IT is only too natural that Scandinavia appears a unity when looked at from the other side of the Atlantic. The distance suffices to efface, more or less, the rather important divergencies between the three nations making up Scandinavia: Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. Nor can it be denied that they are very closely related: the same anthropological type is prevailing; the three small peoples have succeeded in maintaining a high level of economic efficiency and cultural development; their languages, though each of them is possessed of a distinct individual character, are so nearly related that no interpreter is needed between them: a Dane, a Norwegian, a Swede can speak each his own language in a common assembly, and the others will understand easily enough. The same capital facts have influenced the historical development of the three nations, though in different degrees of intensity: the expeditions of the Vikings; Protestant Reform; the constitutional and parliamentary movements of modern times.
The capital fact of geographical proximity must needs draw these three national communities together during the overwhelming crisis of the world-war. A feeling of solidarity of interests, which was considerable already before the war, has been intensified by the aspect of the universal calamity. One object has been common to the policies of governments and statesmen in the three countries: that every effort should be made to avoid internecine warfare in Scandinavia.
On August, 16,1914, a fortnight after the Black Sunday on the morning of which the world awoke to the news of the German declaration of war against Russia and realized that Armageddon had opened, a noteworthy ceremony took place on the frontier between Norway and Sweden. A monument was unveiled to commemorate a centenary of unbroken peace within Scandinavia, and an undertaking was entered into, all the more solemn because of the surrounding conditions, that no more should any of the Scandinavian peoples carry arms against another.
It was realized very clearly even then that it would be an essential condition of success for such a policy that none of the three nations should become implicated in the world-war: a policy neutrality for all was indispensable. As a review of the situation will show, the outlook on the war and on the problems it raises, is far from identical for all the three nations. Looked at from afar, they may fade into unity. When we examine their situation more closely, we shall soon see that the geographical position, no less than the economic interests of each, tends to impose on them considerably divergent policies. Their historic antecedents, in part also a somewhat different political and social organization, are likewise likely to give a somewhat different tinge to their conception of ‘Neutrality.’
It is perhaps a big question whether in this war, raising problems so grave as to force everybody to a thorough searching of heart, neutrality of feeling is possible. There is great strength in the sentiment prevailing on both sides, which proclaims in no uncertain voice, that whosoever is not with me is against me. Personally I am inclined to believe that no one, in his heart of hearts, is really neutral. But it is certainly possible — though not an easy or a grateful task — to be neutral in action and public declarations. If the Scandinavian nations have adopted a policy of strict neutrality, the chief reason is to be found in the fact just mentioned, that every other policy would in all probability have brought about inter-Scandinavian war; at any rate, this was so during the first three years.
Another potent motive for such a policy of abstention is that none of the three kingdoms is possessed of territorial ambitions. It is true that there is a Danish irredenta in North Slesvig, and to a certain extent there may perhaps be said to be a Swedish irredenta in Finland; but in neither of these two countries is national sentiment prepared to take a war in order to obtain satisfaction for these desires — in so far as they exist. War would entail perpetual enmity with powerful neighboring empires; the consequence of liberation of these territories through war would be to impose on Denmark and Sweden respectively enormous burdens for military expense, and probably their permanent allegiance to a certain group of powers; and, what is of paramount importance, the two countries would then belong to different groups of powers, and Scandinavian solidarity would become compromised beyond remedy. I propose now to review the dominant sentiments in each of the three countries separately.
That the Danish national feeling is overwhelmingly anti-German can surprise nobody: North Slesvig is Danish land. It is true that sober historical judgment puts severe blame on the then Danish government for its handling of the situation as against Prussia and Austria in 1864; and there can hardly be any doubt that Denmark might have preserved, at any rate, the part of Slesvig where the Danish language is spoken. This, however, cannot acquit Prussia and Bismarck of their responsibility: territory was taken from another state, the possession of which is of no economic or strategical importance to Prussia; the promise given in 1866 of a consultation of the inhabitants in North Slesvig by plebiscite as to their wishes was highhandedly canceled without Denmark or the Danes in Slesvig being asked their opinion;1 and some 200,000 Danes have been subjected for more than fifty years to an exceedingly hard and illiberal rule — Prussian administration in its most odious form.
