Nikki Haley speaks at the United Nations in January 2018.Lucas Jackson / Reuters

During her recent trip to Washington, D.C., for President George H. W. Bush’s funeral, Nikki Haley, the outgoing U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, sat down for an interview with The Atlantic.

This interview has been edited for clarity.

Uri Friedman: We’re meeting on a pretty solemn day. What’s been on your mind in recent days regarding President Bush? What do you see as, for you, the enduring lesson of his presidency?

Nikki Haley: I think the biggest impact that I have felt with the funeral and everything is seeing that image of Senator Dole saluting the president. That encompasses so much of what America is. That’s the Greatest Generation, the idea that we go through life, we do the best we can, but at the end of the day, how admirable and honorable these people are—just the respect of that was pretty amazing to watch. To look at President Bush’s life, it’s hard not to look at it and say, so many doors opened for him. They weren’t always the doors he wanted, but he walked through them, and it really was a life well lived. He served no matter what he was presented with, and he did it honorably. And to look at the gamut of what he served—obviously a veteran who’s been shot down, but then you go into the idea that he was party chair, that he was UN ambassador, that he was CIA, that he represented us in China, and then vice president and president. That’s an unbelievable life. The unfortunate part was I think he got beat up a lot of the time, but you hope he’s watching all the praise that he’s getting now.

Friedman: I found the letter you wrote to say you were stepping down from the administration really interesting. One thing I was particularly struck by is that you said you were proud of speaking out against dictatorships, including Russia, and standing up for American values and American interests. Literally from the beginning to the end of your tenure, you took a hard line on Russia, on its aggression in Ukraine, on its support for President Bashar al-Assad and his war crimes in Syria. Why? What is the nature, do you think, of the threat that Russia poses to both American values and American interests?

Haley: One of the most frustrating things that I’ve had to encounter at the UN is the Russian veto. Whenever we’ve tried to do good things, Russia is right there to stop it. The perfect example of that is the chemical-weapons issue in Syria. We went over half a dozen times. I’ve lost count of how many times we tried to get an unbiased mechanism in there to prevent chemical weapons, and at every step of the way, they were standing right next to Assad and protecting him. There’s a lot of frustrations there, but I’ve always thought—the one thing I learned at the UN is that countries resent America. It’s a tough place. But they want us to lead. And we have to always lead on our values and our freedoms and what we believe is right. And so if you are supporting a man who is using chemical weapons on his own people, you have to call him out for it. If you are looking at a man who went into another country and used poisonous substances on civilians, you have to condemn them for it. If you see you’ve got a country who is going in and starting to invade another country, and go against their sovereignty, you have to say something. It’s not that I have specifically bashed Russia. It’s that Russia has continued to do things that we can’t give them a pass on.

Friedman: Based on your experience, do you think Mitt Romney was right in 2012 when he was ridiculed for saying Russia was America’s No. 1 geopolitical foe? Do you think he was actually prescient in describing Russia in that sense?

Haley: I certainly think his instincts were right. I think the other one is China. I think they both equally are concerns and they both equally need a lot of attention.

Friedman: One other thing that you focused a lot of attention on is human rights and humanitarian relief, whether it’s the South Sudan arms embargo, which you drafted and got through, or visiting refugee camps in Jordan and Turkey. What’s motivated you to emphasize those types of issues in particular? Specifically, do you feel that America needs to have a moral-leadership role in the world?

Haley: I think those freedoms are every person’s God-given right, regardless of where they were born and raised, regardless of their religion, regardless of their ethnicity or gender. I just strongly believe that when we see anyone’s freedoms violated, or their quality of life is suffering because of a dictator, we have to say something, because they can’t always say it for themselves. And it doesn’t cost us anything to fight for democracy, to fight for human rights, and to fight for the dignity of people. It’s really hard for me to stomach and not say something. We focused a lot on sexual exploitation that was happening, but we also focused on corruption. You go into countries, whether it’s South Sudan or Democratic Republic of Congo, and you see the way the women and girls are sexually assaulted, you see the way the boys are taken as young as 7 years old to be child soldiers, and someone has to say something, because the one thing I know is we may not win a vote at the UN, but we can shame them. And the one thing every country doesn’t want is to be called out. And we have to understand the leverage we have, that when we call out a country or we call out a wrong, everyone takes notice.

Friedman: Based on your work, based on the broader work that the administration is doing, do you feel that the United States is currently a moral leader in the world, a leader promoting American values and doing it in a robust way?

