Around 2004 or 2005, STRATCOM set up what it calls the Joint Information Operations Warfare Center in San Antonio, Texas. IO ops are run from here. Most everyone involved in this controversy, from Furlong to his superiors to the contractor intelligence gatherers, went through the JIOWC at some point in their careers.
The
CIA doesn't think STRATCOM should play in this lane. But neither does
Robert Gates, the Defense Secretary, or the State Department, or the
National Security Staff. Information Operations involves five fields:
deception, psychological operations, computer network operations,
electronic warfare and operations security. When you hear these terms, you
think military, war, penetration of secret bunkers and the like. The
State Department and the others want to make sure that Information
Operations don't conflict with what they call Strategic Communications
-- getting the message out that the US isn't fighting against Islam,
that the Afghan military is a credible institution. State sees IO from
the perspective of an ad agency: what does the customer need? STRATCOM
sees IO from the perspective of a military targeter: what's the target,
and how to we use all resources to manipulate it.
The
problem is that the main thrust of the current administration's
strategy for combating terrorism involves strategic communication,
State Department-style. There is room for both approaches, of course,
but there isn't room for an entity like STRATCOM to make unilateral
decisions about how to influence the adversary.
Inside
the Defense Department, there are a lot of people who work in
Information Operations and few of them who actually are well trained in
the art of deceptive communications. And other parts of the military
already "own" parts of the portfolio. The Special Operations Command is
in charge of psychological and unconventional warfare. It's not
surprising the STRATCOM wants all the territory it can get. Electronic
Warfare is particularly lucrative, because all the technology feeds
hundreds of millions of dollars to major defense companies like Boeing
and Northrop Grumman.
This leads to a final
point--who in the government actually owns information operations and
strategic communications? Good question. A 1991 law tried to split the
baby by saying that attribution is the main issue--if some activity is
stealth and covert, then it belongs to the CIA as "covert action"; if it's
an obvious attempt to influence opinion, then it belongs to the DoD.
What
has all this to do with Furlong, et al? Well, the lack of a unified IO
field theory has left serious gaps. Into those gaps go the
contractors--mostly retired military, intelligence or government
people--who provide the needed services.
As it shifted to a counterinsurgency doctrine in Iraq, the Pentagon stood up so-called "Human Terrain Teams" under the aegis of the doctrine and training command, composed of social scientists and anthropologists who are supposed to help combat units understand the culture of the non-combatants they inevitably come across. This sounds more innocuous than it is. The social science itself is questionable. And the question of what the HTTs are supposed to do -- help the military kill people more efficiently -- has set up a nasty debate inside academia and the Pentagon. Should the civilians use their skills to help military intelligence folks construct databases of relationships between tribal leaders? If if they shouldn't, is that what they're doing? Are military contractors using the HTTs to create more opportunities to profit? (Absolutely). Being on an HTT is also dangerous. Civilian scientists are getting killed. The HTTs are being looked at.
As it shifted to a counterinsurgency doctrine in Iraq, the Pentagon stood up so-called "Human Terrain Teams" under the aegis of the doctrine and training command, composed of social scientists and anthropologists who are supposed to help combat units understand the culture of the non-combatants they inevitably come across. This sounds more innocuous than it is. The social science itself is questionable. And the question of what the HTTs are supposed to do -- help the military kill people more efficiently -- has set up a nasty debate inside academia and the Pentagon. Should the civilians use their skills to help military intelligence folks construct databases of relationships between tribal leaders? If if they shouldn't, is that what they're doing? Are military contractors using the HTTs to create more opportunities to profit? (Absolutely). Being on an HTT is also dangerous. Civilian scientists are getting killed. The HTTs are being looked at.
In
the case, Furlong provided a service and was left by senior executive
service types to hold the bag while they ran for it when they got
caught with their hand in the cookie jar.
That's the main reason why Furlong's operation is still running. It's providing a useful service for the military, though it might be illegal, and there's nothing, really, that's ready to replace it.
That's the main reason why Furlong's operation is still running. It's providing a useful service for the military, though it might be illegal, and there's nothing, really, that's ready to replace it.
This article available online at:
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/05/the-secret-pentagon-spy-ring/56956/
