Death and taxes, inevitable; anything about China, not

I agree with Matthew Yglesias's recent point that America's stakes and interests in China will and should affect U.S. politics more than they do now. (I mean, how could I not think that, given my current location?) I also agree that the articles he cites, while different in specific emphasis, reflect a common perspective that the U.S. has been duped by the Chinese, or has duped itself for reasons of laziness or self-interest.

But as a marker for later discussions, it's worth distinguishing one of these possible delusions from all the others. That is the idea that as China modernizes, it will inevitably become more democratic and less repressive. Everyone has heard the argument: the internet and mobile phones will make it impossible for the regime to maintain control; once people can go to Starbucks, they'll want choice in many other ways as well; a new generation will be open to the world and impossible to fool; and so on. James Mann's valuable short book, The China Fantasy is packed with examples of Americans talking this way.

This is way too huge a topic to be dealt with at the moment, but: If that is the definition of today's complacent-on-China establishment -- people who think that as China becomes rich, it will have to become more liberal -- then in no way do I want membership in that group. You can imagine circumstances that will lead China toward liberalization. I can more easily imagine circumstances that will not.

The main point is: many, many aspects of China's rise are up for exploration and debate. What, exactly, its military has in mind. Whether its environmental problems can be contained before they choke its growth (not to mention its people). How fast and how disruptively it will be able to move up the "value chain" in manufacturing. Whether the atmospherics of America's approach to China will have an influence on its behavior (that is, by treating it as either a "friend" or an "enemy," can the United States in fact make it into either of those things). Whether the regime should be considered "strong" -- able to get away with whatever it wants -- or in fact nervous and weak, (as Susan Shirk of UCSD argues in her very good recent book.) That's only the beginning of a very long list. No one can really be sure of the answers on such points, but there's a lot to discuss and a lot of evidence to deploy.

But the idea that the internet, Starbucks, and nice new clothes will necessarily lead China toward a liberal, democratic civil society? That contention needs to be separated from all the other questions, because it's just wrong.

More to come, mainly in the magazine.