From Vietnam to Afghanistan, 12-month deployments and institutional norms have made long-term planning more difficult.
In 2010, the U.S. adopted a new tactic in southern Afghanistan: it began to bulldoze entire villages to clear them of IEDs. The policy -- reminiscent of Vietnam, of destroying villages to save them -- spoke to a deeper issue with how the war was being fought. Short-term objectives were emphasized over long term planning or consequence management. Destroying villages carries enormous long-term costs for a region, and the U.S. military just wasn't paying attention to what those would be.
Soldiers, from the bottom of the ranks to the very top, are rarely sent into combat for longer than 12 months at a time. Thus, when they think about what they need to accomplish, they're thinking 12 months into the future. It's rare one can find even a four-star general who makes a campaign plan that reaches three or four years ahead.
In Vietnam, the short deployment cycle brought us the cliche that it wasn't a ten-year war, but a one year war fought ten times. This is also true in Afghanistan, where a dogged inability to learn from past mistakes defines military policy there: continued calls to build up tribal militias, create a separate local police, and repeatedly "sweep" areas of insurgents. The war effort has been spinning its wheels for years, in other words, which is why it seems to go nowhere despite all the public declarations of progress and turning points.
Is there a way to break out of this destructive spiral? This past week I was out at the Command General Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth, speaking with some majors who are studying how future small wars can be made better and smarter. They were an impressive bunch, grappling with huge issues in how both Afghanistan and Iraq failed to work out the way proponents or supporters thought it would. We discussed how we can better plan for operations and management in future stability operations or even counterinsurgencies (should one come about any time soon).
We arrived at an early consensus: the U.S. government is terrible at identifying and managing consequences in foreign conflicts. Bulldozing a village in Afghanistan creates enormous dependencies -- homeless people who need to be housed and fed, the reassignment of land rights in an area where they were never formalized, the destruction and then restarting of economic activity, and the possible reassignment of power relationships are just a few of the serious problems that are created by destroying a village in rural Afghanistan.
Luckily, not many villages have been bulldozed. Still, the U.S. government has made other, smaller missteps. Something as simple as giving a poor, small community the money to build things and buy food can create enormous ripple effects. That community had established relationships with nearby communities, and a settled hierarchy for self-government; adding money into that mix -- in some cases hundreds of millions of dollars a month -- destroys that fragile equilibrium. Now, that may not always be a bad thing, especially if the equilibrium is abusive, but upending it has long-term costs that need to be accounted for but currently aren't.
Is there a way to plan for such a thing? In a direct way, there is not -- humans are not very good at predicting the precise consequences of our behavior. But what can happen is for us to change our perspective. For example, why not assume that sending troops somewhere constitutes a long-term commitment?