Should We Boycott Cuba?
July 30 - August 13, 1996
Created by contributing editor James Fallows
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EXECUTIVE-DECISION MEMORANDUM
To: The President of the United States
From: D. N. Forser, Chief of Staff
Re: Cuba
Date: July 30, 1996
Dear Mr./Ms. President:
What is it about a man with a beard? There is always something
dishonest-seeming -- something that someone seems a little too anxious to
conceal -- about a man who won't give us a clear look at his face. Personally
I've always suspected that it's a form of compensation. We all know what it
means when we come across some leathery Baby Boomer with a baseball cap on his
head, with scraggly hair coming out from under the hat down his neck, and with
a growth of beard on his face. What we know is: if he took that hat off, there
wouldn't be any hair underneath it. The beard is a ruse meant to suggest
overall hairiness. The cap is a feint implying that he's so bursting with
energy he's about to run out on the baseball field. Think of the director Rob
Reiner, or Mike Love of the Beach Boys. I rest my case. Think by contrast of
Yul Brynner, Michael Jordan, G. Gordon Liddy, Montel Williams: we might
disagree with them on this or that point of detail, but how refreshingly honest
they seem for putting their whole head and face on open display. Even Liddy
proves the point. He is the one of this group with the diciest reputation --
and he is the one with the partial subterfuge of facial hair, his tough-guy
mustache. (By the way, Mr./Ms. President, I swear that you get younger looking
every day! I guess the burdens of office, which have worn down so many of your
predecessors, are just a kind of fitness drill for you.)
And if the beard is a form of compensation, what are we supposed to make of .
. . a cigar?! Yes, I know that Freud is supposed to have said that sometimes a
cigar was only a cigar. But let's be serious. When we see a big-talking
braggart waving around a 12-inch stogie, well, we know what he's worried about,
don't we? Is this somebody we can deal with as an homme sérieux
-- as someone confident enough in his strengths and limitations that we can
talk to him without endless mind games?
But I digress. Beards and cigars naturally make us think of Cuba, and, Mr./Ms.
President, I am afraid that it is to this diminutive island nation that you
must now direct your thoughts.
I can't remember exactly how many people took the Oath of Office between
Dwight Eisenhower in 1953 and you at the beginning of your first term, but
there have been a lot of them, and the one thing they've had in common is a
headache named Fidel. Reagan and Carter, Johnson and Ford, Nixon and Clinton,
Kennedy and Bush -- you can search in vain for other themes that connect them,
but "What can we do about Castro?" has run right through the years. Indeed if
we renamed the headache "Cuba" we could say that it has afflicted your
predecessors all the way back to the portly William McKinley. "Remember the
Maine" was the battle cry under which the irresponsible press of his era
whipped up a war with the Spanish empire, with its twin outposts in Cuba and
the Philippines. (Hmmm, maybe a headache named "the media" is another great
constant in presidential life.)
In the excitement of victory over Spain and as a kind of lunatic extension of
the Manifest Destiny principle, the United States asserted full colonial
control over the Philippines. In effect the U.S. President replaced the Spanish
King as a distant sovereign over the islands. (Even at the time many prominent
Americans argued that this step toward imperium was a mistake. The best written
of these arguments came -- what a surprise! -- from Mark Twain; years later it
was published in The Atlantic Monthly.) The United States
resisted going quite so far with Cuba, but from McKinley's day until the reign
of the tinhorn Fulgencio Batista in the 1950s, Cuba was a typical largely
corrupt client state where the elite lived high, the masses were supposed to be
happy with their rum and their cane-cutting jobs, and the least savory elements
of American society -- gamblers and gangsters -- were de facto bosses.
All this changed with the Castro regime, of course. Ever since Fidel,
Che, and their band of guerrillas came out of the hills in 1958,
one American President after another has learned what it is like to be mocked
and played for a chump by the neighborhood dictator. The prime chump of them
all, of course, was John Kennedy, who just after his inauguration learned of
the CIA's plan to re-invade Cuba, with Cuban exiles. In theory the oppressed
masses on the home islands would rise up, rejoicing, and join the invaders to
oust Fidel. In reality it did not work that way, and the botched invasion at
the Bay of Pigs in April, 1961, set a modern standard for ineptness in U.S.
foreign policy. The number two chump may have been James Earl "The Orator"
Carter, whose administration sat by fecklessly in 1980 as Castro let prisoners
out of Cuba's jails if they wanted to go to America. Political prisoners might
have been one thing, but a good number of these "Marielitos" were criminals in
the normal sense. Years later, it turned out that many of these immigrants had
adjusted surprisingly well to life in America. (It is better not to talk about
the twenty-five percent of them who were arrested for committing felonies in
their new land. If you'd like to read more about this issue, you might
want to take a look at an article from The Atlantic,
"Immigration:
How It's Affecting Us") But at the time, the "Mariel Boatlift" seemed a perfect
illustration of Castro's inexhaustible ability to annoy, outwit, and generally
vex the United States.
