Morsi is the more complicated and interesting candidate, but against
the backdrop of U.S.-Egypt relations, it's pretty clear that the Muslim
Brotherhood's candidate is not likely to embrace the strategic
relationship. The Brothers have run against the Washington-Cairo link
since bilateral ties grew stronger in the mid-1970s. They used the
issue to pillory Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak and delegitimize a regime
whose legitimacy rested in large part on nationalism. It is important
to remember that the origins of the Muslim Brotherhood lie in Hassan al
Banna's dismay over foreign -- i.e. Western -- penetration of Egypt, which
damaged traditional values. I am not saying that the Brotherhood hasn't
changed since the early 1920s when al Banna first arrived in Cairo, but
mistrust of the khawaga is part of the organization's DNA. To
be sure, the Brotherhood espoused a pan-Islamic message at times, but
at a basic level, the Brothers are good nationalists.
Fast forward to
the January 25th uprising, which was about dignity and
national empowerment, and you understand further why a President Morsi
is unlikely to make his first international visit to the United States.
The Brothers were a bit late to the uprising and Morsi needs to
court -- as he seems to be doing -- the revolutionaries, liberals, and Lefties
who made the uprising possible. Those folks are not known to be
enamored with the United States and U.S. policy in the Middle East.
Indeed, add U.S. support for Israel and the fact that the Brotherhood's
previous electoral platforms indicated that U.S.-Egypt ties under
Mubarak essentially warped Egyptian foreign policy, and the writing -- in
day-glo colors -- is on the wall about the bilateral relationship under
Morsi. Some have suggested that Egypt is in such dire straits
economically that it will force Morsi to accommodate himself to
Washington because Cairo will need U.S. aid and goodwill in order to
secure international assistance. That is probably true and you already
see the Brothers trying out logically contorted arguments about the
United States and assistance, but given what is at best a deep
ambivalence or at worst the profound hostility of Egyptians toward
Washington, the relationship is going to change.
Ahmed Shafiq, in contrast, seems to have a U.S.-friendly background:
He was an air force commander, minister of civil aviation, and served,
if ever so briefly, as Mubarak's last prime minister. Shafiq was a
fully engaged senior official of the old order, which benefited
militarily, diplomatically, and financially from U.S. patronage. I
wouldn't make much of Shafiq's military background when it comes to the
United States. He wasn't trained in the United States, though he did a
fellowship stint on combined arms training in France. By all measures,
he was a proficient airman, serving in all of Egypt's wars since his
commission and seems to be well-respected among the senior officers -- he's
been their presidential candidate -- but here is the rub, the Egyptian
military has not been terribly happy with its American friends.