Jeffrey Goldberg:
Has the administration gone down a dead-end alleyway by having so much emphasis
in the early days on settlement growth?
David Makovsky: I
think the administration is using an ax when it could use a scalpel. The fact is
that there was a basic baseline understanding that Israel would not expand
settlements. The administration felt that even if the agreement existed, it was
insufficient, and that what you needed really was a more kind of
undifferentiated freeze of settlements. It seems like in [the administration's]
pursuit of the perfect, this has proven to be far more elusive than the administration
would have hoped.
JG: I'll give you
two broad developments and just frame them in the current negotiations: the negative
development, of course, is that Iran continues its pursuit of nuclear
capability. The positive development is that in the West Bank, you have, I
would say, the first Palestinian leadership in Palestinian history to truly
fight terrorism, to truly care about the daily lives of their people.
DM: The irony is
that while U.S.-Israel relations is going through a period of considerable
strain, Israeli-Palestinian relations are probably better than they've been in
many, many years. I think
events on the ground are the most encouraging dimension, and I only wish that
the U.S.-Israel piece of this would catch up to it in a way that would say
enough with the diminishing returns; let's get on with the main event.
JG: If you didn't have Iran sitting there, making the move toward
nuclearization, you'd have this positive development in the West Bank, you'd
still have Hamas and Gaza, but it'd be weaker because you wouldn't have Iran.
DM: I'm concerned
that the strain between the U.S. and Israel over settlements is going to bleed
into the U.S.-Israel relationship on Iran. If there's a lot of bruised feelings
here, will this have an impact on the highest level of being able to work
together on the main event? We need to maintain a sense of proportion and we
should reach a pragmatic conclusion, which is, on the settlements, doable: No
expansions. You can monitor that --that means no extra land, that can be
prejudged negotiations, but keep the good relations for this main event, which
is, if the U.S. and Israel don't work together in this Iran crisis, it is more
likely Israel will strike out on its own. To the Administration's credit now, I
think now they're making a real effort to keep Israel close and keep it updated
on its views on Iran.
JG: There are two
things that are going on right now. One is an existential challenge to Israel,
the other is not. Wouldn't you, as a negotiator, say to the prime minister, 'Look,
you feel like you're in a position now that you were in of May 1967, clearly a
huge threat is looming. Why don't you just give on this other issue, which is comparatively
smaller, so that we can all focus together on the overarching issue?'
DM: I think that
ultimately that's where Netanyahu was coming from, but he wanted something much
grander. He wanted Obama to commit to striking Iran, which I don't think Obama
would do even if Israel would say that it would yield Jerusalem. That's not a
linkage that the U.S. wants. Part of the problem is that on the immediate issue
of the Palestinians, the administration believes that a deal is very reachable
and therefore this is just a bridge to that.
JG: Do you think
a deal is reachable?
DM: No. I think a
territorial, borders deal is achievable if you want it. But I think Netanyahu
doesn't like the borders idea and feels that anything he agrees to in the
short-term will be held against him if there isn't an agreement, and it'll
become an open-ended precedent, so to speak. That might be something he could
do for three months, but the administration wants something that's a year and
that's renewable.
Look, we saw this before with the first George Bush, if two leaders
aren't talking to each other, it poisons the relations over time. Bush hardly
spoke to (Yitzhak) Shamir. So I tend to think each one needs the other on
Iran. The U.S. needs Israel too because they don't want the Israelis going off on
their own. My feeling is each side knows that but if there are these bad
feelings that accumulate, what is rationally in the best interest of both sides
somehow won't materialize that way.
JG: Avigdor Lieberman, the foreign minister -- what does it mean if he goes because of the criminal charges that might be filed against him?
DM: My
understanding is that he'll name someone else from the party to his position so
that the party remains in the coalition. I don't think it means a lot because
the fact is that what is happening is you're having other players today, like Ehud
Barak, doing a lot of the settlement negotiations with (George) Mitchell. He's sidelined
already and therefore I don't think his indictment is going to be decisive.
JG: Does Obama
need to do a better job communicating to Israelis, as Aluf Benn suggested, and
to American Jews as well?
DM: Absolutely. This
is a President with very formidable communication skills, and he needs to reach
out. The question is always,if you feel the issue isn't about communication,
it's about policy, maybe there's a way that you could explain your policies in a
way that people could understand, but it is certainly feeding criticism of the President
that he hasn't reached out. And I think he just doesn't want to do it during
this impasse over the settlements because he feels it looks defensive.
