| [an error occurred while processing this directive] |  |  |
 |  | |
| ||
| |||||||
| |||||||
|
| ||||||
| |||||||
| |||||||
 Recent commentary from National Journal: Legal Affairs: The President Should Stop Saying Things That Aren't True (July 23, 2003) The more Bush works at creating his own credibility gap, the harder it becomes to take his word for anything. By Stuart Taylor Jr. Political Pulse: On Second Thought (July 23, 2003) The percentage of Americans who say Iraq was not worth a war has doubled. By William Schneider. Media: Money Changes Everything (July 14, 2003) In assessing presidential hopefuls, the media place one qualification above all others: the ability to raise dough. By William Powers. Political Pulse: California's 'Best Worst Choice' (July 14, 2003) Will Gray Davis once again find a way to be 'the last man standing'? By William Schneider. Legal Affairs: How Campus Censors Squelch Freedom of Speech (July 14, 2003) Under the guise of enforcing vague rules against racial or sexual 'harassment,' censorship is thriving. By Stuart Taylor Jr. More from National Journal. |
Wealth of Nations 
Britain's Prime Minister Is a Hollow Friend
The abiding theme of Blair's career has been ideological pragmatism in the service of political ambition by Clive Crook .... As a frequent visitor from Britain, I am well accustomed to receiving praise for Tony Blair, our exemplary leader. I have long since stopped trying to deflect it. Conversation goes better, I find, if I graciously accept all compliments on the prime minister's behalf, and keep my seething irritation under control. In writing this column I always bear in mind America's fondness for Blair, and try to exercise due self-restraint. But since Blair is visiting Washington this week, and a surge of intolerable commentary on his virtues and achievements is already pouring forth, I have decided to unburden myself. All being well, the following brief outburst will see me through another few months of thanks and admiration. The most remarkable and annoying thing about Blair's appeal to Americans is that the man is adored by conservatives and liberals alike. Blair is about the only topic, in fact, on which they appear to agree. Conservatives see him as a kind of Margaret Thatcher: an unflinching ally in the new war against terror. Liberals see him as a kind of Bill Clinton, minus the character flaws: the champion of a new progressive politics. Skeptics should already be asking, can he really be both? David Brooks, writing in the July/August 2003 issue of The Atlantic Monthly, thinks so. He recalls a comment that Joe Klein, then of The New Yorker, made after watching Blair on the campaign trail and thinking about what Blair had in common with Clinton: "Baby Boom politicians, even in middle age, still seem like helium-filled dilettantes," wrote Klein. But Brooks reckons this "is no longer quite true of Blair. He risked his political career on a single moral proposition: that it was right to use U.S. and British strength to liberate the people of Iraq," Brooks writes. Moreover, Blair "has pioneered a Third Way philosophy that has allowed him to dominate the political landscape of his nation." Brooks does see a certain Baby Boom self-righteousness and self-absorption in Blair, but these are redeemed, he argues, by the "stubborn idealism" that characterizes both his policy on Iraq and, presumably, his domestic political agenda. Brooks, for my money, is among the most acute of American political observers—but he has got Blair all wrong. "Stubborn idealism"? I think not. "Helium-filled dilettante" still works for me. What drives Blair, I believe, is not conviction but vanity. No stubborn idealist would have been capable of Blair's ideological iterations. Blair started off in politics opposed to America's Cold War foreign policy and in favor of unilateral nuclear disarmament; now he is America's staunch ally. When getting on in the Labor Party required it, Blair was opposed to Britain's closer involvement with the European Union; when Europe emerged as an issue that could split the Conservative Party, Blair saw scope for advantage and became a fervent pro-European. Ideological pragmatism in the service of political ambition has been the abiding theme of his career. But ambition to what purpose? First, of course, to make Labor electable and thus achieve power. Now, and if necessary to the exclusion of all other goals, to secure a place in history that rivals Margaret Thatcher's. Thirteen years after Britain's Tories sacked her as leader, it would be difficult to exaggerate the extent to which Thatcher's legacy still shapes British politics. One of its less edifying aspects is the overriding importance of "strong leadership." To rival Thatcher's place in the country's history, Britain's political leaders believe they must strive, however ill-equipped they may be for the task, to do as she did—namely, pick fights over big questions and win. In this, the appearance of deeply held convictions and a seeming willingness to make sacrifices in pursuit of them are both helpful. Actually having deeply held convictions and a willingness to make sacrifices in pursuit of them can be a drawback. Thatcher's inflexibility over Europe was her downfall, as Blair needs no reminding. On other matters, even she, in fact, was more pragmatic than either her admirers or her enemies would care to admit—but she was never remotely in Blair's class of ideological