![]()
Round Three: Concluding Remarks - August 25, 1999 With all due respect, Ted Halstead seems to be changing his tune here to explain away a significant flaw in his article. Halstead acknowledges that my Round One critique of his analysis is correct, admitting that "just because a majority of Xers believe in balanced budgets and a majority also believe in government intervention to help those at the bottom, it does not necessarily follow that there is an overlapping majority in favor of ... 'balanced-budget populism.'" This would seem to undermine one of Halstead's central claims -- that Xers, unlike other generations, favor a unique left-right hybrid when it comes to economic policy.
That's not the way I remembered Halstead explaining it in his article, so I checked again. And (for once) my memory served me right: after positing that "many Xers ... support ... balanced budgets" and that "the majority believe that the state should do more to help Americans get ahead," Halstead draws the unsubstantiated conclusion that Xers are "calling for a new economic synthesis" between left and right. (He even describes this as the "Generation X economic agenda.") That sounds a lot more descriptive than normative. And the description isn't supported by fact. I wouldn't usually make a big stink about what could well be a small mistake made in good faith. But in this case I think it's warranted because the error points to the problem with Halstead's Gen X project itself. As I said before, trying to understand politics along generational lines may cause us, even unintentionally, to make tenuous and forced claims. A good example appears to be Halstead's claim that Xers are uniquely supportive of a left-right economic synthesis. Meanwhile, I'm beginning to think that generational analysis may only make sense when there is a truly horrible event, like a war or a depression, which shapes the experience of an age group. This is true of almost every "generation" we've mentioned during this roundtable: the generation that dealt with slavery and the Civil War, the Lost Generation of World War I, the generation that struggled through the Great Depression, the generation that fought World War II, and the Vietnam generation. These cohorts are not "generations" in the strict demographic sense of some fixed number of years passing between them. Rather they are generations defined by relatively random periods of extreme hardship. In this sense, the defining experience of the folks we call Boomers was probably less the prosperity of the 1950s than the social and political turmoil of the Vietnam War (and perhaps the civil-rights struggle). In the last round I argued that new technology such as the Internet will likely define our generation, and I still believe history will judge this to be true. But I doubt that technological change will galvanize our generation politically unless something related to that change really goes awry, whether it's the unethical use of biotechnology, the depleting effect of e-commerce on local economies, the rise of demagogic Internet-based direct democracy, or some form of biowarfare or cyberterrorism. Only in the event of such an occurrence -- or some other catastrophe -- will our generation be shaken, challenged, and forced to coalesce in a meaningful way. Scott Stossel perceptively asks whether generations only congeal politically "when things go bad." If so, let's hope that our generation remains relatively indistinguishable from those who are older and younger. Then we can return to the task of defining a politics for everyone, rather than just a politics for the elusive Generation X. Join the debate in Post & Riposte. We'll highlight selected readers' remarks as the Roundtable progresses.
Copyright © 1999 by The Atlantic Monthly Company. All rights reserved. |