This was bound to leave a profound mark in the Danish mind. The reports from the brethren in the South, of their sufferings and their hopes for the future, of their unremitting struggle to preserve, for themselves and for their children, the use of the Danish language, contributed to hold open the sore: it was never forgotten, and literary and scientific documents of high quality bear witness to the intensity of this sentiment, no less than to the conscientiousness with which the problem has been treated by the Danes.
On the other hand, intimate economic relations had been developed with Great Britain. During the last generations, in consequence of the competition created by the imports to Europe of sea-borne cereals, the Danish peasant, with high ability, has transformed his country from a cornfield into a dairy-farm. He has industrialized agriculture, and instead of breadstuffs, Denmark is now exporting butter and meat. This has opened up new routes of trade. Denmark has become the pantry of London and of industrial North England. This, of course, has influenced the ways of thinking too; ties of sympathies and of financial connections unite Denmark with the West.
The outbreak of the war fanned the anti-German sentiment in Denmark into hot flame. The tragic fate of Belgium intensified the feeling of antipathy against the military oligarchy of Prussia, under whose heel Denmark had found itself fifty years before.
But there was no question of taking part in the war. On the contrary, ‘absolute neutrality ’ became the watchword. It so happened that a Radical government, supported by the Socialists, was in power when war broke out. Within these parties new ways of thinking had developed as to the foreign relations of Denmark.
In the years following 1864, the feeling that Germany was too strong for Denmark to think of entering the lists against her on account of the Slesvig question was consciously developed by the Radical and Socialist parties, both of them frankly anti-militaristic. But, because the Radical party was in power when war broke out, it was itself, so to speak, forced by the popular feeling of anti-Germanism prevailing in the country to observe a less pronounced attitude, in order to keep up a certain balance.
The Danish government has shown high ability both in its interior and in its foreign policy. With great foresight it effected an arrangement at the very beginning of the war with the two leading antagonists, England and Germany, which allowed the Danish export to each of these two countries to continue according to the same ratio as before the war. The blockade policy and the more and more stringent rationing of the neutrals on the part of England and America has of course caused great inconvenience to Denmark, but there are no signs that this has modified the dominant feelings with regard to the war. On the contrary, the cruelty of German submarine war has rather intensified the anti-German sentiment.
Much stress has been laid on the somewhat curious fact that Danish socialism seems decidedly pro-German. It is, however, more so in appearance than in reality; and at any rate the phenomenon can be easily explained. More or less Continental Social Democracy is of German origin, and in no country is this so evident as in Denmark: the Danish leaders have almost exclusively their relation in Berlin. The Vorwärts is the source of their inspiration. The pronounced anti-Germanism of the ‘classes’ in Denmark brought these leaders of the ‘masses’ to consider it their duty to lay before the Danish public the ‘other’ point of view, and imperceptibly they have perhaps been carrying this to rather extreme manifestations. Common to Radicals and Socialists is a certain disillusion as to the sincerity of the representatives of the Great Powers. It is a favorite saying among them that the chief difference between the Central Powers and the Entente is that the former have not yet acquired the consummate ability of the latter to use fine and high-sounding phrases. Nay, the brutal sincerity of German statesmen is even a merit in their eyes: there is no ‘ hypocrisy ’ about it. This is a kindred feeling to the one which found expression in Georg Brandes’s reply to Clemenceau’s appeal for sympathy from Denmark. ‘Denmark fifty years ago appealed to England and France for sympathy and help in its fight against the Germanic powers. The reply was — neutrality.’
At bottom there can be no doubt as to dominant feeling in Denmark on the war: it is on the side of the Allies. But the exposed situation of the country, its weak military defense, would make it so easy a prey to an attack from the south, that there is practically no disposition whatever to take part in the war. The trophy that might seduce the Danish nation, the re-union of 200,000 Danes, hardly any one thinks it possible to obtain by war. South Jutland won through war would mean enduring enmity with Germany. This Denmark cannot risk. Her hope is that the settlement after the war might entail, as an application of new principles of International Law, the reëntry of the Danes of Slesvig into the Danish political community. Denmark has received abundant proof that the conditions during the war of the youth in Slesvig called to German colors have been so dreadful and tragical that they have only two alternatives before them: reunion with Denmark, or emigration. In Prussia they can no longer stay.
No wonder that Denmark is looking with wistful eyes to the future. With the coming of peace a great problem will lie before the nation. During the war democracy has come into its own: electoral reform has been accomplished, but the new rules have not yet been put into practice. It will therefore in part be a new parliament which will have to decide the Danish attitude toward this grave question, if ever it is raised.
