Fair enough. Greenwald's main point was that it's disingenuous to keep this set of concerns under wraps. But he also used scare quotes and sarcasm to imply that this rationale for engagement was being ginned up to bolster a weak case.  That innuendo is dropped in his response.

I also think that Greenwalk overstates Obama's the alleged secrecy. The challenges of dealing with Afghanistan, "Pashtunistan," Pakistan, Kashimir, and India are devilishly convoluted. The immediate aim is are to neutralize the Taliban so that a measure of stability can be restored in both Afghanistan and Pakistan and the al Qaeda's freedom to operate can be shrunk to as near zero as possible. A broad goal, which Obama has stated, is to foster development in Pakistan -- and so, as Greenwald acknowledges Obama has stated, to foster peace between Pakistan and India.  A means to that end is to convince the Pakistanis that the U.S. is not scheming with India to extend Indian influence in Afghanistan -- and perhaps to help insure that India's role in Afghanistan is constructive. Is it incumbent on Obama to go that far down the aim chain in the public case he makes for war?

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