Egypt's political dilemmas are based, in important part, on its economic dilemmas. But since the overthrow of the Morsi government, far less attention has been paid to crucial economic issues than the political and constitutional conflicts. But economic issues--and the lack of a legitimated economic vision--have been as much a cause of the unrest, change and uncertainty in Egypt, and during both the Mubarak and Morsi tenures. And they may be more intractable.
Any new permanent government will face the choice Morsi had but never made: between market economic reforms on the one hand, led by economists and business people to promote growth, jobs, and trade, and a command-and-control statist economy on the other, which provides subsidies for essentials like energy and staples like bread, rice, and sugar--and also provides sinecures for ex-military officers. Part of the problem is that "liberalizing" reforms--there have been three waves since the end of Nassar's regime than 40 years ago--are perceived as helping the rich and reflecting crony capitalism, rather than raising Egypt as a whole.
Morsi's inability to chart a clear economic path led to a significant worsening of Egypt's economic straits, which in turn helped mobilize the powerful street opposition. From just before 2011 to today: GDP growth is down (from nearly 6 percent to under 2 percent); unemployment is up (from 9 percent to over 13 percent); foreign exchange reserves are down (from $35 billion to just under $15 billion); the budget deficit has more than doubled (from nearly 110 billion Egyptian pounds to over 230 billion); a quarter of that budget are subsidies to poor and middle class; and the poor and near-poor total approximately half of the population. Tourism is down significantly due to security concerns; direct foreign investment has declined sharply; gasoline and power shortages bedevil the population; a slide in the Egyptian currency has raised prices of foreign goods such as food imports; wealth distribution is badly skewed; the nation's credit rating is cratering; the hidden "black" economy constitutes as much as 40 percent of Egyptian economic activity. And corruption continues.
The critical economic issue is not the scope of the problems but what to do about them--a subject lost in the political swirl, but essential to any future regime stability. As with constitutional and political reform, a consensus economic program must resolve deep conflicting interests: between liberal elite capitalists and the military elite, between competitive enterprises and huge state subsidies for energy and food; between a private-sector middle class and a government-employed middle class that makes up fully one third of the workforce; between the 45 million Egyptians under 35, poor or professional, and those who control the economy through what the young regard as corrupt and non-meritocratic means; between urban and rural; between a variety of secular and Islamic views of the economy.
In the fall of 2011, the International Monetary Fund proposed one set of reforms as part of $4.8 billion standby agreement aimed at creating economic growth. More than $5 billion in additional funds from the EU and the U.S.--beyond the current $1.3 billion in military assistance--were to follow. The IMF conditions included the following controversial items: removing energy subsidies for all but the poor; raising revenue through a broadly applicable value-added tax; using those funds to reduce the budget deficit and increase infrastructure spending; reducing a bloated bureaucracy; and significantly increasing transparency in government budgeting and finance--transparency that in Egypt would threaten longstanding corrupt activities.