Haley: I think we’re not perfect because we have our own issues ourselves. But I think we have to always try. Think back to when I came into this position, because when I came into this position, the previous administration had focused a lot on domestic policy, and their approach to foreign policy was “Don’t rock the boat. Just don’t get involved, don’t rock the boat.” But when I came in, they had just passed a Cuban-sponsored, anti-American resolution that blamed us for all things wrong in Cuba, and the United States abstained. Abstained! Then you go and look at the Resolution 2334, basically humiliating one of our strongest allies, Israel, in front of the world, and we abstained, which basically allowed it to pass.

I think you look at that situation, and I so strongly felt that we had to gain our voice back, we had to gain our leadership back, and we had to speak truths. Whether countries liked it or not, we always had to tell the truth. And so as we took on different issues, my concern was never whether countries would like it or not. My concern was to make sure that I was clear in what our stance was in America and that they knew what we thought and why we thought it. What I found was our voice got stronger, respect grew, and the countries really welcomed the leadership. Because even though they resent us, they want us to lead. And they tell us that over and over again.

Friedman: Beyond the question of moral leadership, you’ve had to decide what to focus on and what not to focus on. Do you push for the joint investigative mechanism in Syria? Do you push for UN internal reforms? Or do you do other work? I assume that in doing that, you’ve had to have some kind of working definition of what America’s role in the world should be beyond the question of moral leadership. What have you landed on? How do you think about what America’s role is, because you can’t do everything, right?

Haley: I wanted to make sure we had a good sector of what we focused on, and some of it was planned and some just fell in my lap that I needed to take. One, I was just honored to serve a country I love so much. I wanted to do it in a way that the American public was proud. I thought it was very important that we continue to stand by our allies, which you saw me do, whether it’s Ukraine, whether it’s Israel—all those. I thought it was very important that we go against the dictators, whether it was Iran, Syria, Cuba, Venezuela, and call them out for what they were doing. I thought UN reform mattered because the American public should get what it pays for. We took on reform efforts and were able to slice $1.3 billion off the UN budget and are still moving in that direction; reformed and brought accountability to peacekeeping; we’re now focused on the scales of assessment on what countries pay. That part was also very important. And then just the overall security in the world—making sure that we saw problems before they happened, and that we were in front of it to go ahead and put out those fires. I think those were a lot of things.

One of the things that landed in my lap that was really glaring was the foreign aid. It was probably over a year ago, our team put together a book for the president, and it basically was all of the foreign aid we give each and every country, and the voting coincidence with that, at the UN. I went and I gave him this book and I said, “I just want you to look at this.” He was shocked. He was furious. My point to him was, our aid should not be based on just this vote. But we don’t need to be giving money to countries that say “Death to America.” We don’t need to be giving money to countries that go behind our back and try and stop us from doing things. We don’t need to be giving money to those that don’t want to be our partners, because there’s a lot of countries that do want to be our partners, and we just need to be smart about it. I think it should be one of the things we look at, but I think there should be a strategic view on which countries we partner with, which ones we count on to work with us on certain things, and move forward accordingly. I think we just blindly allow money to keep going without thinking that this is real leverage. We have to use it. The one example I’ll give you is, look at Pakistan. Giving them over a billion dollars, and they continue to harbor terrorists that turn around and kill our soldiers—that’s never okay. We shouldn’t even give them a dollar until they correct it. Use the billion dollars. That’s not a small amount of change. Tell them, “You have to do these things before we will even start to help you with your military or start to help you on counterterrorism.” It’s those types of things that you really want to kind of look at.

I think the Iran deal was very telling. Everybody meant well. Everybody wanted Iran to stop what they were doing. But the reality was, they took most of what they could get and they turned a blind eye to the rest of it, and the blind eye was dangerous. The idea that you’re doing ballistic-missile testing is dangerous. The idea that you’re supporting terrorism is dangerous. The idea that you’re meddling in countries—whether it’s Lebanon, whether it’s Israel, whether it’s Syria, all of these things—and you’re meddling for the bad reasons in the Middle East. That’s serious. To give them literally a plane-load of money—is that smart? Should we not have used it as leverage and worked in a different way? That was the only point I was trying to make to the president, which is that all of the agencies need to come together, and for all of the reasons they give, we need to have a plan on what our relationship is with that country and how much do we want to do.

