuate his own slavery and that of his people.

This is a fact of tremendous importance to the Allies.

The Berlin Staff feels so far from sure of the Slav and Latin troops that it dares not use them in dense masses on the Western Front. They are, for the most part, either sent into Turkey, or utilized in the garrisons of the interior, or mobilized in the munition factories of Pan-Germany. Thus the majority of them are so situated as to make an insurrectionary movement on their part particularly effective. It is for the Allies to have the intelligence to do whatever may be necessary to make the most of it.

2. Table of the possible insurrectionary forces in Pan-Germany.

Gross Estimate

(а) Slaves in the first category (Central Europe) 69,000,000
(б) Slaves in the second category (Western and Ottoman fronts) 17,000,000
(c) Magyar proletariat 8,000,000
Total 94,000,000

There are, then, in gross, in PanGermany, anti-Pangermanist elements numbering 94,000,000 persons. These possible insurrectionary forces are made up of

(a) Anti-Pangermanist men, mobilized against their will 10,800,000
(b) Anti-Pangermanist males, not mobilized (including children) 36,200,000
(c) Anti-Pangermanist females 47,000,000
Total 94,000,000

Net Estimate

The gross estimate of each of these possible insurrectionary elements is subject to reductions for divers reasons.

(a) To allow for the anti-Entente influence which the Germans may exert over the Ruthenians or Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia and over certain Polish elements, and to guard against a too optimistic estimate, the figure 10,800,000 should be reduced to 8,000,000.

(b) and (c) These gross figures include the children and old men — elements that are clearly incapable of effective action. We must therefore deduct from these two groups the infants and youths below twenty and the old men over sixty. Our ethnical data enable us to do this scientifically.

The French census of 1911 discloses that the persons of both sexes under twenty and those above sixty make up a little less than half of the whole population. Thus, if we reduce the gross number of non-mobilized men and women by one half, we shall obtain the result sought. But the gross number of non-mobilized men (b) includes many between twenty and sixty who have been discharged, a large proportion being infirm, or sick, or sickly, and hence unfit for service. The gross figures, 13,800,000, already reduced by half, must be again reduced by a fourth to allow for this situation.

The net result of these deductions is to reduce to 14,000,000 the number of non-mobilized anti-Pangermanist men in Pan-Germany, who are capable of effective action. This number, still quite considerable, is composed of two elements: (1) the 4,000,000 subjects of the Central Powers, whom we reckon as utilizable, are, to be sure, discharged men; but after eliminating the weak and sickly, a considerable proportion of them, whom the Austro-Boche civil service is certainly making some use of principally in munition factories or in agriculture — are capable of taking an effective part in an insurrection. (2) As for the 10,000,000 subjects of the Entente, there are unquestionably many of them who have been deported, to work in the munition factories of Pan-Germany, or in the fields.

Thus these 14,000,000 men may be regarded as a reservoir upon which the Entente should be able to draw.

(c) Females. —Reducing by one half the 47,000,000 females, we have, in round numbers, 23,000,000 women between twenty and sixty years of age.

Thus we arrive at the following table of the minimum insurrectionary forces now existing in Pan-Germany.

Mobilized men 8,000,000
Non-mobilized men 14,000,000
Women 23,000,000
Total 45,000,000

These 45,000,000 men and women in Pan-Germany, whether they represent possible insurgents or centres of passive resistance, do in very truth constitute important sources of both moral and material strength. They are out of sight, and unknown in the Allied countries. Yet they exist, as the image exists, although invisible, on the undeveloped photographic plate.

The problem, then, for the Allies is, first, to grasp the actuality of these latent insurrectionary forces; then to make them known, to impress upon the forces themselves the idea of their power; and, lastly, so to organize them as to transform them into active elements from the passive condition in which they now are.

3. The present stat us of the opposing forces may be summarized thus:—

Forces of Pan-Germany. — The mobilizable forces directed from Berlin, reckoned on the maximum basis of twenty per cent of the population, are to-day about 28,000,000 men, made up of two elements: —

(a) About 19,000,000 troops whom the German Staff can regard as reliable: Germans, Magyars (with the reservation indicated above), Bulgars, and Turks.

(b) Some 9,000,000 Slav and Latin troops incorporated in the armies of Pan-Germany in opposition to their real sentiments; of whom 8,000,000 may be led to withdraw if a certain propaganda and a certain condition of affairs shall be created by the Entente.

