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October 1952
Washington's Hardest Decision
With this essay the Atlantic
begins a series of biographical papers each of which will discuss that time of
supreme crisis, that turning point, when a man's fortunes were made or lost.
DOUGLAS SOUTHALL FREEMAN, the leading historian of the South, knows more about
George Washington than any other man alive. Ten years ago he began laying the
foundation for his great biography, four volumes of which have already
appeared, with a fifth announced for this autumn. Mr. Freeman, affectionately
known as the Sage of Richmond, was for thirty-four years the editor of the
Richmond News Leader, but at his busiest he never ceased to work at his
monumental life of Robert E. Lee for which he was awarded the Pulitzer Prize in
1934. He knew the turning point in Lee's career, and he now singles out with
fresh illumination the hardest decision General Washington ever made.
by Douglas Southall Freeman
The time had come when the General felt that he could resign without disservice
to his country. Sir Guy Carleton's last transport had left New York. Not a
British soldier remained on the soil of the United States elsewhere than at the
western posts from which it was assumed the garrisons soon would be withdrawn.
The peace treaty contained explicit admission of American independence; the
alliance with France was firm. Command of what remained of the Continental Army
could be transferred safely to Henry Knox, former Chief of Artillery.
So, on the 23rd of December, 1783, Washington appeared before Congress at
Annapolis, Maryland, and in ceremonies made tense by their complete simplicity,
he read a brief address that concluded with these words: "Having finished the
work assigned me, I retire from the great theatre of action; and bidding an
affectionate farewell to this august body under whose orders I have so long
acted, I here offer my commission, and take my leave of all the employments of
public life." With that he drew the folded paper from his pocket, stepped
forward, placed the document in the hands of President Thomas Mifflin; and as
soon afterwards as courtesy allowed, he mounted his waiting horse and started
for Mount Vernon.
He knew he was a national hero. Had not Congress voted him an equestrian
statue? When later he asked for his commission as a souvenir, was there not
talk of returning it to him in a gold casket? Glen who had witnessed all the
discouragements and defeats of war from 1775 to Yorktown in 1781 believed that
his energy, his resolution, his leadership had carried the cause to victory,
and they did not begrudge any honor or withhold applause of any apostrophe the
most imaginative of their orators could fashion.
The General was honored not less for what he was than for what he had
accomplished, because the people of the United States realized that in dealing
with Congress, with jealous subordinates, and with some difficult men among the
fine corps of officers France had sent to America, he had displayed a patience
and a candor that had behind them unshakable integrity. Washington was alone on
his pedestal of public acclamation. Survivors of his campaigns mentioned his
name gratefully and then paused before they spoke of anyone else, even of
Nathanael Greene, who had conducted a magnificent campaign with a small force
on the other front.
This distinction in the public mind was the one the retiring Commander-in-Chief
most desired and most cherished. The day before he said farewell to Congress,
he told the authorities of Annapolis that he had the "greatest of earthly
rewards: the approbation and affections of a free people"; and when he had been
home a month he wrote that he was "made extremely happy by the gratitude of my
countrymen." Others might seek the prize their ambition coveted; the good
opinion of the country repaid him for eight years' neglect of his private
affairs. He would not trade principles for popularity but he wanted to preserve
his position at any honorable price. Although he never quite persuaded himself
that it was possible to escape all criticism, he confessed later to Arthur
Young: "I have studiously avoided, as much as was in my power, to give any
cause for ill-natured or impertinent comments on my conduct."
The surest means to these ends obviously was to keep away from political
contention. He would continue to love his country and to rejoice in its
progress, but he had lived his day. "I shall view the busy world," he told one
of his French comrades, "in the calm light of philosophy and with that serenity
of mind which the soldier in his pursuit of glory, and the statesman of fame,
have not time to enjoy." He went further: "I am not only retired from all
public employments, but I am retiring within myself and shall tread the private
walks of life with heartfelt satisfaction." To his beloved Lafayette, his son
in the spirit, he wrote almost exuberantly: "Envious of none, I am determined
to be pleased with all; and this, my dear friend, being the order of my march,
I will move gently down the stream of life until I sleep with my fathers."
