![]()
Round Three: Concluding Remarks - August 25, 1999 There's something about bad politics that makes for good writing. Think Evelyn Waugh. Think H. L. Mencken. Think Ezra Pound. And now think Tucker Carlson, another good writer with bad politics (though his writing isn't as good, nor his politics as bad, as the aforementioned). In his previous response Carlson writes, "Only the wealthy and the highly educated [participate in politics]? What about the motivated, the interested, those who bother to show up at the polls in November? Can't they participate? Of course they can. They participate already, and likely always will. This is the beauty of the American political system: it is run by those who care enough to run it. Everybody else gets the government he deserves."
I hate to take up so much of my final response on a (strictly speaking) nongenerational tangent, but I'm not done with Carlson, whose defense of the Republican tax cut is, alas, as typical as it is preposterous. The people who will benefit most from the tax cuts --those in the highest tax brackets -- are not presently having any trouble going out to dinner or sending their kids to camp. And the people -- most of the rest of us -- who will be most hurt by the erosion of public investment or the withering away of social services will benefit hardly at all in absolute terms. Returning to the generational questions at hand, I think Andrew Shapiro gets it exactly right when he says that rather than asking "What is the politics of this particular age group?" we ought to begin with "What is the politics of our time -- and what role do young people play in it?" These are not easy questions to answer. American politics in recent years has become simultaneously diffuse and constrained. Party differences on many questions do seem to have narrowed, and (as several of us have mentioned in earlier responses) there has not been a catalyzing political event. Shapiro and I appear to agree that the growth of the Internet, and the digital age generally, are an important part of the social and political context today. But another important part is the economy. Eight years of economic growth have clearly had a deadening effect on politics: people who are doing well are less concerned with politics. Eight years of economic growth have made the proponents of welfare reform, for example, look good. And I certainly hope they continue to look good, even though this may mean a continuation of American politics' gradual tilt toward the right. But the persistence of the income gap, and the increasingly contingent nature of employment in the information economy, have engendered a deep uneasiness that lies not far beneath the political surface. When the business cycle turns down, and when the stock market falls, the politics of this country (and the politics of our generation along with it) may lurch to the left or the right -- or both. The nature of this unfortunate situation -- in which continued prosperity perpetuates a rightward political drift and those left behind by economic growth are simply abandoned; in which only bad economic news will galvanize a resurgence of the left, leaving some Nation-types (though not Andrew Shapiro, I'm sure) awaiting a crash with breathless enthusiasm -- leads me to attach some hopefulness to Ted Halstead's ideas about a marriage of fiscal conservatism and progressive concern. I still don't know that generational politics is a plausible route to that marriage, but if someone can manage to awaken the heretofore politically quiescent X Generation before economic or social disaster does it for them, that will likely be a good thing. Join the debate in Post & Riposte. We'll highlight selected readers' remarks as the Roundtable progresses.
Copyright © 1999 by The Atlantic Monthly Company. All rights reserved. |