In reality, therefore, 19,000,000 Germans and pro-Germans must be ready to respond to all military necessities; to keep in their ranks, by sheer terrorism, 9,000,000 soldiers who are there solely by dint of force and compulsion; and to stand guard over a vast expanse of territory, the population of which, in at least half of the superficial area of Pan-Germany, is hostile to them.

Forces of the Entente. — To avoid an exaggerated estimate, these forces are estimated without regard to the smaller Allies, or to Japan, — whose intervention is at least probable, — or to the colonial contingents. Furthermore, the basis of calculation will be fifteen per cent of the population of the European Allies. We have then, —

France (15 per cent of 40,000.000) 6,000,000

Great Britain (15 per cent of 46,000,000) 6,900,000

Italy (15 per cent of 36,000,000) 5,400,000

Total 18,300,000

To this number we must add the American contingents. It is evident, in view of the tonnage problem, that they will never be able to arrive in Europe in numbers proportioned to the population of the United States. It will be a very great achievement if 1,500,000 American combatants can be sent to Europe, with all the essential materials and supplies. Let us assume that that number is both possible and probable. In that case the mobilizable Allied forces which can be expected to play an active part in Europe will amount to 18,300,000 European Allies and 1,500,000 Americans — say, 20,000,000 in round numbers.



The figures given above make possible the following conclusions: —

(а) The mobilizable forces in Europe at the disposal of the Allies (20,000,000) are numerically greatly inferior to the comprehensive forces of Pan-Germany (28,000,000), and practically equal to the forces of which the German Staff can be reasonably sure (19,000,000).

It is difficult to see how the Allies can add to their mobilizable effectives in Europe to any considerable extent. On the other hand, in a few months the Germans will be, perhaps, in a position to make use of fresh troops supplied by Mussulman communities in Russia and Central Asia. Therefore, by carrying on the conflict by means of a purely military strategy, it is probable that the Allies will find themselves numerically inferior to the Germans and their Allies, as is already the case on the Western Front.

(b) But the situation of the Allies would be completely transformed if they should, in their turn, like the Germans, resort to the strategy of the political sciences; for it would enable them to exploit to their advantage the tremendous sources of weakness that exist in the very heart of Pan-Germanv.2

Indeed, in that case, the Allies could systematically arm, by the aerial route, a part of the 14,000,000 anti-Pangermans, non-mobilized, in Central PanGermany, and thus bring about an insurrection in the regions traversed by the vital strategic communications of Pan-Germany. Secondly, they could, by means of such insurrections, bring about a state of affairs, both moral and material, which would enable the 8,000,000 troops embodied against their will in the German armies, to revolt in their turn.

Assuming this form of strategy to be adopted, the 19,000,000 Germans and pro-Germans would have to face the hostile action, active or passive, of 20,000,000 Allied troops, 8,000,000 of their own troops, in revolt or on strike, and 14,000,000 possible insurgent civilians, or 42,000,000 in all.

(c) The 23,000,000 anti-Pangermanist women in Pan-Germany are for the most part compelled to work on the land or in the munition factories. As they represent a by-no-means negligible force, if the propaganda were effective, they could be induced to strike. In fact, in certain districts which I know well, the women are capable of playing a very useful part in a revolt.

Thus, the 19,000,000 Germans and pro-Germans would have to face widely varying but combined hostile forces of 65,000,000 human beings (42,000,000 men and 23,000,000 women).

To sum up: the purely military strategy leaves 20,000,000 Allies face to face with 28,000,000 Germans, proGermans, and troops enslaved by them.

The strategy of the political sciences would transform the situation, for it would subject 19,000,000 Germans and pro-Germans to the submergent action of the endlessly diverse enveloping powers of 65,000,000 persons, of whom 47,000,000 are already in Pan-Germany.

If the Germans had been in our place, would they not long ago have made use of the anti-German elements in Pan-Germany, considering that in Russia they have derived the enormous profit that we all know from elements favorable to their cause, although they were much less numerous than those utilizable by the Allies? Under these conditions can the latter refuse to adopt, at last, the strategy of the political sciences?

Far from working to the prejudice of the Western Front, it would work altogether to its advantage; for nothing could afford greater relief to the Allied troops from the terrible pressure that they are having to withstand on that front, than an uprising, scientifically organized, for the liberation of Central Europe.

  1. See chapters XII and XIII of the second (enlarged) edition of Pan-Germany; the Disease and Cure. Boston: The Atlantic Monthly Press. 1918.
  2. See M. Chéradame’s article in the Atlantic for March, 1918.