In Norway the situation is perhaps simpler than in any other neutral country: public opinion is decidedly proAlly. None of the political parties has had any inclination toward the Central
Powers, as may in a certain sense be said about the Danish Socialists; nor has any other important body of public opinion rallied to the German cause. The practical unanimity of Norwegian sentiment is all the more striking as Norway, perhaps with the single exception of Spain, finds itself in a more detached position toward the war than any other European nation. It is more removed than most of the small European nations from the area of hostilities. It has no outstanding difficulty with any of the Great Powers. Its territorial integrity had been guaranteed (in 1907) by France, Germany, Great Britain, and Russia, — that is to say, by powers in both camps, — and Norway could boast of excellent relations with all of them. Intimate economic connections existed, not only with the Western countries, but also with Germany: Hamburg was the emporium for Norwegian commerce in colonial produce; and shipbuilding, one of the staple industries of Norway, got its chief material, the iron plates, from German factories. If Norwegian political and intellectual life for the last century was under the influence of impulses from England, America, and France, religious feeling and scientific life got their inspiration from Germany.
Norway is the most pronouncedly democratic country in Europe, democratic not only politically, but — what is much more important and far-reaching — also in a social and economic sense. And Norway is a small country, the smallest, so far as population goes, except Luxemburg and Montenegro.
The wanton attack on Belgian neutrality by the Prussian military oligarchy determined Norwegian public opinion. It revealed what a little country could be exposed to at the hands of a state in which power, military and political, belongs to a caste. Norwegian democracy in no uncertain voice declared against Prusso-German oligarchy and its military policy.
But, as in the case of Denmark, there was no disposition to enter the war. Norway is absolutely without any territorial ambition, so its participation would have been exclusively an expression of its conviction as to the rights and wrongs of the conflict. Bigger powers hesitated before such a decision. There is no doubt that in the case of Norway entry into the war would have entailed terrible hardship and misery on the country, while no appreciable advantage would have accrued to the Allies.
Public opinion, therefore, absolutely approved a policy of neutrality, in favor of which, besides, was a motive already mentioned — the consideration of inter-Scandinavian relations.
Of course, Norway has not been altogether without its pro-German elements. In certain cases, family connections, financial or business ties, have been too strong to permit a pro-Ally attitude. To some persons Germany and German civilization have been so important a ferment of their spiritual development; they feel themselves so indebted to inspiration from German philosophy or literature, from German science or industrial skill, that they cannot refuse their sympathy to the German nation or to German policy. The strongest incitement to wholehearted sympathy, at any rate with some persons of a conservative and skeptical outlook on life, has perhaps been a subtle feeling that Germany is after all the chief pillar of the principle of authority in political and social affairs; that with the overthrow of Germany democracy and insubordination would reign supreme in Europe.
It is perhaps necessary to mention also that some few literary men (best known among them the author Knut Hamsun) have expressed strong proGerman sympathies. Perhaps the explanation nearest to the mark with these personalities would be a certain love of paradox and of opposition à tout prix to average opinion, to the views of the man in the street.
Various as are the motives of this proGerman attitude, it would be a mistake to believe that this section of Norwegian opinion is numerically important. I have heard pro-Germans themselves estimate their number at five, or even at two per cent! And the development of German policy as against Norway has inevitably tended to reducing their number and making them less loudvoiced.
Norway has learned during the war how difficult is the path of neutrality. The extensive shipping trade, which has made Norwegian sailors the carriers of the world, has created many problems for the leaders of Norwegian foreign policy, and at different times rather serious conflicts have arisen both with Germany and with England. The stringency of the blockade declared by the latter power has entailed serious inconvenience both to exports and imports, no less than to the shipping interests. This could hardly but create irritation against the blockading power, at any rate in the circles most concerned, shippers and merchants. But this feeling never spread to the people at large, although they felt the consequences of the long delays of Norwegian ships in foreign ports, in the form of inflated prices on all foreign goods — a most serious fact in a country so dependent on oversea imports as Norway. The pro-Ally sentiment was not abated, even when England, in consequenceof some disagreement with the Norwegian government, stopped the import of coal and coke to the country, certainly a drastic measure during the cold season.
