Four psychologists have issued a rebuttal to Neil Sedaka: breaking up isn’t all that hard to do. The researchers tracked 69 first-year students at Northwestern University who’d been in a romantic relationship for at least two months at the onset of the study, regularly asking them how they would feel if they and their partners broke up. Within six months, 38 percent of the subjects had parted ways, but overall, the students tended to experience much less heartache and distress about the split than they’d predicted two weeks before it happened. The students who most overestimated how anguished they would feel tended to be those who’d reported being the most in love, those who’d been dumped, and those who’d anticipated having trouble finding a new love. Those who predicted their feelings most accurately, the authors hypothesize, were the students who were already looking forward to the single life and the pleasures of being back on the prowl.
—“Mispredicting Distress Following Romantic Break Up: Revealing the Time Course of the Affective Forecasting Error,” [PDF] Paul W. Eastwick, Eli J. Finkel et al., Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
Since the insanity defense was first copped in a British court in 1843, canny malefactors have used it to tip the scales of justice in their favor—or so the popular imagination would have it. But studies show that the public vastly overestimates both how frequently insanity pleas are used and how successful they are, misconceptions that can have major legal consequences. A recent paper by two researchers at the University of California at Irvine surveyed 113 people who’d been excused from jury duty at a courthouse in Nevada, asking their opinions about mental illness and its relevance in legal cases. The subjects were then given four vignettes describing cases in which an insanity plea could conceivably be used and were asked to render a judgment. The authors found that “jurors with negative attitudes towards the insanity defense are less likely than jurors with more positive attitudes to find any defendant insane.” An obvious point, perhaps, but as the authors note, a negative attitude can create a serious impediment to a fair trial. Jurors who oppose the death penalty are excused from serving in capital-punishment cases; the authors recommend a similar system for rooting out jurors who are biased against the insanity defense.
—“Constructing Insanity: Jurors’ Prototypes, Attitudes, and Legal Decision-Making,” Jennifer Eno Louden and Jennifer L. Skeem, Behavioral Science and the Law
"The country that owns Madison Avenue ought to win this one easily,” a Marine colonel remarked during the first year of the war in Iraq. He was wrong, but he was thinking along the right lines, according to a recent Rand study, whose authors argue that the United States military could learn a lot from the advertising world. They suggest that the military could create more support for its operations, and thereby achieve greater success in conflicts like those in Iraq and Afghanistan, if it updated its “brand” identity using models such as Apple, Lexus, and Starbucks. For instance, just as the marketing world uses “segmentation” to identify different groups of customers and focus on the most profitable ones, the military could use “enemy prisoner-of-war interrogations, focus groups, and surveys” to identify potential partners within local populations. The study also suggests that the military do more to meet and manage “customer” expectations, taking a page from Continental Airlines, which tells passengers as much as possible about flight delays instead of keeping them in the dark or repeatedly promising that the flight will depart “in 15 minutes.” When the U.S. military invaded, Iraqis had outsize expectations of the American brand, expecting more electricity and better infrastructure immediately. “Like the desk representative at Continental Airlines,” the study counsels, the military “should explain the situation and emphasize that all necessary efforts are being undertaken to address the problem,” but it should never promise something it can’t deliver or set a specific date for achieving a goal unless that deadline can be met. The report also makes a case for re-branding the military, advertising it more as an organization that’s doing good” in the world, through relief efforts like those in post-tsunami Southeast Asia or in post-earthquake Pakistan.
—“Enlisting Madison Avenue: The Marketing Approach to Earning Popular Support in Theaters of Operation,” Todd C. Helmus, Christopher Paul, Russell W. Glenn, Rand Corporation
During its heyday, in the mid-1920s, was the Ku Klux Klan more like a marketing firm than a terrorist organization? A new paper co-authored by Steven Levitt, the University of Chicago economist who scrutinized the Klan in the best-selling Freakonomics, argues that the group was far more successful at raising money than at achieving its professed goals of passing racist legislation and intimidating black or foreign-born Americans. The authors, who compiled data on more than 60,000 Klansmen from several states, found that even at the height of its power—in the mid-1920s, membership may have been as high as 4 million—the Klan was politically ineffective. There’s “little evidence” that its activity prompted African Americans to leave their communities, and though significant numbers of Klan-backed politicians were elected to local and national office, they don’t seem to have pushed through very much legislation. But the Klan did have an “uncanny ability to raise revenue.” New-member initiation cost $10 and annual dues $5, and members were required to buy an official Klan robe and encouraged to purchase other Klan paraphernalia, such as swords or helmets. Klan members typically spent about $275 (in today’s dollars) in their first year and about $80 in subsequent years. Recruiters received a 40 percent commission for bringing in new members. Using similar incentives up the chain of command, the Klan operated on a “multi-level marketing principle, much like modern companies such as Amway and Avon” do. The higher-ups reaped huge profits: the authors calculate that D. C. Stephenson, the “grand dragon” of Indiana, took in more than $2 million annually from state operations.
—“Hatred and Profits: Getting Under the Hood of the Ku Klux Klan,” Roland G. Fryer Jr. and Steven D. Levitt, NBER