As the world (slowly) comes to grips with the
horror of Syria and the Assads, there remains a coalition of nations
that appear to be acting under the belief that the Assad regime is
better than what might come next. It's an odd group in the rather
strange new world of the Middle East: Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and
Turkey. For the Israelis, already reeling from the loss of a regional
strategic asset -- Hosni Mubarak's Egypt -- the predictability of
Assad's Syria was some consolation. Israel and Syria may be in a
technical state of war, but the Syrians have scrupulously kept the
armistice on the Golan Heights and it has been a long time since Syria's
military posed any significant security threat to Israel. The Israelis
put a premium on authoritarian stability in the Arab world, where they
fear change will almost always rebound to the benefit of hostile
Islamist groups. Sitting in Tel Aviv or Jerusalem, it is little wonder
the Israeli leadership is having serious qualms about the unrest in
Syria. Assad may be an implacable foe, but he is better than the Syrian
Muslim Brotherhood. From the perspective of the Israeli security
establishment, at least Assad is doing what Hosni Mubarak should have
done: using all available means to save his regime.
For the
better part of the last decade, Saudi Arabia has not had very good
relations with Syria. But the Arab spring has so unnerved Riyadh that
King Abdallah appears willing to let bygones be bygones. In late March,
when the protests in Syria were just starting to develop beyond Daraa,
the King called Assad to offer his political support. In the short run
at least, Riyadh appears willing to overlook both Assad's three
decades-long strategic alliance with Saudi Arabia's rival, Iran, as well
as Syria's growing influence in Lebanon, which comes at the expense of
Saudi's own ability to sway events there. The support for Assad is
consistent with Saudi strategy throughout the Arab Spring, which has
included support for Bahrain's ruling family and King Abdallah's offer
to Hosni Mubarak that he would make up the loss of American aid if the
Egyptians undertook a major crackdown. Clearly, the Saudis regard the
transformation of the region as a threat to their interests and
stability and will do whatever they can to help bring the uprisings to
an end.
The least surprising member of the region's pro-Assad
camp is Iran. Tehran has been trying to tell anyone who will listen that
the unrest in the Arab world demonstrates the righteousness of the
Iranian revolution and that change in the region only bolsters Iranian
interests and influence. Not exactly. So far, this has been mostly a
wash for Iran. There is nothing in the Arab uprisings that suggests
their instigators want to emulate the Islamic Republic; though, of
course, Islamist groups may yet benefit from more open systems in the
Arab world. Still, Arabs are demonstrating and dying for more freedom,
not for another form of authoritarianism under the guise of theological
messianism. And while change in Egypt weakens the region's anti-Iranian
axis, this does not appear to augur the flowering of Tehran-Cairo ties.
Both Egypt and Iran are big and important countries who maintain the
pretenses of regional leadership and influence. They are more likely to
be strategic competitors than partners. Change in Syria would be far
more problematic for Iran. Damascus is, after all, Tehran's most
important gateway to Arab politics, the focal point through which it has
been able to insert itself directly into the Arab-Israeli conflict,
among other regional issues. A Syria that is less hospitable to Iran
would not end Tehran's regional influence and ambitions, but it would
certainly be a setback for both. That's why along, with Jerusalem and
Riyadh, Tehran is hoping that Bashar al Assad has what it takes to hang
on.