In 1996, a newly Republican Congress ended welfare as we knew it. In doing so, the Republicans improved a New Deal program that had become archaic, counterproductive, and dependency-forming. They also improved the public's image of Republicans. By defining the GOP as a party of ideas rather than interests, they burnished its reformist credentials and helped propel George W. Bush to the White House.
Fast-forward a decade. Once again, Congress has changed hands. Once again, the new majority needs to signal that it stands for more than business as usual. Once again, an archaic, counterproductive, and dependency-inducing New Deal program is ripe for reform. Once again, a consensus has emerged on the general direction for reform. This time, the opportunity is to end farm welfare as we know it.
In 2007, agricultural subsidies come up for reauthorization. Numbingly complex and arcane, farm bills have traditionally been of interest mainly to the agriculture lobbyists and farm-region legislators who wrote them in the Capitol's back rooms. In 2007, however, all Democratic lawmakers, not just the farm groupies, would be well advised to pay attention.
Rep. Earl Blumenauer, D-Ore., is certainly taking notice. Though not a member of the Agriculture Committee, "I've been preparing for this reauthorization, and I plan to be actively involved," he said in a recent interview. "It's critically important to my state, which is shortchanged by the farm bill." His district has fruit, wine, nurseries, and "the largest Christmas tree farm in America"—all outside the charmed circle of federal farm subsidies.
Blumenauer's political calculus, however, is national as well as local. "I think the farm bill is perhaps the best example of federal policy frozen in time, in a mixture of inertia, political considerations, and complexity," he says. "It currently is not serving most states, it's not serving most farmers, it's not fiscally conservative." He sees agriculture as one of only two ripe opportunities for Democrats to prove themselves as reformers in 2007 (the other being energy). "We have a chance," he says, "to send the message that we're serious about making government work right."
No one, not anyone, would sit down today and design the current farm programs. Although much revised in their details, they remain a paradigm of New Deal heavy-handedness, distorting markets in a way that accomplishes little at high cost. Subsidies are absurdly lopsided: 93 percent of payments flow to five crops (corn, cotton, rice, soybeans, and wheat), which together account for only a fifth of U.S. farm receipts. Meanwhile, 60 percent of farmers and ranchers get nothing.
Payments flow disproportionately to large farms and wealthy farmers. Much of the subsidies' value is sopped up by higher land prices, often benefiting absentee landowners instead of working farmers. Worst of all, the steepest price is paid by desperately poor farmers in the developing world, who must compete not only with American farmers but also with the U.S. Treasury.
Expert opinion has in recent years converged on an alternative approach, called revenue assurance. If the goal is to give farmers more income stability than volatile agricultural markets provide—and that, these days, is the only goal that most people agree has a public-policy justification—then revenue assurance is, in principle, a fairer and more efficient way to do it. The government and subsidized private insurers could indemnify farmers against sharp declines in earnings; government-supported "farm savings accounts" could provide further protection.
As it happens, such an approach fits neatly into a framework that is emerging as the Democrats' alternative to old-fashioned government handouts. The government and the private sector have steadily shifted economic risk "onto the fragile balance sheets of American families," Jacob S. Hacker, a political scientist at Yale University, argues in his recent book The Great Risk Shift. Moreover, he says, "the job market has grown markedly more uncertain and unstable." Hacker and other Democratic-aligned thinkers argue for a new focus on wage insurance and other methods of reducing income volatility.
Just being not-Republicans worked for the Democrats in 2006, but it is unlikely to suffice in 2008. Democrats need a plausible alternative to the Republican model of increasing personal choice—but also increasing personal risk—by partially privatizing Social Security and Medicare. The farm bill thus comes along at a providential moment, offering a test bed and showcase for a big idea at a time when the party sorely needs one.