Should NATO Expand Eastward?

EXECUTIVE-DECISION MEMORANDUM

To: The President of the United States
From: D. N. Forser, Chief of Staff
Re: NATO expansion--Should the West go East?
Date: March 25, 1996

Just last week the lower house of Russia's Parliament, in what some analysts interpreted as a reaction to NATO expansion, voted to declare the dissolution of the Soviet Union illegal. It was a non-binding resolution, backed by Communists and nationalist deputies and denounced by President Yeltsin (who is also, by the way, strongly opposed to NATO's enlargement), yet it was a worrying portent. Russian presidential elections are to be held in June. Russia, which since November has had a Communist/nationalist-dominated Parliament, could have a Communist or nationalist President committed to resisting NATO enlargement after those elections. Under these circumstances, should NATO proceed? We see two options:

A. Take a public stand opposing eastward NATO expansion.

B. Take a public stand advocating the absorption of the former Eastern Bloc countries and the Baltic States--and, ultimately, Russia--into NATO.

Mr./Ms. President, it would be foolish to ignore a warning like this one, from General Alexander Lebed, who may well succeed Yeltsin after Russia's presidential election in June: "NATO enlargement into Eastern Europe may force Russia into forming a military bloc of its own," Lebed told Reuters. Russia could cancel treaties and agreements with the West. "The Cold War is over. They won... So why have you decided to re-open the competition?"

A good question. The answer seems to be a desire on our part to look strong, to be seen as leading the Alliance. But we have since led the Alliance in Bosnia. Elsewhere, we have flexed our muscles in East Asia, Haiti, and now Cuba. The need to look strong is no longer so pressing.

A second answer to Lebed's question is that Western Europe fears a U. S. return to isolationism. As one Western European diplomat explained to a writer for The Atlantic Monthly, "We have to give the Americans some new toys to play with in NATO, because we're afraid that otherwise they may get bored and go home." In other words, Mr./Ms. President, the Europeans want to keep us on their continent even at the price of inflaming tensions with Russia. That is too high a price to pay. Russia, as we all know, is still a nuclear power.

We should put the enlargement idea on hold. There's no need to cancel it--just let the bureaucratic-propaganda momentum work backward instead of forward, and fog enlargement under studies and commissions and yet more studies and commissions. Why delay? Because in addition to the potentially dangerous Russian response to expansion (summarized above) there is the eventual reaction of American taxpayers to consider. Already nearly half of our $250 billion defense budget goes to subsidize the protection of the NATO countries. From whom? From a Russian military whose incompetence has been on display in Chechnya? This is not a credible threat.

We are not the Romans, Mr./Ms. President. We stationed troops in Europe to contain Soviet communism. It has been contained. The Soviet Union no longer exists. NATO has fulfilled its historic role. The issue is not NATO enlargement. It is NATO contraction. It is relief for U.S. taxpayers. It is Medicaid cuts and forgone domestic investment. It is guns versus butter.

Let's remain in NATO. But let's adopt the strategy Walter Lippmann recommended before we decided to station troops permanently in Europe. He called it "the blue-water strategy." Our defensive line should begin not in Germany but in the blue water of the Atlantic. We are a maritime--not a land--power. Let the Europeans defend--against whom?--their own land on their own land. We can help to defend it with our carriers on the blue water--as well as from U.S. air bases and missile sites. The Cold War is over. Let's bring the boys home.

Mr./Ms. President, if we back away from enlargement now, even if we do it in the slow-motion way others of your aides are urging, we will look weak. We will be accused of backing down to Russian pressure. Safire, Will, Rosenthal, Krauthammer, to say nothing of Senator Dole, will attack us. In an election year! A political disaster.

The effects abroad of saying "No" to NATO enlargement would be, if anything, worse. Alliance solidarity nearly broke over Bosnia. It could break yet over our proposed December pull-out from Bosnia. If we have public second thoughts about NATO enlargement, our allies will have public second thoughts about us. Our steadiness. Our capacity to lead. Your steadiness. Your leadership capacity.

The No option is strategically myopic. Yes, Russia presents no threat to the West TODAY. Who knows about tomorrow? Policy should be made with an eye to tomorrow--that is, with an eye to history.

Then there is Germany. Twice in this century Germany has sought to dominate the European continent. We can't say this aloud, but another reason to enlarge NATO is to contain Germany towards the East as she is already contained towards the West. We can't expect the Russians to see that now. But in time they will understand that enlargement can help to protect them from Germany.

NATO enlargement to the East will help to realize Woodrow Wilson's dream of collective security formed by a league of peace so powerful as to deter aggression. Those advocating a caesura before eastward expansion envision a peace dividend. But what about peace itself? Isn't that worth a few more tax-dollars? With Russia itself an eventual member of NATO, peace through collective security will be a reality from the English Channel to Russia. Then and only then will the vast slaughters of the two World Wars be vindicated.

The way ahead is the road to peace. The way back is the road toward instability, toward the break-up of the Alliance, toward arms races and the scramble between states for security and possibly toward war. History will judge us harshly if we retreat from the promise of peace.

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