Fidel Castro rules a country with a population of eight million -- that's
barely three percent as large as the United States. Yet I have to say, Mr./Ms.
President, that he often seems to be in the driver's seat in terms of dictating
American policy. From the Eisenhower years right through the first half of Bill
Clinton's administration, Castro more or less determined our refugee policy. If
you were running away from Mexico or Haiti or Burkina Faso and tried to get
into the United States, we would probably send you right back home (if we
caught you). We would assume that you were an "economic refugee." But if you
were running away from Cuba, you could stop worrying as soon as you waded
ashore in Florida. The law assumed that those fleeing Cuba were by definition
political refugees. Given the view of President Clinton by his contemporaries,
it is amazing that he dared change this law, because it was wildly popular
among members of the Cuban-American constituency centered in Florida. But even
after that, little sly Cuba seemed to boss big dumb America around.
Since none of our major allies shares our troublesome history with Castro --
and, to be honest, since none of them has a significant Cuban-American voting
bloc -- they all make fun of the embargo we impose on Cuba. Since all of our
neighbors in this country worry more about United States "hegemony" (where
do they get these words? From books by Noam Chomsky? Or from
junior-year-abroad at the Sorbonne, where Pol Pot once trained?) than about
provocations from Castro, they all basically side against us too. Therefore,
each time Castro gets under our skin, he succeeds in driving a wedge between us
and our allies around the world. Of course you are familiar with the most
flagrant demonstration of this mischievous power. Early in 1996 after the Cuban
air force shot down a "rescue" plane flown by anti-Castro groups based in the
United States, Republicans in our Congress rammed through the "Helms-Burton
Act." In effect, this required us to impose sanctions on other countries unless
they (like us) forbid their firms to deal with Cuba. Almost every other country
permitted this! So, under the law and in order to show its displeasure with
Fidel Castro, the United States was picking fights with the Canadians, the
Brits, the Australians, and others with whom its real disagreements were
small.
I have to be honest with you, Mr./Ms. President: no one in the rest of the
world agrees with our "freeze out Cuba" policy. That does not make our policy
wrong. Whole chapters in a future Profiles in Courage will be devoted to
those who told truths the rest of the world wanted to ignore. (Your place in
this book is already secure.) But when everyone else is headed the other way,
perhaps we should at least check the map.
And so we near the choice, Mr./Ms. President. Will no one rid us of this
troublesome dictator? One way or another the United States needs to get over
its Castro problem. It is undignified for the world's greatest power to spend
so much of its time reacting to one of the world's puniest states. The choice
you face is how to end this problem. And your loyal staff suggests that you
have two main alternatives: HARD ROAD or SOFT ROAD. We await your guidance.
The selections are:
Option A: The Hard Road
Mr./Ms. President:
If you want to be a big-shot in the world of diplomacy, you have to throw
around the word "realpolitik." And you have to be sure to pronounce it the way
Metternich or Kissinger would have -- ree-AL-poh-li-TEEK. But people often
neglect to think about what the word actually means. It means a strategy based
on reality -- not on theories, or intentions, or woulda-couldas, or even
pure ideals, but rather on a hard-eyed, clear-minded calculation of ends and
means.
As soon as we think about the realities of relations between the United
States and Cuba, we come to one awkward but undeniable truth. Nations do not
get something for nothing. They give only in order to get. What Cuba wants --
indeed, what it needs as the first priority of its national survival strategy
-- is normalized relations with the United States. Only then will it attract
large-scale investment. Only then will it have a chance of prospering. Only
then can it build a tourist industry, or sell its farm products to the nearest,
biggest market, or take any of the other steps that have allowed Vietnam,
China, and other recently impoverished states to attract a suddenly larger
share of world economic activity. With each passing year since the collapse of
the Soviet Union -- which, from Cuba's point of view, meant the disappearance
of its main outside underwriter -- the gap between Cuba's misery and the
prosperity of the outside world grows more immense.
