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 Recent commentary from National Journal: Media: The Post War High (April 22, 2003) The Washington Post of old—gutsy, sharp, writer driven—is back in town. Let's hope it is here to stay. By William Powers. Legal Affairs: How Bush Can Save International Law, Not Sacrifice It (April 22, 2003) The president can eschew wars of aggression while retaining the freedom to confront grave new perils. By Stuart Taylor Jr. Political Pulse: Making Other Countries Nervous (April 22, 2003) Conservatives of the 'World War IV' school see a long global conflict with Islam. By William Schneider. Social Studies: How to Secure the Homeland Without Leaving the House (April 12, 2003) Instead of bringing guards to watch America's critical infrastructure, bring the infrastructure to the guards. By Jonathan Rauch. Media: The Subversions of Mr. Kelly (April 12, 2003) In Michael Kelly's case, it's a huge mistake for journalists to reduce a meandering life story to a smooth package. By William Powers. Political Pulse: The Head of the Snake (April 12, 2003) Bringing down Saddam Hussein is essential to destroying his regime. By William Schneider. Legal Affairs: Myths and Realities About Affirmative Action (April 12, 2003) Most of the students who lose out because of racial preferences are not white; they're Asian-American. By Stuart Taylor Jr. More from National Journal. |
Wealth of Nations 
America Must Keep Its Word In Iraq.America cannot guarentee success in Iraq, but it can and must give success every chance. by Clive Crook ..... Whatever comes next, the destruction of Saddam Hussein's odious regime is a great prize, for the world and for Iraqis above all. The United States accomplished this at comparatively little cost to itself, its friends, and, so far as one can tell, Iraqi noncombatants. The speed of the victory, which routed critics of the Bush administration's planning as brutally as it did Saddam Hussein's soldiers, underlines how fearsome America's fighting technology has become. So much for the mockery of "shock and awe": As far as the "elite" Republican Guard was concerned, "shock and awe" about sums it up. The fall of Baghdad is another step in the reshaping of world history. A year and a half ago, America learned that it cannot ignore threats to its security. That lesson was itself a profound geopolitical shift. Since then, the United States has shown that it is not powerless to confront those threats. First, it eradicated Al Qaeda's client state in Afghanistan. Now, in the face of intense international skepticism, it has crushed another vile and dangerous regime. (Exactly how dangerous will be revealed as the evidence is uncovered.) No doubt the governments running Syria and Iran find this course of events uncomfortable. Good. Rogue regimes, sponsors of terrorists, and fomenters of international disorder are not the only anxious onlookers. The Arab street has seen the Iraqi army, which many in the Middle East believed to be the most formidable military force in the region, evaporate in the space of a fortnight. Then it had to endure the shame of watching Iraqis, as the regime collapsed, turn in rage not on the invaders but on the defeated tyranny and its symbols of misrule. This mighty jolt to Arab mythology presents America with a chance, probably brief, to reach some hitherto-closed minds. Many Arabs may be willing to rethink their own hopes of living in freedom and prosperity. Some may even be willing to examine their attitudes toward the United States. Some old assumptions are being called into question in Europe, too. This past weekend, the leaders of France, Germany, and Russia—the "other pole" of global power, as Jacques Chirac would have it—met to discuss their strategy for dealing with what they see as a far greater problem than Saddam Hussein ever was: a new America, determined to defend itself where and when it sees fit, whether France and the others like it or not. Chirac, Vladimir Putin, and Gerhard Schroeder have all the wrong priorities, but they see that the world has changed. The question is, How should America try to shape this new future? The hardest and most important thing for George W. Bush may be to keep a rein on his foreign-policy ambitions. If the sudden new focus on Syria signals a lessening of interest in Iraq within days of the war's conclusion, that would be a mistake. Yes, Syria is run by a bad lot (though not remotely in Saddam Hussein's class of wickedness). Absolutely, a stern reminder that America has its eye on the other Baath regime is all to the good: Zero tolerance of any assistance Bashar Assad might be inclined to lend to the deposed Iraqi leadership is correct. But the most important thing is that America apply its full attention and all necessary resources, political and material, to reconstructing Iraq. This is so despite the cost and the undeniably high risk that things will go wrong in Iraq anyway. America cannot guarantee success, but it can and must give success every chance. The Bush administration promised Iraqis better lives. It leaned heavily on this in justifying the war to Americans and others. Its reputation is at stake. It must keep its word, or at least be seen to try. A peaceful, prosperous, and democratic Iraq would be a grand achievement in its own right, of course. More important, it would be proof to people all across the Arab world and beyond that America's values and interests are not at odds