2.
Retirement did not bring leisure. His antebellum debts remained; bonds and
mortgages due him had not been collected or had been paid, usually, in
depreciated currency; he heard that lands on the Ohio which he had patented
with every safeguard of law were being offered for sale in Philadelphia and
even in Europe as the property of other men; inquiries of every sort came to
him by post; guests, sometimes a dozen of them at a time, enjoyed his viands
and drank his Madeira, while their servants gorged in his quarters and their
horses munched his corn because he lived in a district that boasted no inn to
care for visitors' attendants and mounts. Almost a year and a half elapsed
before he had a single dinner alone with his wife. With Mount Vernon crowded
week after week, Washington counted himself fortunate if he could devote
himself to business during the morning and discharge his duties as host during
the afternoon.
Public service gnawed many hours. Some estates of which he had been executor in
1770 still were unsettled; trusteeships continued; his interest in the
development of the West made him a willing leader in a movement to improve the
navigation of the upper Potomac, and when a company was organized to link this
eastern river with the watershed of the Ohio, he became its president. Even if
financial difficulty and busy occupation denied him the contemplative ease he
had thought he would have, life at Mount Vernon was as close to the fulfillment
of his dreams as a practical man could have expected. With himself the sole
loser by possible mistakes of judgment, Washington did not have to display the
public "care and caution " that had been the vigilant law of his anxious life
in the Army. There could be on the plantation no Thomas Conway to scoff at his
management, no Charles Lee to revile him, no Horatio Gates to hold suspiciously
at arm's length. Decisions about crops and cattle did not incense Governors or
arouse Delegates in Congress.
For a short time, Washington had optimism, curbed but confident, for the future
of the Union. "Everything, my dear Trumbull," he wrote a former secretary,
"will come right at last, as we have often prophesied; my only fear is that we
shall lose a little reputation first." He told Governor Benjamin Harrison, his
long-time spokesman in Congress: "Like a young heir, come a little prematurely
to a large inheritance, we shall wanton and run riot until we have brought our
reputation to the brink of ruin, and then, like him, shall have to labor with
the current of opinion, when COMPELLED perhaps, to do what prudence and common
policy pointed out, as plain as any problem in Euclid, in the first
instance."
Before many months, the theorem was confused. The gradual economic recovery of
some parts of the country was less apparent from the seclusion of Mount Vernon
than was the political bewilderment of public men. Ugly rivalries developed
among the States; Congress manifestly needed more powers than it had, but it
would not exercise those it possessed; the considerable volume of specie left
in America by French and British was hoarded or sent overseas for needed goods;
a depreciated currency was a dragging ball and chain whenever a forward step
was made; British commercial policy appeared inflexibly hostile.
Washington tried to view this philosophically in the private letters he wrote.
Over and over he remarked that the people "must feel before they will see," but
he found even his tightly woven patience raveling. "Illiberality, jealousy, and
local policy mix too much," he warned, "in all our public councils, for the
good government of the Union." In the dispute over the grant to Congress of
powers to raise revenue and to regulate commerce, he did not pretend to be a
nonpartisan, though he made no public statement. "If we are afraid to trust one
another under qualified powers," he insisted, "there is an end of the Union."
In another communication his argument was: "We are either a united people or we
are not. If the former, let us, in all matters of general concern act as a
nation....If we are not, let us no longer act a farce by pretending to it."
This letter was written to the Virginia Congressman, James Madison, thirty four
years of age, for whose discerning accounts of public events Washington was
grateful. Most of the General's older friends in public life were dead or
feeble, preoccupied with their own affairs or concerned chiefly with the
politics of their State. Exchange of views with the Adamses, with Franklin, and
with Hancock never had been frequent. Patrick Henry, Richard Henry Lee, and
even Philip Schuyler now wrote seldom. Most of those sending information to
Mount Vernon or seeking his advice on political questions were men, such as
Alexander Hamilton and Henry Knox, who had been too young to participate in the
colonial juntas and too busy with arms during the war to share conspicuously in
the organization of the State governments. Washington enjoyed and extended this
correspondence. Of his 159 political letters written to Americans in four and a
quarter years at home after the war, 76 were addressed to one or another of
seven men, all of them in their twenties or thirties. Without the least
intention of doing so, Washington speedily became the leader of a company of
young men more interested in the Union than in the individual States.
