For unsurprising reasons, the people's uprising in Egypt has been widely cast as an epochal event for Arab political culture, and somewhat more widely, for the entire Middle East.
To limit our understanding of these events in this way, however, is to lose sight of a story playing out against an immensely larger backdrop. The putative and much discussed decline of the United States in recent years has been cast against the perceived successes, or at least the argued attractiveness, of an authoritarian other.
In books like When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order, by Martin Jacques; The Beijing Consensus: How China's Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century, by Stephen Halper; The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War between States and Corporations, by Ian Bremmer; and in many other recent writings, we have been warned of an almost unfair unfolding contest between the world's messy and often paralyzed democracies, and a rising cohort of efficient, businesslike authoritarian states. They portray those states as steadily accounting for more and more of the global GDP, and at the same time convincingly delivering the goods to their peoples: gleaming new airports, high-speed rail systems, seamless new highways, and dependable and often free wireless internet, to name just a few of the typical benefits. Citizens, in turn, happily go about the business of pursuing prosperity and leave the business of government to the mandarin classes to whom such rights and privileges properly belong. Such is, or so we are given to understand, the nature of a winning social contract.
At the apex of this phenomenon, its leading edge in power of example and in power outright, supposedly sits China. Its economic miracle story has recently loomed so large in our imaginations that it has convinced many Americans that its rise at our expense, indeed its eventual overtaking of the United States, is a foregone conclusion.
The are few places, however, for which the disgraced exit of Egypt's Hosni Mubarak carries greater relevance, or where the nature of that country's popular uprising warrants shaking up a conventional wisdom that was shallow and stale to begin with and has become badly outdated.
Immediate evidence of this has been provided by the response of China's censors, who have worked furiously to contain news of the events in Egypt within their country, and as that has become less and less practical, to spin the news to fit an unthreatening or even self-reinforcing narrative. For days, Chinese readers have been preposterously treated to stories about evacuation flights put on by their government to bring Chinese nationals back from Egypt, along with residents of Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan.
Nowhere have these stories attempted an honest explanation of why an evacuation was needed in the first place. To do so would require getting into some deeply messy topics in post-Tiananmen China about popular demands for democracy and accountability and about the military's ambivalent relationship to the political leadership. For the most part, the Chinese media has ended the discussion about Egypt with bromides about how unrest equals instability and about how instability hurts growth, and by familiar inference how growth is the only thing that matters.