Kim Jong Un's Nuclear Agenda

As the new North Korean leader consolidates power, his country's nuclear program could play a role in its diplomatic relations and even economic policies.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un visits a military facility. (Reuters)

As the country rolls out itsĀ "new look" leadership, North Korea's continuing nuclear program has dropped from the headlines, following North Korea's failed rocket launch and the failure of the Obama administration's "leap day" understanding with North Korea. An article this month by Frank V. Pabian and Siegfried Hecker in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists and an Institute of Science and International Security (ISIS) report by David Albright and Christina Walrond are firm reminders that North Korea's nuclear program and uranium enrichment efforts continue regardless of whether or not they are in the headlines.

Pabian and Hecker build on geo-spatial analysis of North Korea's two previous tests to suggest possible options North Korea might take (or might have already taken) in the event when and if they decide to conduct a third test. The ISIS paper provides preliminary estimates regarding North Korea's potential production of weapon-grade plutonium if they decide to use the LWR currently nearing completion at Yongbyun for such purposes. However, North Korea's uranium enrichment efforts add a sizable degree of uncertainty to estimates of North Korea's fissile material stocks because there is no credible means of monitoring North Korean production of weapons-grade materials now that North Korea is using centrifuge technology, most likely at a secret site, for the purpose of uranium enrichment.

But as he takes steps to consolidate his power, Kim Jong Un appears to be holding the program even closer, acknowledging the program as his father's achievement by including mention of it in North Korea's revised constitution. It is even possible to imagine that North Korea's nuclear deterrent might even become an internal justification for North Korea to pursue limited economic reforms that in turn, may tempt neighbors to strengthen relations with Kim Jong Un's nuclear North Korea.

As a first step in this direction, North Korea has normalized its relationship with China, with China's CCP International Liaison Department head Wang Jiarui as the first foreign official to meet with Kim Jong Un. Kim Jong Un's uncle Jang Song-taek visited China weeks later to talk about two major economic zones on which the two sides have agreed to cooperate. A rumored Kim Jong Un visit to China would be a major step toward conferring legitimacy upon Kim and shoring up external financial support for the new leader in the name of stability, even while North Korea's nuclear program continues apace. South Korea's new president, to be elected in December, is also likely to pursue better relations, including a more stable inter-Korean relationship that is unlikely to be conditioned solely on North Korea's denuclearization. Even if these developments provide a near-term motive for North Korea to defer a nuclear test, they will leave the U.S. marginalized in its efforts to deny acceptance of North Korea's nuclear status.

The task of coordinating South Korea's likely shift in policy toward engagement while refusing to acquiesce to North Korea as a nuclear power would be difficult enough to manage if there is a transition in power only in South Korea, but the there is also the possibility of a dual power transition in Washington and Seoul, in the event that President Obama does not win re-election. This circumstance presents a worrisome opportunity for North Korea to keep pressing forward on its own nuclear program, and could provide the new U.S. and South Korean administrations with an early and urgent test for their alliance. Even if North Korea's nuclear program is off the front pages, it does not lessen the gravity or capacity of the North Korea issue.

This article originally appeared at, an Atlantic partner site.