Two men this week hacked a British soldier to death in broad daylight on the streets of London, hitting the soldier with a car and then nearly beheaded him with a machete, demanding that passers-by film their justification for the attack.
This would be shocking enough were it an isolated incident. Instead, it reflected a 15-year trend of Islamist militants attempting to kill Western soldiers on their home soil.
As was shown in London, it does not take a high amount of casualties to terrorize and scar a nation. This was terrorism at its simplest and most replicable.
Such attacks have occurred throughout Europe -- for example, Mohammed Merah shot and killed three French soldiers last year -- yet the two countries in which the threat has been most pronounced have been the U.S. and the U.K. In the last eight years, there have been thirteen separate plots specifically targeting the U.S. military -- over one and a half per year. Britain has suffered from four separate plots. The attacks differ in terms of scale, strategy, and success, but all have been relatively simple plots aiming to kill.
Some attacks have been spontaneous. When Abdulhakim Muhammad realised he was unable to attack his preferred targets, on June 1, 2009, he used a rifle to shoot two U.S. soldiers who happened to be smoking outside a military recruiting center in Little Rock, Arkansas. One subsequently died.
The other plots required a greater level of planning. This was certainly the case when, in 2003, Sergeant Hasan Akbar used rifles and grenades to kill two soldiers at a U.S. Army camp in Kuwait.
Notoriously, Major Nidal Hasan then killed 13 at the Fort Hood air base in Texas in November 2009. Hasan had contacted -- and taken direct ideological inspiration -- from al-Qaeda cleric Anwar al-Awlaki. Using this attack as a template, in July 2011, U.S. Army Private Naser Abdo was arrested near Fort Hood for a planned shooting and bombing campaign.
Therefore, the attacks that have led to the most casualties within the U.S. military are carried out by members of the armed services themselves.
When attacks are not carried out by U.S. soldiers, they are instead planned by radicalized cells looking to attack military bases. Cells in both New Jersey and North Carolina attempted to launch such terrorist attacks. Yet the larger the cell, the more they were prone to infiltration; and government informants and undercover officers have consistently thwarted plots involving larger networks.
However, even operating with great secrecy is no guarantee of success. Parviz Khan had attempted to keep his 2007 plot to kidnap and behead a British Muslim soldier secret even from members of his own terrorist network. Yet the plan -- which had apparently received approval from al-Qaeda -- was still rolled up by the British police. Khan and an accomplice, Basiru Gassama, were subsequently jailed.