Withdrawing from the nuclear deal, as he seems to prefer, would destroy America’s ability to monitor the Islamic Republic’s nuclear activities.
There’s a decent chance that tearing up the Iran deal, as Trump seems likely to do next week, will lead to escalating confrontation with Iran throughout the Middle East, diplomatic isolation of the United States, and military strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities that would likely have to be repeated periodically in the absence of any nuclear agreement or verification regime. I respect Reuel Marc Gerecht’s honesty in his recent Atlantic pieces advocating withdrawal from the Iran deal, and his willingness to accept the logical consequences of his approach, or at least the serious risk that these could be the consequences.
Gerecht says one reason America must insist on additional demands of Iran is because otherwise we will never know “whether the clerical regime is cheating outside the surveilled sites.” I’ll admit that no inspection regime could ever be perfect. But the current one that provides for 24/7 surveillance cameras at declared sites and gives the International Atomic Energy Agency the right to go wherever else it needs to go—including to military bases, by the way—is not just good but a whole lot better than no inspection regime at all, which is where I fear Gerecht’s policy prescriptions would lead. Once America bombs Iranian facilities, and they kick all the inspectors out, how are we going to be sure they’re not cheating then? Iran is a big country with lots of scientists, engineers, labs, mountains, cities, and military bases. How will we know what they’re up to? Will we send in inspectors like the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) in Iraq, and then, if they refuse, invade to change the regime? It’s not as if we haven’t been in a similar situation before.