with their own. The administration has talked of Iraq as a model for the region. The president must do all he can to make it so. Even with an unstinting American commitment, this is going to be an enormously difficult task. The administration's critics are already questioning whether the commitment is genuine—and they are right to wonder. Look at Afghanistan, say the skeptics. The United States is still there, admittedly, and life in the country has unquestionably improved since the days of the Taliban's insane rule. Even so, the White House gives every sign of having lost interest. Warlords still control much of the country, and that seems fine with Washington. America is spending a pittance on humanitarian aid and reconstruction. Aside from the good such help can do in the first instance, conspicuous generosity of this kind is a wise investment in international goodwill, and a valuable embarrassment to America's enemies. Yet the administration failed even to request funds for these purposes in its budget earlier this year. Letting Iraq fail without a struggle would be a much bigger error than neglecting postwar Afghanistan. Iraq's future is a far more salient test of America's new foreign policy, not least because the administration has deliberately made it so: This, after all, was "Operation Iraqi Freedom." Iraq could still go wrong through no fault of the White House. America and its allies will be held responsible in any case. They cannot hope to absolve themselves by gradually disengaging over the coming weeks. So they must confront the task and spare no effort. In the short term, the priority must be to restore order and the rule of law. Next comes political and economic reconstruction, with those inseparable elements developed side by side. Eastern Europe's experience after the fall of communism shows how extraordinarily difficult it is to manage this kind of radical transformation. Iraq has oil, which will help; but so did Russia, and see what happened there. Iraq does not need to be a poor country, but unless it builds an orderly economic infrastructure that is friendly to private investment and trade, most of its people will stay poor regardless—just as in the rest of the oil-producing Middle East. Arab capitalism is as revolutionary an idea as Arab democracy. Neither is worth much without the other. The hardest thing will be to strike the right balance, in political and economic reform, between speed and quality. Change done quickly but badly gives you a mess like Russia in the 1990s. Take too long to get things right, and you get no reform at all. In Iraq, speed is at a premium because tolerance of the American occupation will wear thin very quickly. Even in the best imaginable scenario, mistakes are going to be made, and some Iraqis will feel they are losing out to others—either to their fellow countrymen or (which would be worse for the country's prospects and American interests) to foreigners. The interim administration will enjoy no honeymoon of the kind that the early reformers of Eastern Europe could count on, and even that was pretty brief. Once order is restored and some economic and political essentials are in place, America must make a swift exit from day-to-day administration, relying on generous conditional aid (on top of what is required to meet immediate humanitarian needs) to push policy in the right direction. The ongoing burden will be in the tens of billions of dollars each year. Oil can be used to help meet the costs of reconstruction, but this must be managed in ways that arouse no suspicion (justified or otherwise) that America has appropriated the country's principal asset. Leaving the oil under international administration for the time being has a lot to recommend it. This points to one useful role for the United Nations. America's approach to that failed institution so far seems right. Look for ways to use the U.N., where it has the appropriate skills, to help carry the burden of normalizing and administering the country. In the interests of speed and decisiveness, deny it the dominant role that France and other countries have been urging. Otherwise, that path would lead to muddle and delay. Making a success of Iraq is far more important than making a success of the U.N. and, despite the difficulties, more achievable as well. Where the two go together, fine. Do not give the U.N. a role just for the sake of it, if that would slow Iraq's transition. Equally, do not resist giving the body a proper job to do, if it can do that job well and be helpful. A glance at the federal budget tells you that money is going to be tight. The Bush administration, zealous to cut taxes as much as possible, is searching for spending economies. Iraq is not the place to look. For the White House to do this on the cheap would be a terrible error. Too much is riding on it.
What do you think? Discuss this article in the Politics & Society conference of Post & Riposte. More from National Journal. More on politics and society in Atlantic Unbound and The Atlantic Monthly. Clive Crook is a columnist for National Journal and the deputy editor of The Economist. This column appears every week in National Journal, a weekly magazine covering politics and government published in Washington, D.C. For information on National Journal Group publications, see NationalJournal.com. Copyright © 2003 by The Atlantic Monthly Group. All rights reserved. |
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