flexibility. For Blair, the substance of any issue is always of secondary importance. The appearance of firmness and resolve invariably comes first, and not caring too much about the issues can often help in faking this. Take Iraq. Everything Blair had previously said about international affairs committed him to the view that any action against Iraq must be taken with United Nations backing in accordance with international law. His instincts, so far as one can judge, were authentically European. Contrary to what Brooks says, liberating the people of Iraq was never Blair's stated goal—for there was never the smallest prospect of U.N. backing for such an aim. For the same reason, Blair did not call for "regime change." Mere compliance with U.N. resolutions was Blair's declared goal for Iraq—and, to begin with, he and his ministers were confident that U.N. support for military action to enforce compliance would be forthcoming, should it be necessary. Britain kept pressing for this support long after America had given up all hope for it. When an exasperated Donald Rumsfeld finally told a questioner that America was ready to act alone if Britain dropped out of the coalition, Blair faced a stark choice. He could do what his principles, as previously enunciated, told him was right: demand more time for the inspectors, insist on a U.N.-backed solution, and look feeble like the French and the Germans. Or he could set his principles to one side, look strong, and do what Margaret Thatcher would have done. The first would have meant running away from a fight—something Thatcher never did, according to British political lore—and would have ended Blair's claim to her mantle. He chose the second, acting despite his beliefs, not because of them. Try this thought experiment. Imagine Al Gore in the White House. Suppose, as seems likely, that Gore would not have gone to war against Iraq. Is anybody seriously suggesting that Blair would have been urging, publicly or privately, for America and Britain to wage war to disarm Iraq (let alone liberate its people)? The idea is ridiculous. But what does that tell you about Blair's convictions on the matter? Which brings us to the "philosophy that has allowed him to dominate the political landscape of his nation." Truly, Blair and the Third Way are a match made in heaven. Thatcher had an ideology, so Blair must affect to have one as well—different from hers, obviously (you get no plaudits for mere imitation), and, even more important, different from the socialist one he started with (because you get no thanks for wrecking the economy). Blair's policies, like Clinton's are nothing but a form of moderate conservatism—or, for liberals who choke on that term, you could say "center-left." Such labels sound tepid and derivative; they will not do for a strong leader. What is required is an ideology that is bold and new and uncompromising, but with no actual content, since that might inconvenience pursuit of the centrist agenda that political necessity for the moment dictates to leaders like Blair. The helium-filled Third Way, with all its grandiose vacuity, is precisely this. So why complain? If the purpose of the Third Way is really just to disguise and dignify the conversion of hitherto-leftist parties to centrist politics, then genuine centrists (most of the electorate) ought to welcome it—or so one could argue. Actually, I would say this is debatable. Third Way rhetoric clouds a good deal else besides the shifting intellectual allegiances of the Left. To serve its camouflaging purpose, it obscures the fact that the world confronts politicians with difficult choices—the kinds of choices that make it impossible to be all things to all people. Instead of weighing the competing claims of individual freedom and collective welfare, for instance, or of economic efficiency and social justice, the Third Way emphasizes goals such as "community," "inclusion," and "citizenship." The point of such ideas is that everybody can agree about them. But everybody can agree about them because such ideas evade the issues that divide people—such as whose taxes should be cut, or how health care should be financed and provided, or how much teachers should be paid, or whatever. Those questions do not go away just because you smother them with a blanket of Third Way verbiage. Also, to be honest, I would prefer some forthright recanting. I would like to see Tony Blair and all the other old leftists admit that nearly everything they used to say was wrong all along—not just rendered out of date by globalization or other altered circumstances, as the Third Way catechism insists, but wrong, wrong, wrong. When Blair does that, I may join in the applause. Until then, it's back to grin and bear it.
What do you think? Discuss this article in the Politics & Society conference of Post & Riposte. More from National Journal. More on politics and society in Atlantic Unbound and The Atlantic Monthly. Clive Crook is a columnist for National Journal and the deputy editor of The Economist. This column appears every week in National Journal, a weekly magazine covering politics and government published in Washington, D.C. For information on National Journal Group publications, see NationalJournal.com. Copyright © 2003 by The Atlantic Monthly Group. All rights reserved. | [an error occurred while processing this directive] | ||
|
Home |
Current Issue |
Back Issues |
Forum |
Site Guide |
Feedback |
Subscribe |
Search
| ||||
