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Recent commentary from National Journal:

Media: Goodwill Lacking (December 24, 2002)
Dole's sense of humor and his heroism kept political and media feelings warm. By William Powers.

Legal Affairs: Do African-Americans Really Want Racial Preferences? (December 24, 2002)
Racial preferences pin a badge of inferiority on every black and every Hispanic student. By Stuart Taylor Jr..

Media: The Corrections (December 17, 2002)
The once-genteel media world has become a place where somebody is always waiting to pounce on your errors. By William Powers.

Political Pulse: Needed: A Tough, Credible Alternative (December 17, 2002)
Kerry could benefit in 2004 if the Democratic Party learns the right lesson from Landrieu's triumph. By William Schneider.

Legal Affairs: Cheney's Win Over the GAO Threatens Congressional Oversight (December 17, 2002)
The ruling is broader than necessary to protect the president's ability to receive candid and confidential advice. By Stuart Taylor Jr.

D.C. Dispatch | December 24, 2002
 
Political Pulse
 
from National Journal Let the 'Invisible Primary' Begin

Gore's decision not to run means the race for money and poll position is wide open

by William Schneider
 
....

Why did Al Gore decide not to run? He undoubtedly learned that a lot of Democratic activists and contributors didn't want to hear from him this time around. They think he blew it in 2000.

Gore was also suffering from the vice presidential problem. Being vice president is a great way to get your party's nomination. That's because the outstanding quality in a vice president is loyalty. Partisans control the nominating process, and they value—and reward—party loyalty.

But once a vice president is nominated, he discovers that most voters outside the ranks of the party faithful do not value loyalty. As Richard Nixon discovered in 1960, and as Hubert Humphrey discovered in 1968, and as Walter Mondale discovered in 1984, and as Al Gore discovered in 2000, voters don't want a president who's "loyal." They want a president who's his own man. The only exception in 150 years: George H.W. Bush in 1988. In that election, being Ronald Reagan's man turned out to be a pretty good thing.

Nixon eventually did win election, in 1968. But he had to wait eight years to "recover" from being vice president. By 2008, Gore, too, may lose the vice presidential stigma. "I make this decision in the full knowledge and awareness that if I don't run this time ... that's probably the last opportunity I'll ever have to run for president," Gore told CBS's 60 Minutes. He added, "Don't know that for sure, but probably it is." That's not quite as definitive as Nixon saying, "You won't have Nixon to kick around anymore" after losing the race for California governor in 1962.

Gore would have been the odds-on favorite to win the Democratic nomination. William Mayer, a political scientist at Northeastern University, has studied every contested nomination in both parties since 1980. Here's what he finds: "In seven of the 10 cases ... the nominee-to-be had opened up a sizable lead over every other eventual candidate by, at the latest, one month after the preceding midterm election—more than a year, in other words, before the start of the actual delegate selection activities." Which means, at this very point in the nominating cycle.

After the 1978 midterm, Ronald Reagan was the front-runner for the 1980 GOP nomination. After the 1982 midterm, Walter Mondale led the field for 1984. Just after the 1994 midterm, Bob Dole was the Republican favorite for 1996. And right after the 1998 midterm, Al Gore led the Democratic field for 2000.

Same thing for George Bush the Elder going into the 1988 Republican contest. And for George Bush the Younger going into 2000.

There were a few exceptions. But each of them was, well, exceptional. After the 1978 midterm, Sen. Edward Kennedy—not President Carter—was the front-runner for the 1980 Democratic nomination. But just before the first primaries, the hostage crisis in Iran put Carter back in the lead. After the 1986 midterm, Gary Hart led the Democratic field for 1988. Hart proceeded to self-destruct. After the 1990 midterm, Mario Cuomo was the Democratic front-runner, followed by Jesse Jackson. But neither of them ran in 1992.

It's not unusual for a candidate to come out of nowhere and pull off a surprise primary victory—think Gary Hart in 1984, Pat Buchanan in 1996, and John McCain in 2000. Didn't they gain what George H.W. Bush called "the Big Mo" after he beat Ronald Reagan in Iowa in 1980? Yes, each of those candidates got momentum. But none of them got the nomination. As Mayer said in an interview, "I characterize momentum as a bit like a roller-coaster ride. It provides a lot of excitement. But in the end, it pretty much takes you back to where you started."

Mayer coined the term "the invisible primary"—the period from the midterm election to the Iowa caucuses, when candidates struggle for money and attention before a single vote is cast. Does the invisible primary matter? You bet it does. Because nine times out of 10, whoever wins the invisible primary becomes the nominee.

Winning the invisible primary means two things: raising the most money, and becoming the front-runner in the polls. Here are Mayer's findings:

"If one focuses on the last poll taken before the start of delegate selection activities—meaning, in most years, in the last poll before the Iowa caucuses—the candidate leading in that poll went on to win the nomination" in nine out of 10 contests. The exception: Gary Hart was the Democratic front-runner just before the 1988 Iowa caucuses.

"The leading money-raiser in the pre-primary campaign—more precisely, the candidate who had raised the largest amount of money by December 31 of the year before the election—went on to win the nomination" nine out of 10 times. The exception: John Connally had raised more money than Ronald Reagan by December 31, 1979.

Gore's decision not to run means the invisible primary becomes a real race—a wide-open struggle to see who can raise the most money and move to the top of the polls by this time next year. "What it does is make sure there's no front-runner," said Vermont Gov. Howard Dean, the first Democrat to get into the race this year. With no front-runner, the invisible primary of 2003 will count more than ever.


What do you think? Discuss this article in the Politics & Society conference of Post & Riposte.

More from National Journal.

More on politics and society in Atlantic Unbound and The Atlantic Monthly.

William Schneider is the Cable News Network's senior political analyst. He is also a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C., and a contributing editor for the Los Angeles Times, National Journal, and The Atlantic Monthly. His column appears every week in National Journal, a weekly magazine covering politics and government published in Washington, D.C.

For information on National Journal Group publications, see NationalJournal.com.

Copyright © 2002 by The Atlantic Monthly Group. All rights reserved.

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