Today, Turkey and Egypt recalled their ambassadors from each other's capitol, signaling a major downturn in bilateral ties. At the same time, Turkey's influence in Cairo seems to be winding down.
Indeed, Turkey's ambitious drive to become a Middle East power by influencing the region's Muslim Brotherhood-inspired parties appears to have been upended. The Brotherhood has fallen from government in Egypt, failed to elect its candidate to lead the Syrian opposition, and has been sidelined in Libya. Qatar, which had hitherto allied itself with Ankara to fund MB-style parties, appears to be changing its heart after an unexpected change in leadership.
With the MB clinging to power only in remote Tunisia, Ankara has turned to an unexpected Middle East ally: Kurds, an ethnic group the Turkish government has historically been at odds with. Turkey's goal this time, though, is not to shape the region, but simply to shield itself from massive Middle East instability.
After coming to power in 2002, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Ankara introduced a novel foreign policy that turned the country's attention to the Middle East, a shift that ultimately wedded the Turkish government to the MB.
Prior to the AKP era, the Turks had mostly chosen to stay away from Middle East conflicts. Following the republican ethos of the country's founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the country's citizens -- and especially foreign policy elites -- had come to think of themselves as a European nation that had been placed accidentally next to the Middle East. They then proceeded to stay away from the region and its complicated problems.
The AKP changed all that. If Ataturk saw Turkey as the Argentina of the Middle East, a country physically in the region but mentally in Europe, the AKP envisioned Turkey as the Brazil of the Middle East, a rising economic power with a burning desire to shape regional events. To this end, the new elites in Ankara pursued deep economic and political ties with the region's governments, including Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and Syria.
Trade between Turkey and these countries boomed, and diplomatic ties took off. Between 2002 and 2009, for instance, the Turkish foreign minister made at least eight trips to Iran and Syria alone.
Turkey's ties with Syria especially benefited from this trend: Ankara and Damascus lifted visa restrictions for travel, and the two country's cabinets started holding joint sessions, bringing key interior, justice and foreign minister together in regular closed meetings. Flaunting its perceived influence in Syria and beyond, Ankara even floated the idea of a "Shamgen Zone," a play on the European Union's Schengen free travel area and Sham, the traditional name for Syria in Arabic, which envisioned bringing together Turkey, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon under a customs and political union.
Turkey's post-2002 Middle East focus brought it close to not only the region's governments, but also various MB-style parties across the region. The AKP, once shunned as a hardline Islamist party but recently rehabilitated, saw itself as a model forward for the MB.
The AKP elites believed that if they could moderate and come to power through democratic elections in Ankara, like-minded Egyptian and Syrian MBs should be able to do the same in Cairo and Damascus, respectively. Hence, Turkey's dream: a region ruled by MB parties, looking to Turkey.