Friedman: So you don’t buy the argument that foreign aid can turn an adversary into an ally, or it can make a country more favorable than it would be otherwise.

Haley: No, I think it absolutely can. I think that you do have to use it as leverage. I don’t think you should blindly give it and then expect goodwill. I think you have to ask for goodwill and then give it when you see good things happen.

Friedman: Do you think that promoting American values is in the core interest of the United States?

Haley: Absolutely. Absolutely. If we defend our values, and if we promote our values, the world is a better place. Every country—they can not like us, they can resent us, they can say bad things about us, but they all want to be us. They all look at the freedoms that we have, they all look at the quality of life, they look at the opportunities, and they all want to be like us. But they have to change their cultures to do it. That’s where the Human Rights Council was such a big deal. Instead of those countries getting on the Human Rights Council because they wanted to do good with human rights in the world, they got on the council to go protect being targeted on the Human Rights Council. You had a lot of bad actors that sit on the Human Rights Council, and those are the types of things that we have to call out. Those are the types of things that I tried to tell the Security Council, that if a government doesn’t take care of its own people, conflict will follow, every single time. Every single time. Human rights, to me, is at the core of peace and security, because it’s very telling about a country.

Friedman: In those complicated moments that I’m sure you faced, where American interests come into conflict with American values, how do you prioritize the two when they’re competing?

Haley: I don’t think you have to prioritize. There’s always a way to deal with both. It’s not comfortable, but when you see wrong, you have to call it out. When you see something that’s in the best interest of the United States, you have to go forward. But you can do both. There were many times with the Human Rights Council—some of our friends were on there, and I was calling them out. But you have to do it. I think the most dangerous thing we can ever do is show a blind eye to any sort of human-rights violations, any sort of wrongdoings, any sort of things that threaten people, because if it threatens people, it threatens the world.

Friedman: What’s the connection there? Why is it so dangerous? Because if there are human-rights violations, are you saying that’s the source of conflict that can then threaten the United States?

Haley: To me, what I’ve seen is when a government starts to oppress their people, when they start to pull their freedoms away, the natural instinct is for people to fight back. So look at Tunisia. You have this farmer. He’s sitting there at a fruit stand. He’s trying to earn a living to pay for his family, and every day he’s ridiculed by government officials, by law-enforcement officials, that come by, steal his money, steal his food, humiliate him. He got so desperate that he set himself on fire. And what happened? The whole country rose up. Conflict happens.

You look at Syria. Everybody talks about how long this war has been. What started that war? That handful of teenagers was out there doing what every teenager does—spray-painted something on a wall, and even though it wasn’t that bad, the government officials don’t just go and say something to them; they beat them, they bloody them, they pull their nails out and return them to their parents. Their parents go out to the streets, the country rises up, the government oppresses them, conflict happens. It always happens. To me, anytime people feel unheard or anytime people feel like their opportunities and freedoms are taken away, their natural instinct is to rise up and say something. And if a government doesn’t value human life, then they will do something to their people that the whole world will have to pay attention to.

Friedman: One case study that’s in the news recently that comes to mind is the murder of Jamal Khashoggi and the Saudi war in Yemen. I gather that there was discussion or there is discussion at the Security Council about, potentially, a resolution to do a cease-fire and humanitarian aid in Yemen. How do you think of interests and values there? Because that seems like a tough case study of where America has interests and it has values at stake in both the Khashoggi murder and the war in Yemen.

Haley: Everything’s not black and white. That’s the hard part. But the way we have to look at that is, we have worked very closely with Saudi Arabia on Yemen, really pushing them to allow humanitarian access—to move faster, to give more. That’s been a lot of our focus at the Security Council on what happened. The whole situation with Khashoggi is, we can’t give them a pass. We can’t. And the reason is, you have Saudi government officials that did this in a Saudi consulate. The Saudi government doesn’t get a pass. We can’t condone it, we can’t ever say it’s okay, we can’t ever support thuggish behavior, and we have to say that. I think that the main thing is: No, we don’t condone this; no, we’re not going to continue to be your partners if you continue to use thuggish behavior. But you know what? That country is our complete partner when it comes to fighting Iran, and our only real partner when it comes to fighting Iran, so it’s a balancing act, but you have to do both.

Friedman: Do you think you can speak out and at the same time maintain them as an ally?

