Skip Navigation
Ben W. Heineman Jr.

Ben W. Heineman Jr. - Ben Heineman Jr. has held top positions in government, law, and business. He is the author of High Performance with High Integrity. More

Ben W. Heineman, Jr. was GE's Senior Vice President/General Consultant from 1987-2003, and then Senior Vice President for Law and Public Affairs in 2004 and 2005. He is currently a Senior Fellow at two Harvard schools: the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and Harvard Law School's Program on Corporate Governance. He is also a Distinguished Senior Fellow at Harvard Law School's Program on the Legal Profession and Senior Counsel to the law firm of Wilmer Hale. A former Rhodes Scholar, editor-in-chief of the Yale Law Journal, and law clerk to Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart, Mr. Heineman practiced constitutional law prior to his service at GE. His book High Performance with High Integrity was published in June 2008. In 2007, he served on the Independent Review Panel on the World Bank Group's Department of Institutional Integrity and is currently on an international panel advising the President of the World Bank on governance and anti-corruption. He is a recipient of the American Lawyer's Lifetime Achievement Award and the Lifetime Achievement Award of Board Member Magazine. Ethisphere Magazine named him one of the 100 most influential individuals on business ethics in 2008.

Can Trust in Corporate Governance Be Restored?

By Ben W. Heineman Jr.
Jan 31 2010, 6:07 PM ET Comment

gm - Joe Raedle - getty.jpg
The headline in The New York Times story from the World Economic Forum read: "Leaders in Davos Admit Drop in Trust."

No kidding! 

After poor business decision-making in the financial sector was a primary cause of the Great Recession, and after years of board and management mistakes leading to the bankruptcies of industrial icons GM and Chrysler, the business community today faces a crisis of confidence in its own ranks and in broader society. Regard for corporations is at a historic lows

Many are asking: how can corporations govern themselves more effectively---and truly be held accountable?

I found this Times story of special moment because the Committee for Economic Development just a few days ago published a Policy Brief in which I tried to suggest a way forward. It was entitled: "Restoring Trust in Corporate Governance: The Six Essential Tasks of Boards of Directors and Business Leaders." 

Necessary public policy debates are taking place all across the globe on new regulations to ensure the safety and soundness of the financial sector and to improve the governance of all publicly-held corporations (with focus on an enhanced shareholder role and mandated disclosure about compensation and risk processes).

But, regardless of regulatory outcomes, the destiny of public corporations will still turn on the complex decisions made by business leaders and boards of directors.

In my view, to meet the legitimate criticisms of business decision-making, corporations must first redefine their mission---and the role of the board and CEO. 

To summarize a much longer discussion, they must clearly and explicitly redefine the purpose of the corporation as creation of long term economic value through sustained economic performance, sound risk management and high integrity.

In particular, business leaders must forge a sound balance between necessary risk-taking (creativity and innovation) and required risk-management (financial and operational discipline). They must fuse this high performance with high integrity. High integrity means a commitment to law, ethics and values in order to attain affirmative benefits in the company, the marketplace and global society but also to reduce legal, ethical, reputational, public policy and country risk. 

The past emphasis on short-term maximization of shareholder value must be significantly reduced. 

The Policy Brief then argues for five other essential tasks built on the imperatives of sustained performance, sound risk management and high integrity: revamped leadership training; a refocused CEO selection process; a restatement of operational goals across performance, risk and integrity dimensions; a revision of compensation that holds back or pays out a significant portion of pay as objectives are met, exceeded or missed; and a re-alignment of board oversight to focus on critical operational and compensation goals. 

In my view, only if these six, closely connected tasks are carried out with focused intensity is it possible for trust to be restored. But there are many obstacles to prevent this from happening such as the short-termism of many institutional investors; a "money happy" labor market for business talent which will frustrate compensation regimes paying out over time and for performance, and problems in meaningful board oversight of management. 

There is, thus, certainly reason for substantial doubts whether the "practical ideal" I suggest can be realized. For example, with the separation of ownership (shareholders) and control (managers), the theory was that the boards would represent the shareholders and control the management. Unfortunately, too often the practice has been that management controls the board (and, today, there is no one "shareholder" as various types of "shareholders" have myriad conflicting objectives and strategies).

Nonetheless, although other accountability mechanisms such as regulation may, limit private discretion in order to accomplish public goals, private decision-making by boards and business leaders still must drive corporations.  This is where ultimate accountability will always lie, however uncertain and problematic. 

And, for those skeptical about corporate governance, there is the answer of self-interest. With business facing a crisis in confidence about governance and accountability, it is, I believe, in the demonstrable interest of corporate leaders (and capitalism itself) truly to address legitimate criticisms, to provide a clear, credible and powerful private sector response and, as one alternative, to consider using the "actionable framework" of the six essential tasks.

                                                     * * * * * 

For those interested in reading more, go to the website of the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation to find both a longer summary of the argument and the Policy Brief itself.

Photo credit: Joe Raedle/Getty Images



Presented by

More at The Atlantic

The Middling Hilarity of 'The Dictator' The Middling Hilarity of Sacha Baron Cohen's 'The Dictator'
Chinese Media's Short-Lived Love for Sacha Baron Cohen's 'Dictator' Chinese Media's Short-Lived Love for Sacha Baron Cohen's 'Dictator'
Why Do Science and Business Experiment More Than Government? Why Doesn't Government Experiment More?
Why Older Americans Have the Worst Long-Term Unemployment Crisis How Older People Have the Worst Job Crisis
Ken Burns on Why His Formula for a Great Story Is 1+1=3 Ken Burns's Formula for a Great Story

Join the Discussion

After you comment, click Post. If you’re not already logged in you will be asked to log in or register.
blog comments powered by Disqus
Special Report
China Takes Off The Atlantic China Takes Off
Exploring the growth of a massive economy—an Atlantic special report Read more ›
View All Correspondents

The Biggest Story in Photos

Views From the Night Sky: London and the U.K.

May 16, 2012

Subscribe Now

SAVE 59%! 10 issues JUST $2.45 PER COPY

Facebook

Newsletters

Sign up to receive our free newsletters

(sample)

(sample)

(sample)

(sample)

(sample)

(sample)