On the other hand, difficulties have not been wanting with Germany. The inhuman submarine war has brought tragic losses to Norway, losses not only in ships, but also in human lives. Almost seven hundred Norwegian sailors have found their deaths by German submarines or mines, some of them even by direct shots as they tried to save themselves in the lifeboats. The sinking of valuable tonnage means a serious menace to one of the chief t rades of Norway. The shipowners may not lose their capital, for the ships are of course insured; but the shipbuilding trade not being able by far to fill the gaps, very many of them already now find themselves unable to maintain their business.
Besides, the costly freights and enormous insurance premiums have still more inflated the prices of all articles of consumption; all salaries have risen enormously. There is probably no country in the world where life is at present so expensive as in Norway, and Norwegian public opinion does not hesitate to put the chief blame on the submarine war.
Resentment against Germany has been running high, and it culminated when in June last the police discovered that a German diplomatic courier had been carrying bombs to Christiania under the seais of the German Foreign Office, and that these most dangerous objects had been stored in different places within the city for weeks and months. This discovery put an end, practically speaking, to what might still be left of pro-German sentiment in Norway.
From the middle of last century a strong anti-Russian sentiment dominated Swedish public opinion. In Swedish eyes Russia figures as the insatiable conquering power, continually on the lookout for expansion; and the indefensible Russian policy against Finland, with which secular ties of common traditions, in part also of common language, united Sweden, furnished potent arguments for such a view. At first Sweden had looked out for, and also found, support with the Western Powers, which fought Tsardom in the Crimean War. Later, especially from the beginning of the present century, which saw the rapprochement between Russia and England, Sweden became more and more attracted into the orbit of German diplomacy.
When the world-war broke out, Sweden had just passed through a fierce conflict over problems of military preparedness, a conflict which assumed at times a pronounced political character. The Liberal government in power had been ousted in the spring of 1914 by a seemingly popular movement, engineered with great skill by the Conservatives, but whose chief force was Royalty itself. King Gustavus succeeded in forming a government of his own, whose only task should be the reorganization of the defense of the country; it was contended that these interests would have been gravely compromised had the Liberal government been maintained; and the great argument for strengthening the defenses of the country was always the Russian danger.
Such was the origin of the later so famous Hammarskjöld Ministry. Proclaimed as a ‘national’ government, it was in fact the King’s ministry. Its duration was said to be expressly limited to the period necessary to carry out its military reform programme. Because war broke out even before the government had really set about its task, it stayed in power for three full years (February, 1914, to April, 1917).
At the general elections which took place in the autumn of 1914, the Swedes renewed their declaration of allegiance to the two democratic parties; and the Socialists especially made very important gains at the polls. In the popular Chamber they numbered 87 members and their allies, the Liberals, 57; while the Conservatives, who had been fighting for the Hammarskjöld government, got 86 seats. It is true that in the Upper Chamber the Conservatives were possessed of a large majority; but in the joint votes of the two houses prescribed, in case of difference of views between them, for all votes of credits or of ways and means, the Liberals and Socialists among them had a narrow majority.
Everything therefore seemed to prescribe a change of government. It did not take place, because of the peculiarity of the situation in Sweden as to the world-war.
When war broke out, fear of Russia rose to its highest pitch. An attack on North Sweden was generally anticipated, especially by the higher classes. It did not take place, but the fears had been so strong that the political consequences were quite as important as if it had come. The whole of the landed aristocracy, of the court, of the higher administration, of the military and naval officers, not only declared their sympathies for Germany, but openly advocated what they called an active neutrality, active in the interest of Germany as against Russia and the democratic powers of Western Europe. The last point of view is not unimportant: as the Swedish Conservatives realized that their political power was threatened, their sympathies for Germany, and especially for Prussia as the apparently impregnable stronghold of conservatism, only became more intense. Moreover, the landed aristocracy had not a few affinities and ties of parentage with the Prussian Junkers. Finally, a cleverly led German propaganda obtained great influence in Sweden from the very beginning of the war.
It is true that this fraction was numerically an unimportant element of the Swedish nation. Socially, however, they exercised a far greater influence than their numbers and weight should entitle them to, and through their connections at court and in the royal family itself, they were able to gain political power. The crisis of February, 1914, had shown that the King might be able, eventually, to play a personal part, and even to supersede a government supported by a parliamentary majority.