Washington's own opinion of the States was being lowered by every delay on
their part in voting to Congress the power to raise revenue with which to
revive public credit. The danger that America would lose the reputation she had
won in the war made him forget on occasion his resolution to give no cause for
"ill-natured comments." "My opinion," he said almost angrily in May, 1786, "is
that there is more wickedness than ignorance in the conduct of the States." He
concluded unhappily: "The want of disposition to do justice is the source of
the national embarrassments. It was not necessary to specify. Unwillingness to
pay taxes, suspicion of government in general and particularly of Federal
government, the selfish jealousy of rival States, and an alarming increase in
every sort of vicious economic cheating that promised temporary gain--these
were hampering the recovery of America and were too widespread for Washington
to spend time in describing them to correspondents who battled daily with the
base realities.
He began to think that the men who formed the American Confederation "probably
had," as he put it, "too good an opinion of human nature," and he confessed his
concern over a situation he did not think he could improve. "Having happily
assisted," he said, "in bringing the ship into port, and having been fairly
discharged, it is not my business to embark again on a sea of troubles." He
continued: "Nor could it be expected that my sentiments and opinions would have
much weight on the minds of my countrymen; they have been neglected, though,
given as a last legacy in the most solemn manner. I had then perhaps some
claims to public attention. I consider myself as having none at present."
3.
Events of the summer and autumn of 1786 seemed to confirm all Washington's
fears for the future of the Union. Bitter loss and perilous sliding on the very
brink of financial chaos had not convinced the country that a surfeit of paper
money was worse than a shortage of specie. Seven States yielded to the
temptation and started the presses again. Rhode Island outdid them all by
voting to issue any needy freeholder paper currency equal in nominal value to
half the estimated value of his real estate, the only security behind the
bills. This currency was made legal tender for the payment of all debts. If a
creditor refused it, the debtor could deposit the bills with the court and
procure his discharge. Any person who declined to accept this paper money in
current purchase and sale was liable to arrest and fine. If, as a few
courageous leaders warned, the result of this emission of depreciating paper
was relief for the poor debtor and ruin for the well-to-do creditor, this was
considered by many as precisely what should come to pass. All had shared in
saving property during the war; they should divide equally what had been
preserved. To Washington it seemed as if the controlling faction in Rhode
Island were burning down the homes of all, but he said, half bitterly, "there
are combustibles in every State, which a spark might set fire to." Shays'
Rebellion in western Massachusetts alarmed him, if possible, still more.
Anxiously he wrote to inquire whether the insurgents had a just grievance that
should be corrected; and if they had no excuse for their acts, he wished to
know what Massachusetts intended to do to vindicate its courts and its laws.
Until this time Washington had abandoned his detached position to the extent
only that he had spoken sternly in private letters of men and of policies that
threatened to ruin the country's credit and to destroy the Union. Now, in
answer to his inquiries, his friends had to suggest that he do more than write.
David Humphreys knew how earnestly his old chief wished to continue in
retirement, but in describing to the General the state of affairs in New
England, the former military secretary gave this unpleasant advice: "In case of
civil discord, I have already told you that it was seriously my opinion that
you could not remain neuter, and that you would be obliged, in self-defense, to
take part on one side or the other, or withdraw from the Continent. Your
friends are of the same opinion." Word was sent, also, that Congress might ask
him to come to New York to counsel the discouraged Delegates; James Madison had
received intimation that it would be desirable for Washington to make a
"private visit" to New England if conditions grew worse, as some of his
correspondents believed they inevitably would. "We are all," Light-Horse Harry
Lee wrote his old leader, "in dire apprehension that a beginning of anarchy
with all its calamities has approached and [we] have no means to stop the
dreadful work." Washington himself said, "I shall be surprised at nothing, for
if, three years since, any person had told me that at this day I should see
such a formidable rebellion against the laws and constitutions of our own
making as now appears, I should have thought him a bedlamite, a fit subject for
a mad house."