Haley: We have to. And they don’t expect us to give them a pass, because that’s not who America is. But if you also look, that’s why we sanctioned the dozen or so Saudis, that’s why we’re asking for accountability, that’s why we’re going to push back. We need to continue to do it until we get it.

Friedman: Is there anything more you want the administration to do—you want the United States government to do—in response to Khashoggi that it hasn’t already done?

Haley: I think that they need to hold these people accountable, and we need to see that happen. Obviously we sanctioned, which is what we can do. They don’t owe that to us—they owe it to the world to show that this was not right. We can’t condone it, they can’t condone it, and they have to hold these people accountable.

Friedman: I’m sure you’re aware that there was a lot of drama at the Senate yesterday when the CIA director briefed certain senators that it was pointing the blame at the crown prince. Do you feel there’s more to do to hold the crown prince accountable if he was involved in this at all?

Haley: I think all of that, the administration needs to decide. It’s his government. His government did this, and so he technically is responsible.

Friedman: Broadly, on foreign policy, I’m wondering what you’ve learned over the past two years about foreign policy that you didn’t know beforehand, and specifically about the value of diplomacy, since so much of what you’re doing is diplomatic in nature.

Haley: As a governor, we were No. 1 in foreign financial investment—South Carolina was. So I was out everywhere recruiting companies from overseas to come to South Carolina, and we were great at it. I was used to dealing with other cultures or other countries from a business standpoint. Very different when you’re talking about peace and security, and so I’ve really enjoyed learning the aspect of peace and security and how that ties in. I think that diplomacy is always the right option, because war is never a good option. I looked at it as: Diplomacy was our means of trying to keep people safe. Sometimes it works and sometimes it doesn’t, but I only think diplomacy works if you demand actions. That’s the impatient part of me at the UN: Everybody loved to talk about things. I wanted to see things get done. It took us a couple years, but we got the arms embargo on South Sudan. I think that will make things completely different. It was tough getting the three sanctions packages [against North Korea], but we got them, and that’s what brought them to the negotiating table. Everyone was against us on the Iran deal, but all of a sudden if you noticed yesterday, the Europeans are now acknowledging that ballistic-missile testing that they’re calling Iran out for, so while we were standing alone at the time, they’re now all joining in the conversation, the fight.

I think that the one thing that I have felt is important is, some say that America has been weakened under this administration. I think it’s been strengthened, and the reason I think it’s been strengthened is because we’re not afraid to stand alone if it’s for the right things. If you’re fighting for human rights and you get out of the Human Rights Council, it’s the right thing. If you’re fighting for the fact that everybody is turning a blind eye to all the behavior that Iran is doing, it’s the right thing. If you go and say, “You can’t use chemical weapons,” it’s going to be the right thing. If you say that this is our embassy, we have the right to put it wherever we want to put it, yes you’re standing alone, but it’s the right thing. Like the Cuban resolution—we’ll stand alone all day long, but Cuba’s problems are not anything we did. It’s because dictators are not treating their people well. Same with Venezuela and Nicaragua.

Friedman: Specifically on what you learned, what experience did you draw on to get the Russians and the Chinese to support the toughest sanctions ever against North Korea, three times, in the summer and fall of 2017? What did you tell them to be able to convince them to get on board?

Haley: When you’re a governor, you do learn negotiating, and then obviously when it comes to foreign policy it’s just a different type of negotiation. But the one thing that is true in any scenario for anyone is, if you are trying to negotiate something, you first have to look at it from their point of view. You first have to think about it from what are they scared of, what would they see as a benefit, and then take what we want them to do and convince them it’s their decision. What I knew was, China didn’t want war on the peninsula. The relationship with North Korea had become nonexistent—between China and North Korea. North Korea was starting to get aggressive to them. Something needed to be done. They didn’t want military action. And they didn’t want a ton of North Koreans coming across their border. That was the big thing, because if Kim fell, they saw it as they would have to take care of North Koreans, and they didn’t want to have to do that. With that, we went into the situation of, “Okay, look, I get where you’re coming from. I know you don’t want North Koreans coming.” Just very bluntly and honestly. “I know you don’t want them crossing your border, I know you don’t want to have to take care of them, and I get there is no successor to Kim—a successor that we could openly look at.”

