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The Trouble With Trade

by James Fallows

June 3 - June 17, 1996



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Presidential Seal

EXECUTIVE-DECISION MEMORANDUM



To: The President of the United States
From: D. N. Forser, Chief of Staff
Re: The Trouble With Trade
Date: June 3, 1996


Dear Mr./Ms. President:

You may think you've had enough of polarized, emotional debate propelled by religious or semi-religious zeal. Abortion, same-sex marriage, gun-control--just going down the list makes us all tired.

Think again! You can't let yourself feel too worn down because another of these decisions is on the way. It involves the mild-sounding issue of "trade."

Remember those eighth-grade American-history classes we shared back in Bogalosa, when neither of us ever dreamed that one day we'd be working in Washington D.C.? We all expected it of you, of course, with your photographic recall of the names and places of history, exceeded only by your laser-like ability to cut to the heart of any issue. But I remember that even you got a little glassy-eyed when patient Mr. Hargrave would try to make us remember who was on which side of the "tariff" debates in the 1800s, or what exactly the "cross of gold" speech was about. (Just think: eighth graders a century from now will be hearing from future Mr. Hargraves about your recent "The Chinese have grown tedious" speech.) I don't think either of us could have imagined--certainly I couldn't, and if you did you kept it concealed behind your trademark poker face--how important tariffs, trade balances, and all the other minutiae of international economic policy would finally become in today's world.

Let's face it: when we first dreamed of your taking the big step up to this office, we still thought of the big questions of foreign policy as involving the traditional Big Statesman's list. Nuclear weapons control. Peace in the Middle East. (As if!) A lot of treaty-signing and furrowed brows and compacts that would last through the ages. Whatever foreign policy was meant to be about, it was not for salesmen! Was Woodrow Wilson peddling American beef at Versailles? Was Henry Kissinger talking Motorola exports to the Chinese? It might be fine for the luckless Japanese to have their diplomats be known as "little transistor salesmen"--the term, I'm sure you remember, that Charles De Gaulle haughtily applied to a visiting Japanese prime minister. (Query: would our English teacher Mrs. Phillips have considered "haughtily" to be redundant in a sentence about De Gaulle?) But not for big leaders from big free lands.

Ah, how all that has changed! I suppose it was Pat Buchanan who planted the seeds of change, back in the 1996 campaign. This, you will remember, was before his surprise conversion to Judaism; his decision to move permanently to the West Bank as a settler, "to begin to atone"; and his tragic death while leading a nighttime attack on what he thought was a raiding party from Hezbollah but in reality was a heavily-armed U.S. Marine Corps unit doing remote training with their Israeli counterparts. Pat's decision to run at the force yelling "Remember Meir Kahane!" and waving his Uzi proved in retrospect to be a costly error.

While he was still on the American political scene, however, Pat opened a door that could never really be closed again. He added political force to an argument that had been burbling among economists, think-tank activists, the odd labor union official and corporate executive during the previous ten years. The point of this argument was to ask: Is international trade really good for us?

Since you scored record-high grades in your college economics courses, you know what the answer is supposed to be. Of course trade is beneficial! That is what old David Ricardo said nearly two hundred years ago, when he rolled out the theory of "comparative advantage." As you well recall, this theory told us that if the Portuguese specialized in producing port wine (and olives and similar crops), and the British made woolens and other manufactured goods, then each would become richer by exchanging with the other. And this would be true, miraculously, even if the British economy were so much more advanced than the Portuguese that the Brits could theoretically produce anything more cheaply than the Portuguese did. If each specialized in the area where its "comparative advantage" was greatest, all would profit most in the long run.

From this simple homily, and several tons worth of mathematical demonstration that followed, the international-trade regime emerged. What it told people, up through the time of the Buchanan campaign, was that the ups and downs of the international economy were BY DEFINITION good for us in the long run. If some other country was making cars or computers or even wine more cheaply than we could make it here, then every time our consumers bought from foreign producers, they were improving our national welfare. A domestically made car might cost us $10,000. If we could buy a car of the same quality for $5,000 from some other country, we'd have the car plus an extra $5,000. We'd be better off! We didn't even need to ask why the other country was willing to sell for this level. That's their problem! Willing buyers and willing sellers--each enhanced their welfare through trade.

But as Buchanan, with his claque of think-tank and journalistic supporters, began to say, maybe there's more to the story than that. What about the people in the American car factories? Where are they going to get the money to buy cars or anything else, if their factory shuts down? And what are the foreign sellers going to do with that $5,000 USD they got for their car? If they just trade it back for their own currency, the pressure of supply and demand lowers the value of the dollar. If they want to hold it in dollars, they can use it mainly to buy assets inside the United States, gradually decreasing our future control over our own destiny. Of course, they could use those dollars to buy American products, thereby keeping our employees at work. But if the last three decades of trade experience show us anything, they show us that most other countries view that as a last resort. (Why else do we have such enormous trade deficits?)