Benjamin Lincoln routed Shays' insurrectionists in January-February, 1787, and
deferred, if he did not render unnecessary, a call for the former
Commander-in-Chief to take the field, but the Massachusetts general could not
destroy the contagion of unrest. Madison confessed a fear that discontent still
was spreading. Washington thought the spring of 1787 would witness events that
would "astonish world." If this was to be prevented and a score of other
dangers averted, the Federal government must be strong enough to raise money
and to enforce law. Unless these things were done, the Union would cease to
exist. It could not live on sentiment or by sufferance. The Revolution was
played out, the spirit of '76 was gone. Most of Washington's correspondents and
native guests were of one mind on all this. The speediest rescue, they agreed,
would be through the revision of the Articles of Confederation, but in what
manner should this be undertaken? From what quarter could strength be mustered
to overcome the hostility of those who lived in the illusion their States could
survive though the Union perished?
The answer was not as complex as the question made it appear. A demand had been
taking shape for a convention of the States. The proceedings of the Annapolis
convention, attended by several of Washington's most devoted political
lieutenants, had pointed the way. If a body of the ablest men of the entire
country met and exchanged views, their recommendations for changes in the
Articles might be approved. The proviso was a most important part of the plan.
Any success that attended the work of a new convention would depend, among
other things, on the representation of all the States, and on the standing and
equipment of the men who were put forward--small men, small issue.
Favorable action by Congress on the call for a convention and the election of
Delegates by all the States except Rhode Island came quickly and presented a
new problem to the old soldier, whose hounds in full cry made finer music, he
thought, than even that of General Saint-Simon's band at Yorktown. Instead of
having the prospect of continuing the daily delights of rural life and all the
pleasures of experimenting with seed and trees from far countries, Washington
might be required to return to the realm of wrangle: the Virginia General
Assembly had named him unanimously as one of the State's representatives at the
Federal Convention, which was to meet in Philadelphia early in May.
His supporters were divided over the "yes" or "no" of his acceptance. James
Madison insisted that Virginia could not spare Washington from her delegation
and that gloom would engulf the enterprise in his absence. Edmund Randolph,
then Governor, and Henry Lee were equally urgent. Henry Knox was doubtful.
Washington, he said, would be elected president of the convention if he
attended, with the result that "the proceedings...will more immediately be
appropriated to you than to any other person." Knox concluded: "Were the
convention to propose only amendments and patchwork to the present defective
constitution, your reputation would in a degree suffer." Conversely, the
proposal over Washington's signature of an "energetic and judicious system"
would be "highly honorable to your fame...and doubly entitle you to the
glorious republican epithet, The Father of your Country." David Humphreys was
cautious, almost pessimistic: "What chance is there...that entire unanimity
will prevail? Should this be the fact, however, would not the several members,
as it were, pledge themselves for the execution of their system? And would not
this inevitably launch you again on a sea of politics?...I have heard few
express any sanguine expectations concerning the successful issue of the
meeting, and I think not one has judged it eligible for you to attend."
4.
Washington's inclination was to accept Humphreys's view. Previously the General
had notified the Society of the Cincinnati that he would not attend its
meeting, which was to be held in Philadelphia about the time the Federal
Convention assembled. It might seem rude, if not insincere, to decline to sit
with his old officers and then to appear in the same town as a member of
another body. Besides, he was having rheumatic pains and could not conveniently
be absent from his plantations at the wheat harvest. On the other hand, the
life of the Union depended on revitalizing its organic law. If this could be
done at the proposed convention, "it would," he said, "be an honorable
employment," but if the convention were small and restricted to easy amendment,
then, he said frankly, "I should not like to be a sharer in this business."
Still again, he wondered whether his absence from the convention might not be
considered, as he phrased it, "dereliction to republicanism." Even worse
motives, which he did not specify, might be attributed to him.
