Note that this has always happened: The Publius of the Federalist Papers was an anonymous user, producing user-generated content for national distribution networks. Publius could write anonymously because text makes anonymity really easy. Twitter's innovation, then, is that it allows anonymous writers to participate at the speed of discourse: to share a link before anyone else, to snark during Presidential debates, to fret while election results flow in.
6. Discussion tends to happen around news events that are already being covered.
This is another finding of the Sweden 2010 study. Check the graph below: it graphs the number of tweets against time. All those big spikes are tied to televised debates, well-covered rallies or the election itself.
Social media may democratize who gets to participate, but its aggregate decisions about what's news align pretty well with what the mainstream media think is news.
7. So what remains special about social media is that nonelite users control distribution.
Last month, a team of researchers led by New Mexico State's Ivan Dylko released their study of YouTube videos about the 2008 American Presidential election in the journal New Media & Society. Dylko's team looked at the most popular political videos every month, and those featured on the front News and Politics pages. Then they divided the figures depicted into "elite" and "nonelite" piles: the elite being major parties and media organizations; the nonelite being everybody else.
And what did they find? Check this chart, which looks at the percentage of video content variously featuring, made and posted to YouTube by elites and non-elites (as they defined those two groups):
Elites -- the candidates, but also the broadcast journalists -- dominated as the subject of the videos and as the makers of the videos. But "nonelite" people had posted almost all the videos.
Here's another graph that makes that more clear. This graphs the percentage of footage in each video created by pros:
Most of the videos were mostly made by the journalistic elite. But, in the words of the study, "over one-third of the most popular videos in the sample relied on no traditional media content at all."
The lesson here is nuanced: most political content in the 2008 election concerned candidates and was filmed by network camera crews. Media democratization of the sort predicted by the most radical technofuturists wasn't going on -- but ordinary people controlled what content made it to YouTube, and a non-trivial amount of content was being filmed and posted in its entirety by regular people.
8. Participating more in political discussion online doesn't necessarily increase political knowledge.
In a study published this year in Computers in Human Behavoir, Occidental Colleges's Meredith Conroy looked at how participation in political Facebook groups correlated to offline engagement. That part of her study, alas, only examined undergrads at a single college -- which makes its findings of rather limited use -- but it also contained a whole second part, which analyzed the content of a wider swath of political Facebook groups.
Conroy's team wrote:
Our content analysis indicates that political Facebook group users, in general, often do not share much new information and the information they do share tends to be somewhat inaccurate, incoherent, or not very well supported with evidence. As a forum for people to easily engage and share their opinions, online political groups are beneficial; however, as a forum to learn new political information online political groups are ineffective due in part to low quality wall discussion.
That's more than semi-obvious, right? (Cf. Reddit, as reported by Gawker's Adrian Chen.) But it builds toward a central point:
9. The huge effect social media have in elections, then, is that they allow nonelites to frame and distribute content made by elites. For better or for worse.
This shows up across the board, in study after study. In Dylko's YouTube study of 2008, power came from ordinary people posting and distributing professionally-made videos. The study of Sweden 2010 noted the same. And in this election, the Pew study found that candidate-issued tweets fell or rose based on whether people retweeted them.
The biggest change that can occur, then, is that framing by social media can shift how the professional media itself frames stories. Social media feeds the loop of news judgement. A study of a media scandal in India, written by Maryland professor Kalyani Chadha, found Internet distribution of certain primary sources helped make the corruption they documented into a story in the professional media. And Lei Guo's study of Chinese citizen media in the same journal distilled a number of elements. Citizen media could frame and affect state-controlled media if it created a "turning-point" that could no longer be ignored. Citizen media, in other words, framed the media's telling of a story, which refracted back onto how the media told the story. But in that refraction, elements got lost: a major theme in the Chinese citizen media was individual vs governmnet, and state media didn't convey this.
* * *
Reviewing these few points, I don't have huge answers, but I want to add a few closing thoughts.
The first: Yes, I'm assuming there are certain norms that stretch across the world, that Swedish Twitter use is usefully generalizable to American Twitter use. I do so tripping and bounding over philosophers who think about this stuff full-time, including those who worry that American or Western ethics about society and privacy are coming to dominate "home-grown" ethics in other societies. But I think, given the conclusions above, Sweden is useful enough.