The American pullout from Afghanistan has the potential to destabilize the entire region.
In his State of the Union speech on
February 12, U.S. President Barack Obama declared that by the end of
2014 "our war in Afghanistan will be over." This step, long expected,
will decrease security in neighboring Central Asia. Flows northward from
Afghanistan of terrorists and narcotics will put at greater risk a
region already weakened by corruption, despotism, and ethnic and water
tensions. The West should do more to enhance security in Central Asia,
comprised of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan.
U.S. policy is predicated on the expectation that the 350,000-strong
Afghan National Army, with assistance from U.S. advisers, will be able
to keep the Taliban at bay. It is more likely that after 2014, barring a
political agreement, the Taliban will remain in the field with control
in most Pashtun areas and perhaps beyond. A bloodied but still standing
Taliban would also pose a danger beyond its borders.
In the 1990s, Taliban control in Afghanistan spurred extremists in
Central Asia. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) fought alongside
the Taliban in Afghanistan and carried out bombings in Uzbekistan and
kidnappings in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. In 2004 a splinter group, the
Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), claimed suicide bombings in Uzbekistan and
targeted the U.S. and Israeli embassies in Tashkent. Both groups are now
holed up in ungoverned areas of Pakistan, but as NATO leaves
Afghanistan they will probably carry the fight back to Central Asian
homelands.
More Afghans will turn for sustenance to the opium industry, perhaps
one-third of their country's gross domestic product. Trafficking
northward will exacerbate staggering addiction problems in Central Asia
and Russia. Afghanistan and nearby areas provide over four-fifths of
Europe's heroin.
Central Asia faces other sources of insecurity. Dams that may be built
in impoverished Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan would boost their economies
but choke off much downstream water for agriculture in Uzbekistan. Its
ruler, Islam Karimov, recently warned of "water wars." The lush Ferghana
Valley -- shared by Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan -- is a
swirl of peoples and oppression, and a recruiting ground for Islamic
jihadists. In 2005, a large number of protesters died at the hands of
Uzbek security forces in Andijon, Uzbekistan, and in 2010 several
hundred Uzbeks and a much smaller number of Kyrgyz died in ethnic
clashes in the Kyrgyz city of Osh and nearby areas. A cesspool of
corruption in Central Asia undermines governance. On Transparency
International's index of corruption perceptions of 174 countries,
Central Asian states rank poorly, averaging 157th place.
Caught Between Great Powers
Central Asia lies between ambitious regional and great powers. In
December 2012, former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton cautioned
against Russia's manipulation of a customs union it dominates in order
to "re-Sovietize" Eurasia. Despite popular objections at home,
Kazakhstan has joined the union but resists its becoming a political
body. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan may have no choice but to sign up since
one-third to one-half of their economies depend on migrant-labor
remittances from Russia. If after NATO draws down in Afghanistan
fighting spreads northward, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan -- both of which
host Russian military bases -- might seek added protection from Moscow
even as they try to maintain wiggle room to protect their own interests.
China looms large in Central Asian economies, enriching opportunities
for trade and inward investment. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan now ship
energy long distances to China, helping shield them from Russian control
of export pipelines as a political and financial lever. China employs
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to boost its Central Asian
interests, for now mainly economic and energy. It does not publicly
challenge Russia's geopolitical role there, but economic dynamism
increases China's sway and Central Asia's room for maneuver.
Troop reductions in Afghanistan will lessen NATO's need for logistical
support via the northern distribution network through Central Asia.
Frictions within the region could heighten transport impediments. Wary
of a NATO pullback that would leave them more exposed, Central Asians
want continued Western support to forestall IMU and IJU subversion,
counter narcotics smuggling, and help them balance Russian and Chinese
power.
For the West to augment security in Central Asia will not be easy. After
September 11, 2001, Russian President Vladimir Putin sanctioned a U.S.
and coalition presence there to support operations in Afghanistan, but
no longer. Russia urges the United States' ouster from its transit base
in Kyrgyzstan and opposes a Western presence even to address narcotics
and terrorism threats.
Another constraint is authoritarian governance and human rights abuse in
Central Asia. The West should offer pragmatic aid but be wary of
providing security tools that might be turned against domestic
protesters.
Third, the West will want to take account of Russian and Chinese
sensitivities. The West does not seek to enhance its position in Central
Asia at their expense, but rather to bolster common security. For
example, stronger borders that stem the flow of terrorists and narcotics
should serve Moscow and Beijing's interests.
Beyond NATO forces leaving behind in Central Asia some of the equipment
they withdraw from Afghanistan, there are two broad areas for security
cooperation: information exchanges and border security. The West ought
to seek arrangements with willing Central Asian governments on more
robust sharing of information about terrorism, narcotics, and criminal
threats, while protecting sources and methods. Building on solid,
low-key work by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
and the European Union, the West should examine how it could provide
better practices and technology to tighten security along borders with
Afghanistan, especially in the badlands areas. This would impede
terrorist strikes into Central Asia and help its governments suppress
infiltration. Western security dialogues with China and Russia could
spur wider cooperative efforts and improve understanding.
After 2014, Central Asia ought not to become the focal point of a new
"Great Game," a battleground in which outside contestants seek to impose
their writ. Central Asia will need help in securing its people against
external dangers, but autocratic rule and weak governance are just as
serious a threat. Frankly, Western interest in helping Central Asia will
increasingly depend on whether freedoms expand and human dignity is
respected.
This article available online at:
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/02/the-coming-crisis-in-central-asia/273278/