The choice was difficult, but in the end the pressure of his friends and the
prospect of the attendance of leading men in considerable number induced him to
accept appointment and to start promptly for Philadelphia. When the convention
was organized, he was unanimously elected president, as Henry Knox had
predicted, and in that position he was spared a direct share in debates for
which he was not well-equipped. His presence meant more than his vote, though
he went on record for a strong executive and for a lower House of Congress in
which there could be a Representative for as few as 30,000 voters. He was
willing, too, to have the constitution become effective when seven States
approved it, and he did not value the good opinion of all honest men so highly
that he withheld denunciation of those who refused to participate in efforts to
give America a respectable and responsible government.
Rhode Island's absence from the convention outraged him. That State, he said
privately, "still perseveres in that impolitic, unjust and, one might add
without much impropriety, scandalous conduct which seems to have marked all her
public councils of late." Empty argument on the floor, fruitless debate over
trifles, angered him further. For a time, he almost despaired of a favorable
outcome, and, he confided to Alexander Hamilton, "do therefore repent having
had any agency in the business." He went on: "The men who oppose a strong and
energetic government are, in my opinion, narrow-minded politicians, or are
under the influence of local views."
The document that finally was placed before him for signature contained a few
provisions he disliked and many that he approved. His judgment both of the
constitution and of the country's needs made him favor ratification: but was it
necessary that he publicly say so? He had stepped out of retirement in the
emergency and had taken the risk of being denounced as a partisan: could he not
return to his position as the impartial friend of all right-minded men? The
constitution, he wrote Lafayette, "is now a child of fortune, to be fostered by
some and buffeted by others." Then he said, "What will be the general opinion
on, or the reception of it, is not for me to decide, nor shall I say anything
for or against it; if it be good, I suppose it will work its way good; if bad,
it will recoil on the framers."
Washington's old neighbor, Colonel George Mason, draftsman of the Virginia
Declaration of Rights and a member of the delegation to the convention, had
begun to assail parts of the constitution before he had left Philadelphia.
Patrick Henry aligned himself against ratification. So did Richard Henry Lee.
The incurably suspicious Arthur Lee, youngest brother of Richard Henry, was of
opinion that what others termed "errors" in the constitution were a deliberate
scheme to create an oligarchy. Washington thought the arguments of these men
were feeble, shortsighted objections to the best system of government on which
it had been possible to reach agreement. The moment the constitution was
assailed, his experience in dealing with an impotent Congress and with selfish
States made him the champion of the new plan. He left the detailed argument to
Madison, to Hamilton, and to others scarcely less astute; but almost without
regard to its effect on his reputation as a man who stood apart from the
political controversies of the time, he opened correspondence with supporters
of the constitution in all the States where he had friends of influence and he
continued eagerly to follow the deliberations of all the State conventions.
They absorbed much of his thought in the winter of 1787-88 and the following
spring.
Nowhere did the heat of contest rise more quickly or the fires of debate flame
more furiously than in Virginia, where Washington and the other supporters of
an adequate Federal government had to face the persistent opposition of Patrick
Henry, who was fully aroused and at the head of a powerful following. It was
manifest early in 1788 that ratification or rejection of the constitution in
the Old Dominion would be by a narrow margin. Washington took up his pen with
much awkwardness but he wielded it as vigorously as if it had been a sword,
though in one instance only, and then by mistake, did his letters get into
print.
Without excessive risk and opposition, the constitution received the favorable
vote of nine States. When Virginia became the tenth in June, 1788, by a
disagreeably narrow majority of ten, many thought that Washington's efforts had
been decisive in prevailing over the opposition of Patrick Henry. "Be assured,"
James Monroe said, "General Washington's influence carried this government."
5.
Washington had not been subjected to personal abuse, though in several
instances relations had been strained. "With some," he said, "to have differed
in sentiment is to have passed the Rubicon of their friendship." He added:
"With others (for the honor of humanity) I hope there is more liberality; but
the consciousness of having discharged that duty, which we owe our country is
superior to all other considerations." Unruffled, he continued: "It is the lot
of humanity. But if the shafts of malice had been aimed at me in ever so
pointed a manner...shielded as I was by a consciousness of having acted in
conformity to what I believed my duty, they would have fallen blunted from
their mark....At my age, and in my circumstance, what sinister object or
personal emolument had I to seek after, in this life?"
