Saleh was always regarded as a notoriously resilient leader. He
weathered 33 years in office, first as the dictator of the Yemen Arab
Republic. He maintained his power despite a unification agreement with
South Yemen in 1990 and a civil war in 1994. He was famous for his
ability to manipulate tribal rivalries to direct popular ire away from
his office. Perhaps his most impressive feat, though, was his improbable
return
to Yemen in September after nearly three months of medical treatment in
Saudi Arabia, even as protests against his regime continued. Despite
his return to Sanaa and months of trying to divide the protest movements, Saleh could not outlast them.
The agreement will not satisfy all of the protesters; many will likely
be disappointed by the amnesty provision. The uprising has been bloody.
Hundreds of protesters, soldiers, and tribal militants have been killed;
the massacre
of more than 50 protesters in March prompted the defections of
government and military officials, and intermittent violence has
continued since. Many protesters had insisted that Saleh stand trial,
but there are other concerns facing the country.
Yemen is now wracked with several domestic conflicts. The government has
fought against various tribal groups, including al Ahmar's tribal
militia and rebellious tribes in Arhab province; against protesters in
the anti-regime town of Ta'iz; and against Islamist militants affiliated
with al-Qaeda in the south. Violence has displaced
many Yemenis from their homes. Because Yemen already hosts many
refugees from the Horn of Africa, it is struggling to find more
resources to house and feed displaced Yemenis. Yemen also faces a dire
water crisis, an oil crisis, and an economic crisis. None of these
problems has gotten much attention during the government's legitimacy
crisis.
The revolution isn't over yet. The agreement stipulates that Saleh must
delegate his executive authority to Hadi in the next 30 days and begin a
transition that will lead to new elections. There is still plenty of
time for stalling. United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon said
that he was told Saleh was planning to seek medical treatment in New
York, but Saleh's D.C. spokesman has since said that those plans are on
hold for now; Saleh's plans remain unknown. Ginny Hill, a Yemen expert
at Chatham House, speculated on Twitter that Saleh finally signed the
deal to avert a freeze on his assets. Indeed, Saleh could still be
buying time.
It is also unclear how the powerbrokers in Yemen will respond. Hadi has
never been known as a particularly forceful political figure; the
implementation of the transition will rely on three men still in Sanaa
-- Sheikh Sadiq al Ahmar, the leader of the powerful Hashid Tribal
Federation; Ali Mohsen al Ahmar (no relation to Sadiq), the commander of
the defected 1st Armored Division; and Ahmed Saleh, the president's son
and commander of the Republican Guard. Gregory Johnsen, a doctoral
candidate at Princeton University, observed on Twitter that while Hadi
may nominally have the power of the presidency, the rivals are each
backed by armed supporters. If these three leaders don't come together,
their disagreements could lead to more violence.
The deal does provide some reason for guarded optimism. The process
of effecting a transition in Yemen was always going to be slow and
difficult, but the first step has always been to end Saleh's tenure as
president. He may still try to find ways to evade his obligations, but
there is a signature now, ink on paper, committing him to step down.
New battles may be waged for the control of the Yemeni government, but
that will be part of the process, a process that can now, finally,
begin.
