How would the Sunni community react to the establishment of such a de
facto Shiite dictatorship? It seems unlikely that they would simply
acquiesce, but even if they did, it would be no guarantee of stability
for Iraq. Since Iraq gained (nominal) independence from the British in
1932, it has been wracked by countless coups d'état. The country proved
almost impossible to govern for one autocrat after another, each of whom
found himself locked in various battles (often literally) with one
unhappy group after another. Saddam Hussein was arguably the only Iraqi
dictator to create a somewhat stable autocracy--and he was certainly the
only one who was able to rule continuously for more than a few years. Of
course, he was able to do so only by creating a Stalinist totalitarian
state and employing near-genocidal levels of violence. Especially
because of the recent experience of the Sunni insurgency and the Iraqi
civil war, the likelihood is that a Maliki dictatorship would prove
short-lived and unstable, and it could easily end in a new civil war.
It is far more likely that the Sunnis won't acquiesce to Maliki as
dictator, even if merely in an opaque, de facto sense. Then the question
will be whether they decide to revolt and mount a violent opposition
suddenly or more gradually. Either way, we would likely see the
Sunni-dominated provinces of al-Anbar, Diyala, Salahaddin and Ninewah
distance themselves from the government, demand regional status, cease
cooperation with Baghdad, and prevent Iraqi government officials--likely
including federal police and army formations--from gaining access or
moving around freely in their territory. Terrorist attacks would
increase in both intensity and geographic scope as more money and
recruits poured in from the Sunni community in Iraq and from neighboring
Sunni states like Saudi Arabia and Jordan.
Eventually, those terrorist attacks would expand into a full-blown
insurgency. If the Iraqi army were to fracture along ethno-sectarian
lines, allowing Sunni soldiers to bring their training and heavy
weaponry with them to the Sunni side, we could see pitched battles
between government forces and well-organized Sunni militias. Iraqis
would once again find themselves sliding into all-out civil war, this
time without the prospect that the United States would--or even
could--save them from themselves.
A Way Forward
What should the United States be doing instead if not trying to help
fracture Iraqiya? Washington has relinquished so much of its influence
in Iraq. But at the very least, we can and should be outlining what a
good solution to the current crisis would look like.
First and foremost, Prime Minister Maliki will need to be convinced
to back off from his campaign against the Sunni leadership. Although he
blames the Sunnis for starting things by agitating for a regional
devolution of power, a right enshrined in the constitution, all he can
legally do is insist that they follow the procedures established by
law--and then try to persuade Iraqis not to support their bids. Instead
he has tried to head off these moves by using all manner of legal and
illegal actions to eliminate the Sunni leaders supporting regional
status.
Thus Maliki must agree to some face-saving mechanism that would
effectively eliminate the arrest warrant against Hashimi (even if it
were simply to be placed in some kind of administrative limbo) and
enable either Mutlaq to remain as deputy prime minister or allow Iraqiya
to choose his replacement. This would have to be accompanied by a
renewed commitment by the prime minister to implement the terms of the
Erbil agreement, which outlined how the prime minister, the Kurds and
Iraqiya would work together to govern Iraq. These conditions will be
hard for Maliki and his advisors to accept, but the last will be the
hardest by far, since the Erbil agreement mandates real curbs on the
prime minister's power. The Sunnis and Kurds (and perhaps some Shia too)
now feel these curbs are more important than ever given how he used his
powers to go after the Sunni leadership, exactly the sort of thing that
the Erbil agreement sought to prevent. Unfortunately, Maliki has so far
adamantly refused all of these moves, particularly the elements of the
Erbil agreement intended to limit his power.