So I said, “If that’s where you’re coming from, and if our goal is to stop the ballistic-missile testing, and your goal is to stop the ballistic-missile testing, and military is not an answer, then let’s see what we can look at.” So we started looking at sectors. I said it in the first resolution: “Let’s send them a message.” Let’s just do these few, and it was a good number of sectors. “Let’s do these.” Throwing out their oil, which they never wanted to do. So I was like, “Okay, you push, push, push oil.” And then they’re like, “Okay, let's just do these.” So we did those. After we got China to agree, I let the rest of the Security Council know that China and I were in negotiations on how to do this. It wasn’t with paper. It wasn’t with talking points. It was me sitting down with the Chinese ambassador, saying, “I know what you have to prove for your government; I know what I have to prove. Let’s figure out how we do this.’”Once we got that, the rest of the Security Council was relieved, and then the issue was Russia. And Russia just didn’t like the idea that they weren’t involved. But if I’d had them involved, they would’ve been a spoiler. So what I ended up doing was going to Russia and saying, “We have this.” They immediately started wanting to strike these things. We probably gave them a little bit here or there, but nothing of substance. I told them we were going forward and they said, “Well, we’re not gonna have it.” So I said, “You’re going to be the only ones standing with North Korea against the rest of the world—is that what you want to do?” And we tested it, and they were with us.

Friedman: Did you know until the vote that they were going to be with you?

Haley: I knew, from the way the Security Council was talking, and the narrative that we were pushing out, no one wanted to be standing next to Kim. No one. Because if you think back to that time, it was a scary time, and no one wanted to do that. Clearly Kim gets upset again. It seemed like on every holiday and weekend, he would have a ballistic-missile test. Then another one happened. I start to have conversations again and say, “Clearly we’ve got to nudge a little bit more. If we don’t do anything, he’s going to continue to do this.” They obviously said “No, no, no, we can’t do that.” I said, “Well, let’s just look at these. Can we look at joint ventures? Can we look at something that will send another signal?” The pressure again was kind of mounting—I can’t remember if there were one or two ballistic-missile tests during that time—and we kind of did the same thing. That time, if I remember right—my timeline is blurred—the president had really strengthened his rhetoric at that point, which only helped me. All of that was very, very helpful, because I would say, “You know, I don’t know what he’s gonna do.”

Friedman: Did you know?

Haley: Yeah, I knew. But I said, “He very well could use military action.” At that time, Kim was starting to really say anti-American things. So I told my counterpart, “We're not going to be threatened. We’re not going to have American people threatened. This has to stop. And the president’s getting upset. I can’t promise you what he’s gonna do. We’ve gotta get this done.” And so at that point we were able to push a little bit harder. And I think one of [the rounds of sanctions] we did in a week. I can’t remember what it was. The French ambassador reminded me a few days ago—he said, “I will never forget you coming into the Security Council saying, ‘We’re gonna have a resolution and we’re gonna have it at the end of the week.’” And he said, “We all kind of looked at each other like, Yeah right.” He goes, “You got it done at the end of the week.” But I bounced it off the president’s rhetoric, saying “I can’t stop him. I’m not gonna be able to control him. We’ve gotta get this done.” I think that was the second [round of sanctions]. The third [round] there was no appetite whatsoever. They didn’t want to do it. They pushed back. They felt like they had done enough. They were nervous about where this relationship was going with North Korea.

Friedman: The Chinese and Russians?

Haley: Yes, the Chinese specifically. Russia fought the second [round] again. And then with the third one, they just didn’t even want to talk. The second one we went after part of the oil, and that was a big deal to get the second one. The third one we started talking about refined petroleum and some of the other things—I think that’s when we talked about laborers, which was huge for Russia, but it was huge for everybody. They didn’t want to talk. I said, “If you don’t wanna talk, then we’re gonna start doing our own thing.” [Treasury] Secretary Mnuchin was having conversations with the Chinese on his issues. And he and I got on the phone and he goes, “Let me talk to them,” so he talked to them—talked to them on other issues—and then he called me and said, “Okay, they’re coming to see you.’ A lot of the top guys came to see me. We sat down across a table. I said, “This is what we want.” They said, We’re not gonna give it to you.” I said, “Well then there’s nothing to talk about.” And because the president and Xi had said we’ve got to find something, I got up and walked out.

