A strike could reinforce the hardliners' push to weaponize--a
path to which the Tehran has not yet committed. In 2009, the Bookings
Institute simulated potential Iranian responses to an air strike. Some of Iran's
responses include attacking military outposts in Afghanistan, attacking supplies
transported from Kuwait through southern Iraq, and launching missiles at oil
installations in Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province.
Although policy leaders in both the U.S. and Israel want to
keep "all
options on the table," a chorus of well-respected generals has warned
about the tumult that would ensue were the U.S. to strike Iran. Striking
known facilities is not a permanent solution -- we can bomb the facilities, but
not the knowledge and technical expertise required to rebuild them. Buying
three years, but thereby obliterating any potential for diplomacy, is not a
compelling end.
Washington's calculations have been driven, in no small
part, by successive administrations' insistence that continued Iranian
enrichment activity is unacceptable. Unfortunately, Iran has crossed the
nuclear capable threshold. Nuclear
capability is often defined as reaching enrichment levels of 20 percent,
and per the IAEA and numerous other reports, Tehran
has achieved these levels. As a nuclear capable state, Iran possesses the technical expertise and materials to move
quickly to create a weapon, though how quickly is not clear.
Iran's objectives for weaponizing (were they to do so) --becoming
a stronger regional force and deterring a conventional military attack--would be
better addressed diplomatically. Unlike a military strike, deft diplomacy could
move Tehran to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Association.
While this would allow Iranian enrichment activity to continue, it is the best
way to ensure Iran does not arm. In other words, destroying nuclear facilities
would address the symptoms while worsening the underlying disease. In order to
prevent Iran from weaponizing, U.S. policymakers will need to address Tehran's
motives.
In addition to normalizing economic relations, Washington
could reintegrate Iran into the international community, push for Iran's
entrance into the World Trade Organization, and provide security support to
compensate for the lost deterrence capability. More meetings with Iran won't
generate a good campaign slogan for Obama, but bargaining has worked.
In 2003, Libya opened up its nuclear program to IAEA
inspectors in exchange for full reintegration into the international community
and normalization of economic relations. NATO intervention following the 2011
Libyan uprising, and subsequent ousting of Qadaffi, might not have been
possible had Tripoli succeeded in weaponizing. Several
other countries, including South Africa and Brazil, gave up their programs
peacefully with a mix of incentives and international pressure. There is no
guarantee, given the current rift between sitting President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei as well as the lessons Tehran's leadership likely
drew from Qaddafi's abandonment of Libya's weapons program, that Iranians would
be receptive. But we will never know until we try.