The Legacy of David Petraeus and the Future of American War

As the former CIA chief and military leader's official career ends, the grappling with his formidable legacy -- and what it might mean for future U.S. policy -- can begin.

Pet Karz.jpg
Afghan President Hamid Karzai awards a medal to outgoing International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) commander General David Petraeus at the Presidential Palace in Kabul, on July 18, 2011. (Reuters)

Before he was embroiled in the lurid and increasingly complicated scandal that ended his brief tenure as director of the Central Intelligence Agency, General David Petraeus was an already-iconic military leader, the commander who rescued the U.S. war effort in Iraq, and who was brought in to help reverse course in a deteriorating Afghanistan. But before he even assumed command of U.S. forces in Iraq, Petraeus assisted in producing a document crucial to understanding the general's broader impact on American policy -- and on thinking about how and why America wages war.

Future students of Petraeus's intellectual legacy will likely start with the 2006 version of FM 3-24, the army's counterinsurgency manual, the result of an effort spearheaded by Petraeus and General James Mattis, and necessitated by the waning prospects of victory in Iraq. In the midst of a directionless and seemingly doomed campaign, the generals brought in a wide range of civilian scholars and military officers to help formulate the first update to the military's counterinsurgency field guide in over two decades. According to John Nagl, a defense policy scholar and retired lieutenant colonel, and one of the authors of the manual, Petraeus involved over 100 civilian journalists, scholars, and intellectuals for a two-day vetting and open discussion of a draft version of the document. "It was a great example of Petraeus's ability to reach out to a broader intellectual community to gather ideas, but also to gain support for the project. And it mattered."

As Stephen Biddle, a scholar and George Washington University professor who served on Petraeus's Strategic Assessment Team in Iraq in 2007, explains, the resulting manual conceived of warfare in jarringly unconventional terms. "Its primary logic is that you succeed in the war not by destroying the enemy but by protecting the civilian population and giving them a stake in the government you're trying to support," says Biddle. "The manual conceived of counter-insurgency as essentially an armed contest in good governance, in which the government we're trying to support and an insurgency are both competing for what are thought of as being a largely uncommitted middle of the population. The side that convinces the uncommitted middle to side with them, wins the war....The new doctrine is about how to provide governance, economic development and security to a threatened and largely uncommitted civilian population."

The occupying army can't sit in remote and heavily-guarded bases. It has to have continuous contact with the civilian population -- the people whose trust and cooperation you need. Biddle says that counter-insurgency is very intelligence-heavy. The insurgents don't advertise themselves, or wear uniforms. Routinized interaction with the locals is essential if the civilian population is ever going to become comfortable with identifying the bad guys, and identifying keys to their eventual defeat.

"Petraeus declared a unilateral ceasefire with people who had been previously killing Americans in order to ally against al Qaeda."

In Iraq, Petraeus's decision to support the Sunni population's turn against al Qaeda in Iraq -- the so-called "Anbar Awakening" -- led to a dramatic decrease in violence and the routing of the country's brutal terrorist franchise. According to Nagl, this decision to support and arm the Anbar Awakening, which was largely the effort of Sunni militants with plenty of American and Iraqi blood on their hands, was a direct outgrowth of the ideas contained in the counterinsurgency manual. "That was another manifestation of not viewing the Sunni insurgents necessary as the enemy, but in some way as part of the population we were trying to protect," says Nagl. "Petraeus declared a unilateral ceasefire with people who had been previously killing Americans in order to ally against al Qaeda.... it was a high-risk decision, and he took it all on his own authority."

* * *

Petraeus's views on warfare manifested themselves in a number of less-dramatic battlefield experiments. Petraeus oversaw the writing of a manual on Human Intelligence Collector Operations, a guide to the effective and humane interrogation of potential intelligence assets captured in war. And in both Iraq and Afghanistan, Petraeus introduced Human Terrain Teams (HTTs), groups of social scientists who gather detailed, even academic-style information about local populations.

Ryan Evans, a social scientist who served on an HTT in Helmand province in Afghanistan in 2010 and 2011 and a current research fellow at the Center for National Policy, explained his team's contribution to the war effort. His HTT was attached to a British army brigade, and was "integrated into the brigade planning cycle." In practice, this meant that two to eight HTT members -- experts in anthropology, sociology or economics, along with a team leader with some kind of military background -- would interview Afghans in the battalion's area of operation, and review classified and unclassified documentary sources. Evans says his team would accompany regular patrols. "We would conduct research and then write it up in an operationally relevant report with recommendations," he said, adding that they would even discuss social-theoretical concepts in reports if the team believed it could help their brigade's commanders understand the environment in which they were fighting.

The HTTs could prove emblematic of Petraeus's larger impact. They sprang from a belief that war was no longer the sole purview of the warrior -- that killing or disrupting the enemy was a subset of a broader effort to create political and social space for vulnerable and often distrustful populations. But the HTTs were an area where theory and practice clashed: two social scientists have been killed in the field, and the program's rapid expansion and recruiting practices have both been questioned (participation in HTTs is highly controversial within the anthropological profession as well).

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Armin Rosen is a former writer and producer for The Atlantic's Global channel.

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