Now that the task was performed and the new government was assured of a chance
to prove itself, he hoped once again that he could return permanently to the
quiet occupation he most enjoyed. "The growing infirmities of age and the
increasing love of retirement daily confirm my predilection for domestic life:
and the great Searcher of human hearts is my witness that I have no wish which
aspires beyond the humble and happy lot of living and dying a private citizen
on my own farm."
When this was written, August 16, 1788, Washington knew that jealous, hostile
men probably were saying already he "aspired"--and to the highest office. While
the Philadelphia convention still was in session, the assumption had been that
he would head the new government. The powers vested in the President of the
United States had been shaped, as Pierce Butler said afterwards, with one eye
on Washington; otherwise they would not have been so extensive. Lafayette,
reading the constitution "with an unspeakable eagerness and attention" in
Paris, was alarmed because a President who exercised those powers was eligible
for re-election. But he found comfort, he wrote, in the belief that Washington
could not decline the presidency and, once in the chair, would recommend that
the seat be narrowed if it proved too much like a permanent throne.
In February, 1788, General John Armstrong, friend and comrade since the days of
the French and Indian War, had exhorted Washington solemnly: "Persuaded as I am
it will cost you much anxious thought, nevertheless, if the call of God is
manifested to you in a plenary or unanimous call of the people, I hope that
will obviate every objection; if not for the whole term of four years, at least
for half that time, if health admit; considering, as you will, that we were not
made for ourselves, therefore must not live to ourselves. My sole reason for
these early hints is, that by a divine blessing you may be made instrumental in
giving a wise and useful EXAMPLE TO SUCCESSORS, in more things than what may be
merely essential to the office."
Washington scarcely could have read a more disturbing letter or one written in
wiser appeal to his love of country. In answer, he reminded Armstrong he had
accepted membership in the convention because, "at so critical a moment, an
absolute refusal to act might on my part be construed as a total disregard of
my country, if impelled to no worse motives"; but a call to another "tour of
duty" of this kind? He hoped from his heart he would not receive it. "I am so
wedded to a state of retirement," he said, "and find the occupations of a rural
life so congenial with my feelings, that to be drawn into public at my age
could be a sacrifice that would admit of no compensation."
There he left it; there he prayed it would remain. Even to Lafayette, he
elaborated only in this: "it might not be decent for me to say I would refuse
to accept or even to speak much about an appointment which may never take
place." He repeated over and over again that he did not entertain a wish
"beyond that of living and dying an honest man on my own farm," but these
answers neither silenced nor satisfied the Federalists, whose cause he had made
his own. They continued to urge him to accept an office they insisted the
electors unanimously would tender him.
6.
As long as he could, he persisted in saying, "The event...may never happen,"
but by October, 1788, he felt the "kind of gloom" coming over him that always
had shadowed him when he had to make a crucial decision. He comforted himself,
as best he could, with the assurance that if he had to accept, he would remain
in office no longer than was necessary to get the new bark over the shoals and
into the clear channel. Then he might be permitted "once more to retire," as he
wrote wistfully, "to pass an unclouded evening after the stormy day of life." Another
hope of the autumn was that the "government would
be just as happily and effectually carried into execution without my aid as
with it." He did not find his friends willing to admit this, or even to look
for someone else. Before the month ended, he was forced to say, "At my time of
life, and under my circumstances, nothing in this world can ever draw me from
[retirement] unless it be a CONVICTION that the partiality of my countrymen had
made my services absolutely necessary, joined to a FEAR that my refusal might
induce a belief that I preferred the conservation of my own reputation and
private ease to the good of my country."
On that he stood, but not confidently, because the two influences he had
underlined, the conviction of duty and the fear of just reproach, challenged
him hourly. In December he cried: "May Heaven assist me in forming a judgment,
for at present I see nothing but clouds and darkness before me....If ever I
should, from any apparent necessity, be induced to go from home in a public
character again, it will certainly be the greatest sacrifice of feeling and
happiness that ever was or ever can be made by [me]." He still clung to the
hope that he would not be called, and he told himself that if he were elected
he would decline if he could.
