Lessons of the Wikileakileaks: Both Funny and Sad

Assange's organization is learning an important lesson about the value of secrecy -- even for a mission of transparency

Foust Sep 1p.jpg


Karma, as they say, is a killer:

More than 250,000 secret U.S. diplomatic cables are now available in full and unfiltered online, exposing scores of U.S. diplomatic sources and informants that were meant to be protected often for their own safety, according to the website WikiLeaks.

But this is not an official WikiLeaks release. Rather, what appears to be a string of errors has lead to both the raw file and the password that unlocks that file to be released into the public domain, without WikiLeaks control.

As tempting as it is to say things like "I told you so," or to simply laugh at how the radical transparency group's own hubris and amateurism had backfired, there is a more serious aspect to this latest leak-of-leaks. 

For one, Wikileaks' inability to manage its own information security in many ways mirrors the U.S. government's own challenges: it relied on discretion, on the reliability of people, and in many ways on luck. Even as I laugh at the organization dedicated to leaks complaining about someone else leaking their information, I'm struck by just how challenging it is to keep information confidential. Now that it has tasted a bit of its own medicine, it will be interesting to see how Wikileaks tries to cope with information leakage.

The loser in all of this, as it has been since Wikileaks began releasing its stolen classified data, is not the U.S. government but the process of diplomacy and statecraft. When they first released the Afghan War Logs, Wikileaks revealed a key area where they demonstrated their inherent untrustworthiness in safeguarding sensitive information: they had no idea what was actually sensitive. I wrote at the time:

The military is rightly accused of overclassifying material, but in this case we have some idea of why: even with the names removed from these reports, you know where they happened (many still have place names). You know when they happened. And you know an Afghan was speaking to a U.S. soldier or intelligence agent. If you have times, locations and half the participants, you don't need names to identify who was involved in a conversation -- with some very basic detective work, you can find out (and it's much easier to do in Afghanistan, which loves gossip).

If I were a Taliban operative with access to a computer -- and lots of them have access to computers -- I'd start searching the WikiLeaks data for incident reports near my area of operation to see if I recognized anyone. And then I'd kill whomever I could identify. Those deaths would be directly attributable to WikiLeaks.

In the year or so since the initial release of raw Afghan incident reports, the U.S. military has been loathe to admit any negative consequences. There are many reasons for this: by the data's very nature, any "blowback" in the form of botched operations or murdered Afghan informants would be classified, so publicizing them would defeat the purpose of keeping them secret to begin with. Furthermore, it is in their interest to never admit that such leaks damage them in anything other than general way -- otherwise, they would offer anyone who might want to hurt the government's ability to function a blueprint for how to do so.

Presented by

Joshua Foust is a fellow at the American Security Project and the author of Afghanistan Journal: Selections from Registan.net. He is also a member of the Young Atlanticist Working Group. More

Joshua's research focuses on the role of market-oriented development strategies in post-conflict environments, and on the development of metrics in understanding national security policy. He has written on strategic design for humanitarian interventions, decision-making in counterinsurgency, and the intelligence community's place in the national security discussion. Previous to joining ASP, Joshua worked for the U.S. intelligence community, where he focused on studying the non-militant socio-cultural environment in Afghanistan at the U.S. Army Human Terrain System, then the socio-cultural dynamics of irregular warfare movements at the National Ground Intelligence Center, and later on political violence in Yemen for the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Joshua is a columnist for PBS Need to Know, and blogs about Central and South Asia at the influential blog Registan.net. A frequent commentator for American and global media, Joshua appears regularly on BBC World, Aljazeera, and international public radio. Joshua is also a regular contributor to Foreign Policy's AfPak Channel, and his writing has appeared in the New York Times, Reuters, and the Christian Science Monitor.


How to Cook Spaghetti Squash (and Why)

Cooking for yourself is one of the surest ways to eat well. Bestselling author Mark Bittman teaches James Hamblin the recipe that everyone is Googling.

Join the Discussion

After you comment, click Post. If you’re not already logged in you will be asked to log in or register.

blog comments powered by Disqus


How to Cook Spaghetti Squash (and Why)

Cooking for yourself is one of the surest ways to eat well.


Before Tinder, a Tree

Looking for your soulmate? Write a letter to the "Bridegroom's Oak" in Germany.


The Health Benefits of Going Outside

People spend too much time indoors. One solution: ecotherapy.


Where High Tech Meets the 1950s

Why did Green Bank, West Virginia, ban wireless signals? For science.


Yes, Quidditch Is Real

How J.K. Rowling's magical sport spread from Hogwarts to college campuses


Would You Live in a Treehouse?

A treehouse can be an ideal office space, vacation rental, and way of reconnecting with your youth.

More in Global

From This Author

Just In