Ledeen:

What’s going to happen?, you ask.  Nobody knows, even the major actors.  The regime has the guns, and the opposition has the numbers.  The question is whether the numbers can be successfully organized into a disciplined force that demands the downfall of the regime.  Yes, I know that there have been calls for a new election, or a runoff between Mousavi and Ahmadinezhad.  But I don’t think that’s very likely now.  The tens of millions of Iranians whose pent-up rage has driven them to risk life and limb against their oppressors are not likely to settle for a mere change in personnel at this point.  And the mullahs surely know that if they lose, many of them will face a very nasty and very brief future.

If the disciplined force comes into being, the regime will fall.  If not, the regime will survive.  Can Mousavi lead such a force?

If anyone had said, even a few days ago, that Mousavi would lead a nation-wide insurrection, he’d have been laughed out of the room.  Very few foresaw anything like the current situation, although I will claim credit for predicting that neither side in the electoral circus would accept the official verdict.

Does Mousavi even want to change the system?  I think he does, and in any event, I think that’s the wrong question.

He is not a revolutionary leader, he is a leader who has been made into a revolutionary by a movement that grew up around him. The real revolutionary is his wife, Zahra Rahnavard. And the real question, the key question in all of this, is: why did Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei permit her to become such a charismatic figure? How could he have made such a colossal blunder? It should have been obvious that the very existence of such a woman threatened the dark heart of the Islamic Republic, based as it is on the disgusting misogyny of its founder, the Ayatollah Khomeini.

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