And so it is back in your lap--to put it more precisely, back in your capable hands! The trade decisions you will confront cover a wide variety of issues. Should we slap tariffs on the Japanese or Koreans or French if they are slow to open their own markets to our competitive goods? What should be do about rogue nations, like China, that laugh at our attempts to protect our intellectual property? What about a "Buy-American" policy? What about training for our workers who are displaced by trade?

It's time for an overall policy choice about trade. I ask you please, Mr./Ms. President, to indicate your overall preference for our policy by choosing a strategy named in honor of one of the following prominent officials. I will then coordinate work with the State Department (which is trying *much* harder to follow our requests), Treasury (still some room for improvement), Commerce and the U.S. Trade Representative's office to produce a policy.

The selections are:


Option A: Remember David Ricardo!


Two centuries later, it's clear that David Ricardo was right. It is silly to get worked up about solving our trade problems, when the only "problem" we have is that we don't have enough trade! The hand-wringers worry about our big trade deficits. Look at it this way (which is the way economists would look at it, I might point out): The bigger the trade deficit gets, the more it means that workers and consumers in the rest of the world are subsidizing our people right here at home. Do the Japanese want to live in tiny houses, so that their extra savings can finance big factories that make high-quality goods for us? Fine! Keep 'em coming! Do the Koreans want to work for suppressed wages to give us lower-cost semiconductor chips? A grateful America should give its thanks. All these exporting countries get for their efforts is little pieces of paper--dollar bills, IOUs for America. To redeem them they ultimately have to spend them back here in the US of A. Problem solved.

Moreover, anything except the laissez-faire approach goes against a long track record of failure in state-planned economies. If planning and control are so great, why are the Japanese in a six-year recession? Why do the Germans and French envy the job creating power of the American economy? Why are economies around the world dismantling controls? At just the moment of the crowning success of the idea of freedom, it would be folly--and tragedy--to lose our faith in that same vision here at home.

Let buyers buy what they want, and sellers sell, and producers produce. A billion individual decisions will make the world a safer place than it is now--and as prosperous as it possibly can be. Doing anything else would run the risk of tragic trade war!



Option B: Remember Alexander Hamilton!


The economic theories we learned in school are great--as theories. What they tend to leave out is the real histories of actual companies, countries, and economies in the real world. The reason today's professors skip past yesterday's histories is that the history is embarrassing to them. What it shows is that countries that have grown rich--all of them--have refused to put their faith in Ricardo's laissez faire. They used tariffs, industrial policies, aggressive trade strategies, and a hundred other tricks to bring industries within their control. Think of the pattern: the British made themselves the world's leading industrialists through the most protectionist system the world has ever seen. Remember the history classes about the "Navigation Acts" and other restrictions the British slapped on the North American colonies? They were irritating to Americans but they helped do the job for British commerce. The Germans did the same thing in developing their industry. And as for the Japanese. . . it is only those who refuse to look at the evidence who imagine that industrial policy was not a key to their development.

What about America? We "all" believe in Ricardo now, but until the end of The Second World War we "all" believed instead in some version of Alexander Hamilton's theory. Hamilton's famous "Report on Manufactures" early in the nineteenth century laid out a kind of master plan for developing industry in the young nation. It was based on the common-sensical idea that having an industry, which is a source of current earnings and future wealth, is better than the short term benefit of having a cheaper product made by somebody else. As your predecessor Abraham Lincoln once put it, "When we buy the product from the foreigner, we've got the product and they've got the money. When we buy it at home, we've got the product and the money too."

Your challenge, Mr./Mrs. President, is to be the Alexander Hamilton of this age. Every other nation is run under a policy that cares a little about world-wide freedom of trade--but cares very seriously about jobs, security, and meaningful work for the people of their own country. We have to do the same. This means an explicit "Buy American" policy for government purchases--computers, hospital equipment, subways, other capital goods. When America built its railroads a century ago, it could have saved money by buying cheap British rails. Instead it built a steel industry by buying domestically. We can learn from that strategy.

We need tough tariffs too--on economic, environmental, and simple "results oriented" grounds. If other nations want to pillage their environment or exploit workers, fine--but we don't have to impoverish our own workers in head-to-head competition that way. If other nations want to try to run gigantic, chronic surpluses with us--that is not fine, because it will erode our employment base in the long run. We'll just impose tariffs until they see the wisdom of opening their markets as much as we've opened ours.

