In the Republic's early days, many citizens viewed the ability to carry and service a public debt as a source of national strength. Great Britain's ability to borrow more effectively than its rivals, for instance, allowed it to finance a military establishment that vaulted it past all of its competitors in the 18th and 19th centuries. Alexander Hamilton, the first U.S. Treasury secretary, had that example partly in mind when he declared in 1781, "A national debt, if it is not excessive, will be to us a national blessing."
Thomas Jefferson and the Democratic-Republican Party that he led never accepted that logic and paid down the debt during the first decade of the 19th century. Even so, the public debt didn't become a major political issue until Andrew Jackson made it one in the 1820s. Jackson's objection was less economic than ideological — and personal. His abhorrence of debt was rooted in a failed land deal of his own, and his contempt extended to paper money, most federal spending, and — above all — the Bank of the United States, a distant precursor of the Federal Reserve. He viewed all of these as the means by which the rich and powerful manipulated government to gain advantage over the nation's small farmers and workers.
"At that point, the idea of the federal government living beyond its means meant that the rich and powerful were bilking the taxpayers," said historian Sean Wilentz of Princeton University, who has written extensively on that era.
As early as his (losing) 1824 presidential campaign, Jackson called the debt "a national curse" that served "a monied aristocracy," historian John Steele Gordon recounted in Hamilton's Blessing, a concise history of the federal government's debt that provided key insights for this account. After Jackson won the White House in 1828, he proudly tracked progress toward extinguishing the debt in each of his State of the Union addresses. When it was finally paid off at the end of 1834, he triumphantly wrote: "Free from public debt, at peace with all the world "¦ the present may be hailed as the epoch in our history which shall be best calculated to give stability to our Republic and secure the blessings of freedom to our citizens."
Ironically, Jackson's maneuvers — particularly, his Javert-like quest to eliminate the central bank — produced a financial crash that sent the nation back into debt. The red ink became a torrent during the Civil War, whose costs demanded enormous borrowing, even after the first income tax was introduced. Validating Hamilton's vision again, the Union's superior ability to borrow contributed to its victory over the Confederacy.
During the next half-century, the federal debt declined steadily as a share of the economy without much fuss or discussion. Predictably, it rose again during World War I, though the government subjected more Americans to the income tax and raised its rates. The war's aftermath produced the first big round of debt politics since Jackson's day. Calvin Coolidge and his Treasury secretary, Andrew Mellon, placed reductions in the debt, spending, and taxes at the center of their economic vision — anticipating arguments that Ronald Reagan and then the tea party would offer decades later. "From a reduction of the debt and taxes will accrue a wider benefit to all the people of this country than from embarking on any new enterprise," Coolidge insisted.