How Hamas Lost the Arab Spring

After drifting away from Syria and Iran, the movement faces an uncertain future.
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Hamas chief Khaled Meshaal gives a speech during a rally marking the 25th anniversary of the founding of Hamas, in Gaza City, on December 8, 2012. (Ahmed Jadallah/Reuters)

The Palestinian terrorist group Hamas is feuding with its former patron, Iran. Along with Hezbollah and Russia, Iran has stood squarely behind the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria while it slaughtered tens of thousands of Syrians over the last two years. Despite its own rather gruesome history of violence, the carnage was too much for Hamas. The group's external leadership deserted their longtime headquarters in Damascus last year and abandoned the Iranian "Axis of Resistance" in the process.

This apparently did not sit well with Iran's clerical regime. News reports indicate that Iran has drastically reduced its financial assistance to Hamas, which was said to be over $100 million a year, in recent months. While Hamas officials deny these reports, and Iran almost certainly continues to provide weaponry to the Palestinian faction, the relationship is unquestionably strained.

The Arab Spring years have been surprisingly unkind to Hamas. The falling out with Iran is just one example. The Islamist group has failed to benefit from the rise of other Islamist governments across the region. Instead, the faction finds itself at a strange inflection point, with more ideological allies but few true alliances.

"Hamas is in the process of transformation. 'Moderation' is not the right word here. But something is happening."

That Hamas would be at this crossroads was unthinkable three years ago. The regional standing of the movement, born in the early days of the 1987 Palestinian intifada as a Muslim Brotherhood splinter group, was buoyed by the rise of the meteoric rise of various Brotherhood governments across the region. Hamas had already emerged victorious in the 2006 Palestinian elections, and in 2007 it subsequently became the government in the Gaza Strip after ousting the Palestinian Authority in a violent coup. So when the Brotherhood ascended regionally in the wake of unrest of the Arab Spring, it seemed only natural that the de facto government of Gaza would seamlessly integrate into the new Middle East.

But Hamas' financial relationship with Iranian and Syrian patrons soon became a liability. The group found itself caught in a sectarian tug of war between its Shi'ite financiers (Iran is Shi'ite and Syria is a client state of Iran) and the new Sunni order (the Muslim Brotherhood is Sunni). Hamas's decision was soon made easier by Western sanctions against Iran for its illicit nuclear program, which ate into Iran's foreign exchange reserves and eroded the regime's ability to bankroll its proxies. Hamas then found itself in the decidedly awkward position of having an alliance with the Iranian-backed Alawite regime in Syria while Assad mowed down Sunnis and Palestinians, alike. Hamas pulled out of its Damascus headquarters in February of last year.

Hoping to realign with the new Sunni regional order, the movement dispatched senior figures to manage relationships with three powers strongly tied to the Muslim Brotherhood: Egypt, Turkey, and Qatar. Over time, this triumvirate has filled the void left by Iran.

Qatar, which is flush with cash, has contributed the most generously, and also takes the lead on construction projects in Gaza. Turkey is believed to have provided additional funds, while also building hospitals and mosques in the coastal enclave. It additionally sells a wide range of consumer products there. Egypt, which is drowning in debt, is unable to provide Hamas with funding, but the Morsi government has labored to bring Hamas out of isolation.

This new patronage arrangement is clearly reflected in the movement's recent leadership selection. Politburo chief Khaled Meshal, who used to work out of Damascus and managed the relationship with Iran, now works out of Doha, Qatar. Saleh al-Aruri, who is a rising star in Hamas and is in charge of the movement's operations in the West Bank, serves as Hamas's Turkey-based emissary. Veteran Hamas leader Mousa Abu Marzouk, who serves as a media spokesman, is based in Cairo, Egypt. Additionally, the movement maintains leadership figures in Jordan, Lebanon, with still other leaders, such as Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh and the Hamas cabinet based in Gaza.

Of course, Hamas has always maintained leadership abroad. The movement is deliberately decentralized to ensure that Israel cannot decapitate its top leaders in one blow. But since the exodus from Damascus, its structure looks more like a diplomatic corps.

Meshal's leadership throughout all of this has been tenuous. In recent years, numerous reports have suggested he was prepared to step down . After all, he was responsible for managing ties with the Iranians and Syrians, and those ties had gone sour. But by April, the journeyman Hamas leader appeared to have found job stability in Doha, thanks to the movement's new financial lifeline there. He was reelected in April 2013 as politburo chief, but only after a protracted period of confusion surrounding the selection process, which reportedly took place in multiple locations such as TurkeySudan, and Egypt, and were postponed several times due to "technical issues."

Where Hamas is headed under Meshal's leadership is still unclear, however. He has repeatedly expressed his desire to join the secular Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which has long served as the political base for Hamas' domestic adversary, the Fatah faction. As Gaza-based political science professor Mkhaimar Abusada notes, "Meshal understands that in order for Hamas to become a legitimate entity, it must be part of the PLO."

But it is entirely unclear how this this appeals to a majority of Hamas' stakeholders. Joining hands with the PLO is antithetical to the movement's platform of resistance. After all, the PLO remains open to negotiations with Israel - something Hamas steadfastly rejects. Perhaps this is why, amidst the divorce from Iran and Syria, his former patrons heaped scorn on Meshal, calling him a Zionist, for good measure.

Presented by

Jonathan Schanzer, a former intelligence analyst at the U.S. Treasury, is vice president of research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

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