Many were nervous about the recent Kenyan election because more than 1,000 people died in the aftermath of the last one. Why does democratic voting sometimes spiral into rioting?
In the winter of 2007, machete-wielding mobs marauded around the Kenya, hacking rival tribes to death and burning women and children alive. In all, more than 1,300 people died and 600,000 people were displaced in the violence that followed the country's previous election.
This time, Kenyans stocked up on staples like flour, rice, bread ahead of Monday's vote in case riots broke out again. But although watchers both inside and outside of Kenya steeled themselves for violence, this year's election was comparatively peaceful. While it's still possible that the country's political rivalries could turn deadly if there are reports of voting irregularities or a contentious run-off, only a few pockets of violence broke out on voting day, and it wasn't clear that it was election-related.
Kenya made some changes to its electoral process in 2010, partly in response to the 2007 bloodshed, which might have helped things run more smoothly this year. But the sheer outrageousness of the violence in 2007 also raises the question: Why are some elections violent, while most proceed without incident?
Developing countries do tend to see more election-time violence, according to one 2005 study, but they also tend to have the kinds of poor economic conditions and weak governmental institutions that are likelier to result in post-voting rampages.
Previously, Kenya's political system didn't grant much power to anyone but the president -- the same guy who had just been accused of stealing the election.
The last election's carnage was so extreme that it launched a flurry of studies and reports centered on how to prevent it the next time around. Here are a few of the circumstances that some experts say can spark election violence -- in Kenya and elsewhere:
1. Unclear election results that aren't credible
The unrest in Kenya began in December 2007, when Mwai Kibaki was declared the winner and his main opponent, Raila Odinga, claimed there had been countless instances of vote-rigging. It had been the closest election in Kenya's history.
"One of the issues is that people went to bed the last time thinking one side had won and they woke up the next day and the other side had won," said Bill Sweeney, the president of IFES, which provides technical assistance for elections. "There was very little transparency in the process, which gave rise to the tensions in the society. There remain lots of conspiracy theories as to what happened."
That might sound like a familiar problem -- the 2000 U.S. election was also famously extremely close, strongly disputed and involved some voting irregularities (hanging chads, anyone?) But unlike the U.S., Kenya lacked a strong judiciary to resolve the issue.
The problem was, Kenya's political system previously just didn't grant much power to anyone but the president, the same guy who had just been accused of stealing the election.
"All institutional organs outside the presidency were seen as compromised and unable to resolve things," said Boston University African Studies Center researcher Susanne Mueller, who has studied Kenya's politics. "Civil servants and various arms of government understood how their bread was buttered and tended to defer to the president."
This time Kenyan officials had installed a credible chief justice, Willy Mutunga, to oversee the voting -- although he's also reportedly received death threats for attempting to ensure peaceful, fair elections.
2. A system where the winner "takes all"
Kenyan political parties operate around personalities, rather than ideologies. The "big man" -- the candidate -- is a vehicle for his own party or ethnic group, according to Mueller. The country also has what's called "zero-sum ethnic politics," which means supporters of losing parties don't see opponent victories as a win for the other side -- they see it as a loss for themselves and their ethnic group.
"If you as a Kikuyu win, I feel that I as a Luo lose," Mueller explained, referring to two of Kenya's ethnicities.
Some studies have found that elections in which the winner wins too much -- say, the right to favor his own group or region, for example -- tend to spark feuding because both sides have more at stake than simply seeing their party in charge. While supporters of the winner may be more likely to get civil service jobs or better development projects for their regions, losers may become economically disadvantaged.
That might explain why in Kenya, all three presidential candidates have campaigned along ethnic lines, and the tribal groups vote as units. One group, the Kikuyus, are said to practise "oathing," in which villagers swear only to vote for candidates from their tribe, the Economist reported.
"In some countries, you either win or you're out in the wilderness," said E.J. Hogendoorn, the International Crisis Group's deputy director for Africa.
To avoid post-election violence, the losing party has to feel they still have a say, albeit a smaller one, in the running of the country.
In response to the 2007 violence, Kenya's new constitution provided for a network of governor-like legislators throughout the country, with the idea being that voters will not see the "big man" president as their only hope for political representation. It remains to be seen if that's enough of a consolation to stave off frustrations over losing.
3. A precedent of violence proving effective
Kenyan MPs earn sky-high salaries , and elections are costly to run. The incentives to win can be overpowering.
Kenyan government officials were involved -- either directly or indirectly -- in stoking the ethnic hatred and inciting the violence that surrounded 2007's electoral results. Politicians on both sides gave speeches that fanned the flames of long-standing rifts. Two Kenyan presidential candidates are currently facing trial in the Hague for allegedly planning and funding attacks against their political opponents in 2007.
Mueller notes that Kenya has a long history of politicians using hired gangs to influence election results. In 1992, Human Rights Watch found that high-ranking Kenyan government officials had armed so-called "Kalenjin warriors" to attack villages of their opponents with bows and arrows and to torch their homes.
"Kenyan politicians have figured out that there are ways to swing votes, particularly when votes are close," Hogendoorn said. "You can use violence strategically to get people to flee or to intimidate them into not voting."
It may still be possible that there will be rioting by opposition groups if Uhuru Kenyatta, who is currently in the lead, wins the general race. And if the race is close or if there's evidence of vote rigging, supporters of each side could still take to the streets to air their grievances. (As a precautionary measure, Kenya's police chief banned all demonstrations Tuesday, saying Kenya had "no history" of peaceful protests, the New York Times reported.)
This time, though, Hogendoorn notes that Kenya's citizens have been so traumatized by the 2007-08 killings that they appeared more committed to peace than in previous election cycles. One election day, the public seemed both more alert to potential violence and more dedicated to ensuring a peaceful transfer of power, according to IFES's Sweeney, who was in Nairobi on Monday.
Five years ago, a small urban riot arose out of a rally that two political opponents staged in the days before the election. But on Saturday, Sweeney said young men in orange and in red -- the colors of two competing Kenyan parties -- walked side-by-side to separate rallies without confrontation.
"It's like watching people go to sporting events," he said. "They're not fighting, they're talking to each other. There's a commitment to making the system work."