Michael Singh has a good post on what happens if Ahmadinejad loses:

More troubling is the possibility that a reformist victory could lead Iran to engage in dialogue with the United States at the initiative of the new government, while continuing apace its nuclear program and support for terrorism at the direction of the Supreme Leader. This was the case during the presidency of Mohammad Khatami, who was courted by the West, who was the beneficiary of a series of unilateral gestures by the Clinton administration, but who made little change to Iran’s most troubling policies.
Nevertheless, a reformist win would likely evaporate whatever support exists for sanctions in Russia, China, and much of Europe, and spark instead a rush to Tehran for diplomatic and economic dealmaking. As a result, this outcome could paradoxically leave the Obama administration facing the bitter choice between military action and accommodation. Adding to the complexity, it is likely to take some time -- perhaps months -- to determine how the outcome of the election is affecting Iran's nuclear program and its policy toward the West.

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