In September 2006, in some of the darkest hours in Iraq, Mario Loyola wrote a very prescient piece in NRO on Iraq. Since so many - including me - have gotten so much wrong (and understandably in the opaque chaos of post-Saddam Iraq), it's worth tipping the hat to someone who got it right and for the right reasons. The piece is reprinted here. Money quote:

As the months pass, the struggle for Iraqi democracy is rapidly becoming Iraq's fight. Nearly all military operations in Iraq today are either joint or Iraqi-led. Coalition casualties have evened out, while those of the Iraqi security forces have increased dramatically. These are grim but telling statistics. Iraq's government of national unity is not out of danger yet. But given its broad representation of Iraq's communities--and the absence of any real competition--it is getting harder to see how it can fail. And victory by default is victory all the same.

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