If we were practicing foreign policy according to the dictates of St.
Francis of Assisi, the fact that Cuba is desperate for this opening means that
we should give it to them. But the teachings of St. Francis are not the axioms
of realpolitik. If Fidel Castro is seriously interested in rescuing his nation
from the dead-end of socialist autarky, then he must act as if he is serious --
and that means changing policies that from our perspective are indefensible.
Cuba is still run as a totalitarian police state. It is still at least
rhetorically committed to the worldwide struggle against "Yankee imperialism."
It still permits no political competition or serious internal debate. It is a
standing affront to our belief in an ever-more-open international order, with
the steady expansion of democracy and free-market systems. There is no doubt
about the goal we want to achieve: a change in Castro's implacable resistance
to open society and open markets. The only question is the best means of
reaching that goal. Your staff hopes that, as soon as you think about the
matter realistically, you will agree that continued firmness -- giving
only when we get something in return -- is better than a flaccid, Franciscan
willingness to give and give and hope for the best. If we were starting with a
blank slate and had no previous dealings with Cuba, idealists might argue for a
different approach than the one we are recommending. But the reality -- once
more -- is that we have four decades of policy behind us. To change it
whimsically would be a sign of weakness and would eliminate the leverage we
possess.
Therefore: retain the embargo; impose sanctions on our allies who want to
trade with Cuba; recognize that your predecessor Teddy Roosevelt was right in
calling for the Big Stick; and select Option A.
Option B: The Soft Road
Mr./Ms. President:
In diplomacy as in life it is sometimes necessary to step back and ask,
how did we get here? Like the last half-dozen or so Presidents, you inherited
rather than created our nation's policy toward Cuba, Mr./Ms. President. You
would never have come up with such a cockamamie, disproportionate scheme on
your own. The inevitable awkwardness of changing an existing policy will be far
outweighed by the sanity of a different approach.
Let's start from the beginning. Do we treat Cuba like a pariah because its
regime is so uniquely objectionable in the world? Clearly not. The Castro
regime has been totalitarian in the classic sense of that term, but through
most of American history we have preferred to deal with such nations --
acknowledging their existence, while not condoning their practices -- rather
than pretending, as we do with Castro's Cuba, that they do not exist. Our
nation maintained diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union through the
darkest moments of the Stalinist terror. It now deals with regimes against
which a thousand criticisms could be made, from Burma to Serbia to Zaire.
Moreover, in our dealings with one of the most troublesome of all the world's
governments -- China's -- U.S. officials have argued for years that engagement
is more likely to bring liberalization than is a freeze-out policy. If there is
any hope for such an effect in China, whose population is five times larger
than ours, why not with Cuba -- so close at hand, and so small?
Must we isolate Cuba because it is a threat to our security, or to the
peace of the world? In 1962, Cuba arguably did imperil our security -- or had
the potential to do so, if the Soviets had succeeded in basing ICBMs there. But
John Kennedy backed them off, and since then the worst we've had to fear from
Cuba is occasional outflows of refugees. A decade or two ago, some of our
neighbors in the Americas feared that Cuban mercenaries were threats to their
own stability. Now every one of those neighbors opposes our embargo policy.
Is it important to maintain our Cuban policy for face-saving reasons on
the international stage? On the contrary: perhaps the most ludicrous part of
current US foreign policy, in the eyes of the rest of the world, is that it
spends so much time and emotion worrying about so minor a threat. The most
immediate threat to smooth relations with such close allies as Canada is the
idea that we might punish them for letting their own companies deal with Cuba.
"Loss of face" is never a good reason to avoid a step clearly in our national
interest.
Would we, finally, be condoning dictatorship or abandoning our fight
against tyranny if we simply decided to get along with Cuba? Any realistic look
at the recent history of the world suggests quite the reverse. The ultimate
threat to Castro's regime is an open flow of people, products, and ideas from
the outside world. Communist regimes from the rest of the world could not
withstand this pressure. Can a country that, per capita, has produced more
baseball talent than any other in the world (with the possible exception of the
Dominican Republic) really resist the onslaught of American ideas and ideals?
So, Mr./Ms. President, we recommend that you give common sense a chance.
Remove the trade embargo. Restore diplomatic relations with Cuba. Encourage
American companies to invest. Choose Option B -- and watch a totalitarian
society open up.
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