Iain Dale attacks it. As does Iain Martin:

[A]n enthusiastic supporter of the government had the best argument. The idea, he says, is that it diminishes the PM’s power to call a snap election, giving the Lib Dems a lock on such a decision because he would need their votes to get to 55% of the House. This, he says, is an erosion of executive power and A Good Thing. However, he claims (or presumes, because ministers have yet to decide or make it clear) that there seems to be nothing to stop the Lib Dems breaking the coalition at some point, and joining Labour and the other parties to vote down the Tories on an old-fashioned 50%-plus-one no-confidence vote. Not sure that’s the case, as combined the other parties seem to have about 53% of votes in the Commons.

Or is it being suggested that there will now be two types of no-confidence motion? One requiring 50% plus one if it’s the PM’s opponents are putting it down and another different kind requiring 55% if it’s the PM trying for a dissolution?

The beauty of the existing convention of 50% plus one in all eventualities is that it is simple, easily understood and was, until the coalition document, accepted by all sides.

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