They got very concerned at that point. They came back and said,” No, no, no, let’s talk. Let’s talk.” Once we got that—and we really pushed it—that was the laborers, which was a huge hit to Russia, huge, and then that’s where we got more refined petroleum; it was really the kicker at the end. When I went to Russia, Russia said, “You can’t keep doing this to us.” They are a strong believer that sanctions don’t work. That was their No. 1 argument to the Security Council: Sanctions don't work. “All you’re doing is making them more mad.” But I knew that all of the money North Korea was getting, they weren’t using it to feed their people. They weren’t using it to take care of their people. Every dollar they got was going to that nuclear program. And if we could stop the money going to their nuclear program, then we could stop the threat that we were seeing. And so I made the direct correlation between money and the threat.

Russia said, “I’m not gonna do this.” They said, “These are laborers”—they tried to play with it. China at that point tried to be Russia’s friend and say we shouldn’t do laborers, whatever. I just pushed through. I just absolutely pushed it through and said, “We’re gonna do this,” and I shamed them into it. I think after that, for as difficult and complicated as that was, it wasn’t just that alone. You had General McMaster at the NSC [National Security Council], who was doing an amazing job of getting countries to expel their diplomats, closing down embassies, so there was an added pressure there. Between my work with sanctions, the NSC putting pressure on all the other countries’ embassies, and the president’s rhetoric, it was those things that really allowed it to happen.

Friedman: You said, “I don't know what the president’s gonna do,” and you knew. Were we actually close to war?

Haley: No. Having said that, if they had launched something, if it had come near the U.S., the president totally would have. But at the time, were we gonna instigate something? No.

Friedman: You’ve mentioned that one of your conditions for taking the job was you being able to speak your mind, even when what was in your mind was not in the president's mind. I’m curious, if you can think of any examples, of when you persuaded the president to come around to your views on a particular issue, or vice versa—when you have changed your views when working with the president and come around to the way he sees things.

Haley: I thought it as governor and I think it now. I think that personal conversations should stay personal. What I can tell you is there have been issues where I felt strongly about something and I picked up the phone or called the president. He was always willing to listen. He was always unbelievably supportive and would always hear me out. I don’t think he gets enough credit for that, because there were many times I pushed back that he could’ve easily said “This is what I’m doing,” and he never did that. He never did that. He would then give his argument or his thoughts, I’d give him mine, and we’d come together in the middle on where we could meet. It has been an amazingly good relationship, and really, I would not have been successful at the UN had I not had the support of the president. Every ambassador knew I had the ear of the president. Every ambassador knew I could pick up the phone at any given time and call him. And that support was monumental in me being able to do my job.

Friedman: Do you feel that you share the president’s vision of America’s role in the world?

Haley: I think that we have two different styles, and I think his style is unique, but I think people see that. But I get where he wants to go, and I just have my different style of getting us there. I think we agree on most things. There are certainly things that we don’t agree on. And when we talk about it, he’s the president. If he’s still that way, my job is to go and do what he needs me to do. But for the most part, he’s been very willing to listen and very willing to come around. If you give good arguments, you have to say why it matters, what it will do, what the connections are, and explain yourself. If you do it in a very thorough way, he will usually go and get a couple of other people’s take on it, and then that’s it, and then he’ll go with it.

Friedman: The United Nations: total mess, or just a partial mess?

Haley: Depends on the day. The United Nations has a lot of flaws—the waste and bureaucracy, the anti-Americanism, the Russian veto. It’s a very frustrating place. Having said that, we would not have gotten the North Korea sanctions had it not been for the UN. We would not have gotten the arms embargo from South Sudan. We would not have had the conversations on human rights and corruption, which I brought to the UN for the first time. The American people are going to need to decide whether they find value in the UN. I never thought that my job was to prove whether it was good or bad. I always thought my job was to educate the American public on what it was. They could decide whether they liked it or not, but I put the good and the bad out there. I wanted them to know the issues we talked about, so the feeling I got over time was instead of being anti-UN, we brought the American public into the issues at the UN. That, I felt, was giving them value for their investment. I think the verdict is still out. I think countries really need to look at our leadership role, look at our host-country role, and respect it. They don’t have to agree with us all the time, but we do deserve respect there, and we do deserve getting a value on our investment, and I think we have to always fight for that.

Friedman: Campaign slogan for Haley 2024?

Haley: Truly no one believes me: I am not even thinking about it. You know what I think about? I think about sleeping in. I do. I think about sleeping in, I think about binge watching TV for a day, I think about not having the stress level that I’ve had for the last eight years. For the last eight years, seven days a week, I always pick up my phone with a pit in my stomach, worrying that something bad is gonna happen. And I wait for the day when I don’t have to be so scared of my phone. That’s the reality of it.

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