One letter after another, written to those he knew would keep his statement
confidential, set forth his overwhelming perplexity. Against acceptance he
mustered all save one of the arguments that seemed most reasonable to him: he
was too old; his interest was in agriculture; he had a growing love of
retirement; the office would involve new fatigues and trouble; if he returned
to public life after all he had said about ending his service, might he not be
"chargeable with levity and inconsistency, if not with rashness and ambition"?
His last citadel of defense was the assertion that the duties of the office
most certainly could be discharged by someone else as successfully as by him.
What he naturally kept to himself was the unhappy state of his finances: he did
not have money with which to pay for even current household purchases and he
would have to go deeper in debt to make the journey to the temporary capital.
In the "contra" column of this balance sheet of duty and inclination, the
heaviest entry had the simplicity of this eight-word question: Was the good of
the country at stake? If danger or collapse did not threaten the new structure,
he would remain in his own house, where by silence and kindly action he could
preserve the good opinion of his fellow citizens; but if the welfare of the
United States required his service, he would leave Mount Vernon again, risk his
reputation and endure the clamor, the censure, the unjust abuse even, he was
apt to receive. "If I know myself," he said, "I would not seek or retain
popularity at the expense of one social duty or moral virtue."
The new year, 1789, brought hope for the future of America along with added
unhappiness for Washington. Elections to the First Congress, he wrote
Lafayette. "have been hitherto vastly more favorable than we could have
expected." There were evidences of an "increasing unanimity" that was "not less
indicative of the good disposition than the good sense of the Americans."
Through the "clouds and darkness" of his own perplexity, Washington thought he
saw "a path as clear and direct as a ray of light, which led to the attainment"
of national happiness. "Nothing," he continued, "but harmony, honesty, industry
and frugality are necessary to make us a great and happy people." In that was
promise and perhaps reward, but with it--of all things!--an embarrassing
multitude of insistent applications for office as if he already were President.
To the burden of answering these letters was added the task of getting affairs
in order at Mount Vernon. Five or six hundred pounds had to be borrowed, also,
if Alexandria merchants were to be paid before...
Yes, it now was "before" and not "if" he had to quit that beloved refuge of his
on the Potomac, and face again the contest and confusion. He did not say in
plain words "I will accept," because formal notice of election had not been
received. The electors in the various States were assumed to have met on
February 4 and were believed to have cast their votes unanimously for
Washington; but their certificates had to be delivered to the new Congress,
which was not due to meet until a month later. In March, Washington's
correspondents wrote discouragingly of the slow arrival of Senators and
Representatives. It was impossible to say when a quorum would be mustered and
the vote be counted, but the result was certain. Washington knew it, and knew
that his sense of duty demanded he accept. There was no escape. Delay in the
organization of Congress, he told himself, was no more than a reprieve.
Painfully, sadly, on the 1st of April he opened his heart to Henry Knox, his
still-young former Chief of Artillery, the man who had never failed him: "My
movements to the chair of government will be accompanied by feelings not unlike
those of a culprit who is going to the place of his execution: so unwilling am
I in the evening of a life nearly consumed in public cares, to quit a peaceful
abode for an ocean of difficulties, without that competency of political skill,
abilities and inclination which is necessary to manage the helm. I am sensible
that I am embarking the voice of my countrymen and a good name of my own, but
what returns will be made for them, Heaven alone can foretell. Integrity and
firmness is all I can promise; these, be the voyage long or short, never shall
forsake me, though I may be deserted by all men."
That was the decision; the rest was formality. When Charles Thomson arrived at
Mount Vernon on the 14th of April and delivered the official announcement of
unanimous election, Washington wasted no time in answer: "Having been impressed
with an idea of my being with Congress at as early a period as possible, I
propose to commence my journey...the day after tomorrow"; a long, hard journey
for him--and for any like-minded man who comes after him.
Copyright © 1952 by Douglas Southall Freeman. All rights
reserved.
The Atlantic Monthly; October, 1952; "Washington's Hardest Decision"; Volume
190, No. 4;
pages 45-51.
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