This explains the uneasiness felt both by the government itself and by the Riksdag. The government, which was far from ‘activist,’ so little felt sure of its being able to steer a clear course of neutrality, that it concluded an arrangement with Norway, stipulating that, even if either of the count ries were implicated in the war, this should, under no conditions, entail hostilities between them. Because of their geographical situation, this in fact amounts to a sort of anti-war-insurance: neither of the countries would be a useful ally to one or the other group of the belligerents when the frontier between them is considered as inviolable.
The arrangement was entered into at the request of the Swedish government, a fact which was taken by the Riksdag as a proof of the honest intention of the government to follow a neutral policy. The consequence was that the relations between the two authorities were eased to a certain extent, and the Liberal-Socialist majority of the Riksdag preferred that the Hammarskjöld government, even though conservative in complexion, should remain in power, because it would probably be better able to control the ‘activists’ than a government toward which the latter would feel no obligations whatever. The irresponsible agitation of the spring of 1914 had shown to what lengths the Conservatives might go against their political antagonists.
It was generally supposed that, during the first part of the war, the Swedish people was equally divided in its sympathies. I am disposed to think that the friends of Germany have been in an actual minority from the very beginning. But they have been noisy, and, in high position, able to play a very dominant part.
The course of events during the war has steadily tended to diminish the influence of the ‘Activists’ on Swedish public opinion. Their chief argument, it must be remembered, was the ‘Russian danger’; and the government, through extensive military preparations, showed that it shared these apprehensions. It is known that not the slightest symptom has been forthcoming, proving a disposition on the part of Russia to attack the Scandinavian kingdoms. This must be said to be a decisive proof that those circles in Scandinavia were right which maintained that the Russian danger was nothing but a bogey. For if ever the temptation was great for Russian imperialism to try and obtain access to the open sea in the northwest, it must have been during this war, when the Baltic and the Black Sea were both blockaded.
As the ‘activist ’ sentiment had chiefly been living on the threat of Russian danger, this circumstance could not but tell heavily against it. But another cloud was constantly gathering — Finland. The continual, or at any rate recurring, Russian defeats in the war inspired new hopes in the Finnish patriots of a liberation of their country. Some of them even established connections with the Germans, and several youths from Finland went to Germany to be trained for officers and leaders of the national rebellion. As these sentiments were chiefly represented in the Swedish-speaking part of Finland, Stockholm became naturally the intermediary between the insurrectionary elements in Finland and the Germans. At certain epochs an outbreak of rebellion was expected in Finland; and I know that leading Swedes feared that a wave of generosity in favor of the Finns might carry Sweden into war against Russia at the side of Finland. Fortunately for Sweden and for the peace of Sca ndinavia, with the Russian revolution, which opened to Finland, as well as to Russia itself, a new vista of liberation in peace and through negotiations, the last foundation for an ‘activist’ policy in Sweden vanished. But unfortunately, the way in which the Hammarskjöld government handled the foreign policy of the country had caused serious friction with the Entente powers.
Everything seems to indicate that the government from the beginning had had the best intention of following a sincerely neutral policy. But the circumstances were too strong for them. The geographical situation of Sweden, the intimate connections of the court with Germany, the dependence of the government on royalty, the temptations offered to Swedish exports in the form of fabulous prices paid by the Germans — all tended to give to Swedish neutrality a rather pro-German tinge. There is no doubt, however, that the Socialist leader, Hjalmar Branting, has been voicing the sentiments of the majority of Swedes when he, while stead, ily advocating neutrality, has put the blame for the war on the Central Powers. The pro-Germans were a minority, but they decided the official policy of the country.
At length this entailed such serious consequences to the country, imports from the West practically stopping, that a change of government had to take place.
In May, 1917, the Hammarskjöld government was succeeded by the Swartz-Lindman ministry, whose task it should be to obtain an arrangement with England as to imports. It is very characteristic of the situation that even now a Conservative government was formed, Lindman, the Foreign Minister, being the leader of the party in the Riksdag, and all of the members also Conservatives, though without any ‘activist’ leanings. Even in 1917 the Liberal-Socialist majority did not insist on taking office themselves, and the Conservatives were quite willing to take the risk. Perhaps the reason was that they did not wish their opponents to inquire too closely to what extent the administration had entertained relations with Germany. The recent disclosures of the cables from Argentine make this suspicion legitimate at any rate.
