Assange's organization is learning an important lesson about the value of secrecy -- even for a mission of transparency
Karma, as they say, is a killer:
More than 250,000 secret U.S. diplomatic cables are now available in full and unfiltered online, exposing scores of U.S. diplomatic sources and informants that were meant to be protected often for their own safety, according to the website WikiLeaks.
But this is not an official WikiLeaks release. Rather, what appears to be a string of errors has lead to both the raw file and the password that unlocks that file to be released into the public domain, without WikiLeaks control.
As tempting as it is to say things like "I told you so," or to simply laugh at how the radical transparency group's own hubris and amateurism had backfired, there is a more serious aspect to this latest leak-of-leaks.
For one, Wikileaks' inability to manage its own information security in many ways mirrors the U.S. government's own challenges: it relied on discretion, on the reliability of people, and in many ways on luck. Even as I laugh at the organization dedicated to leaks complaining about someone else leaking their information, I'm struck by just how challenging it is to keep information confidential. Now that it has tasted a bit of its own medicine, it will be interesting to see how Wikileaks tries to cope with information leakage.
The loser in all of this, as it has been since Wikileaks began releasing its stolen classified data, is not the U.S. government but the process of diplomacy and statecraft. When they first released the Afghan War Logs, Wikileaks revealed a key area where they demonstrated their inherent untrustworthiness in safeguarding sensitive information: they had no idea what was actually sensitive. I wrote at the time:
The military is rightly accused of overclassifying material, but in this case we have some idea of why: even with the names removed from these reports, you know where they happened (many still have place names). You know when they happened. And you know an Afghan was speaking to a U.S. soldier or intelligence agent. If you have times, locations and half the participants, you don't need names to identify who was involved in a conversation -- with some very basic detective work, you can find out (and it's much easier to do in Afghanistan, which loves gossip).
If I were a Taliban operative with access to a computer -- and lots of them have access to computers -- I'd start searching the WikiLeaks data for incident reports near my area of operation to see if I recognized anyone. And then I'd kill whomever I could identify. Those deaths would be directly attributable to WikiLeaks.
In the year or so since the initial release of raw Afghan incident reports, the U.S. military has been loathe to admit any negative consequences. There are many reasons for this: by the data's very nature, any "blowback" in the form of botched operations or murdered Afghan informants would be classified, so publicizing them would defeat the purpose of keeping them secret to begin with. Furthermore, it is in their interest to never admit that such leaks damage them in anything other than general way -- otherwise, they would offer anyone who might want to hurt the government's ability to function a blueprint for how to do so.