The worriers will start fretting immediately about a trade war, Mr./Ms. President. Don't listen to them. The entire period since the Second World War teaches the opposite lesson. When the United States shows that it is serious about trade, everybody--the Japanese, the Koreans, the Chinese, the French, the Mexicans-- suddenly sees the wisdom of opening their markets. When we're not serious neither are they.

The people who elected you wanted some security in their own employment. Even more, they want hope for their children. Give it to them, much as Hamilton gave it to the nation of the previous century.



Option C: Remember George Bush!


Our trade concerns have a curiously short-sighted nature. At the moment, it is annoying to have a shrinking-but-still-enormous trade deficit with Japan, and a sizeable-and-rapidly-growing deficit with China. But if we have learned anything, as individuals and as a nation, it is that time changes many perceptions. Right now, the Chinese feel they have to industrialize like crazy, which means building factories to export everything to everyone. The Koreans felt that way three or four years ago. The Japanese did twenty years ago. The French or Germans or Italians did sometime in their national past.

But riches contain the seeds of their own undoing. As the middle class grows, and grows more comfortable, it changes its outlook in two crucial ways.

First, it is less willing to tighten the belt, bite the bullet, keep its nose to the grindstone, and do whatever other clichéd activity we can think of to help the nation export. They want to live! They want to enjoy! It happened to us in the 1960s, and it will happen to everyone else.

The other change involves politics. To be an export powerhouse, a country can't really be a democracy. It needs a cadre of powerful bosses, either from big cartels or from the government, to keep people in line and bend their efforts to the nation's export will. Students must study! Families must save! Prices must be kept higher than in the rest of the world. This worked, most notably in Japan and Korea, during their come-back years. It is noticeably crumbling in both places now.

George Bush thought that his greatest achievement was to liberate Kuwait. (Now there is a cause that will live in history!) In reality it was to start the "structural impediments" talks, designed to convince the Japanese to change their protectionist ways. The plan worked slowly--but eventually it will prevail, because history is on its side.

The world is becoming more democratic, more market-minded, less governmentally controlled. Put yourself on the side of this unstoppable trend, Mr./Ms. President. Make minor, short-term complaints when there are trade problems, but remember that time will heal them all. You can afford to be above the fray because with each passing day our trade problems come close to solving themselves.



Option D: Remember Boutros Boutros-Ghali!


What many Americans know about trade begins and ends with the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930. That tariff didn't really do what most people think it did--that is, it didn't cause the Great Depression. The Depression had been underway for several months by the time Smoot-Hawley was passed. But it did make the world's economic problems worse, and it reminds us now that the worst mistake we could make about trade is to try to solve our problems "unilaterally." A bunch of whining complaints from the United States, enforced by the United States, is much worse than a concerted, international effort to solve problems collectively.

Are the Chinese flouting all standards of intellectual-property protection? Well, yes they are. But is the right way for the United States to strong-arm them? Not at all. The Chinese will play divide-and-conquer, "punishing" us by buying airplanes from the French, telling the Japanese and Indians and Thais that the white Western world is again picking on the formerly colonized nations. In the long run the logic of trade is to make nation-states less and less significant. We are, or should become, citizens in an interdependent world. Unilateral action just encourages the divisive, beggar-thy-neighbor mentality that delays this time of integration.

Instead, whenever you talk about the problems or promises of trade, you should refer to the World Trade Organization. President Clinton fought hard to get this body approved, and it is up to the United States to show that the W.T.O. can be a powerful, effective body for resolving disputes. Think how much happier the world would have been through the twentieth century if Woodrow Wilson had fought harder to make the League of Nations a forum for resolving diplomatic disputes!



Option E: Remember James Monroe!


The rest of the world is of theoretical importance to the United States. Our neighbors in the Americas have real, immediate, practical impact on our quality of life. If Mexico prospers, we will never have a security problem in this hemisphere. If Mexico's economy deteriorates, that country will have problems--and so will we. Immigration; instability and violence; the drug-trade; spillover corruption: these problems and others will affect Mexico and therefore will afflict us.

Your predecessor James Monroe wisely made a distinction between America's distant interest in the world at large and its quite specific interest in this hemisphere. This should be the logic of your trade policy too. The world is dividing up more and more clearly into regional trade blocs. The Japanese and Chinese are competing for control of East Asia. The Europeans are locking up Europe for themselves. Our destiny, and our greatest hopes, lie in our own region. Make sure--with free-trade zones, with investment strategies, with every possible means to make Mexico prosper before it's too late--that we fulfill our proper role in this region.


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