The recent elections have shown the real situation in the country. The Conservatives willing to uphold the present foreign policy have dwindled from 86 to 58, while the opposition has grown from 144 to 172 — a majority of three fourths in the popular Chamber. In their internal policy the Conservatives can probably count on 12 more votes, representing two small peasant groups; but even here their minority is barely one third. Everything seems to point to the definitive advent of political democracy in Sweden through the reform of the Upper Chamber.
Thus the conditions of a united democratic front will be created in the three Scandinavian countries, and this cannot but have a beneficent reaction on their cooperation in foreign affairs.
When war broke out, considerable resentment against Norway still reigned in Sweden: the dissolution of the Union in 1905 was not yet forgotten. The common danger of the war blotted out the last remnants of this feeling, and it was the Swedish King’ himself who took the initiative of Scandinavian cooperation. In November, 1914, he invited the two other sovereigns, Haakon of Norway and Christian of Denmark, to meet him at Malmoe. This has been until recently the only interview of the monarchs. But three subsequent meetings of the prime ministers and foreign secretaries have taken place — symptoms strong enough of the growing sense of solidarity between the three nations.
The practical, tangible results of this cooperation should not be exaggerated. Even as among these three countries, so proximately situated, so intimately connected by common traditions, it soon appeared that the violent storm of the war attacks them from different sides and forces them into divergent attitudes.
Therefore we also see how few and far between are the common Scandinavian declarations or protests. Perhaps this divergence is best explained by the different outlook on the war of the three governments, as I have tried to describe it in the preceding pages. This difference of views has at any rate tended to circumscribe very narrowly the field of action: only in a policy of strict neutrality has it been possible to find the common denominator. And even this policy has to some observers looked suspicious enough. The Scandinavian coöperation had been opened at the initiative of Sweden; the appearance of a certain Swedish hegemony could hardly be avoided, because Sweden alone has more inhabitants than the two other countries put together. This has created the impression in some quarters that Scandinavian cooperation had certain German affinities, —an impression, however, completely false.
On the other hand, the change of government in Sweden, through which proGermanism will be completely eliminated, will, as has just been said, prepare a still sounder basis for Scandinavian cooperation, and other fields of work may be opened. Initiatives in this direction are not wanting. Thus the chambers of commerce and similar organizations of the three countries have just discussed possibilities of closer cooperation as to currency, and even in respect of tariffs.
The calamity of the world-war, with its sufferings and losses, has certainly drawn the three nations together. Although in a lesser degree than the belligerents, they have felt very hard what war means. The military burdens laid upon them have been heavy, entailing financial liabilities under which the budgets of the future will suffer for years to come. The entire population is groaning under high prices, and the coming winter threatens to bring cruel want of the necessities of life.
The Scandinavian nations realize very clearly, howrever, that they do not suffer as the belligerents themselves; and their sympathies and active help have not been refused to the martyr nations. Especially the appeals in favor of Belgium have been met with a free response.
Hitherto the affairs of each nation have been considered as strictly national and not pertaining to the domain of the others. The war has shown that this principle, anarchic and destructive, can only lead to perdition; and in the Scandinavian countries this has been very clearly recognized. In all of the three countries the movement working for the formation of a league of nat ions on the basis of International Law has made considerable headway during the war. Especially the common meetings of the three national groups of the Interparliamentary Union, held during the war, have educated public opinion and have been working on the governments. At their initiative the governments have been trying to organize a common work on the part of all the European neutrals, in order to discuss the means of laying the basis of a lasting peace, founded on justice and guaranteed by a common wall and by common institutions.
The Scandinavian nations have no illusions as to their power to enforce such a solution on the nations now at war. Their whole-hearted support of any effort bending toward the goal of a durable peace must only be taken as a symptom of what is certainly their dominant sentiment on the war: that this terrible crisis should at any rate bring home to all nations the futility and criminality of international war.
Several of our best minds hope and believe that, if the Scandinavian countries succeed in maintaining to the end their neutrality in the war, they may perhaps in future serve as a common meeting-ground for efforts toward a wider international cooperation, perhaps as an intermediary in the exchange of scientific and industrial, of artistic and literary experiences, which, during the first years of resentment, it will perhaps not be possible to arrange through direct channels.
In this high mission of humanity Denmark, Norway, and Sweden would fain find a special field of action.
- It should be said that two thirds of Slesvig is pure German. The Danish grievance, therefore, applies only — from the racial point of view — to a third of Slesvig, called by the Danes South Jutland. — THE AUTHOR.↩