War? Sanctions? Or Inspections?

Roger Cohen argues that exposing the Qom facility "did not change the nuclear equation," and that harsher sanctions "won't work."

The choice is indeed between a military strike and living with a nuclear Iran. But what is a “nuclear Iran?” Is it an Iran that’s nuclear-armed a very dangerous development or an Iran with an I.A.E.A.-monitored enrichment facility? I believe monitored enrichment on Iranian soil in the name of what Obama called Iran’s “right to peaceful nuclear power” remains a possible basis for an agreement that blocks weaponization.

[US negotiator William] Burns must seek to open a parallel bilateral U.S.-Iran negotiation covering at least these areas: Afghanistan and Iraq (where interests often converge); Hezbollah and Hamas (where they do not); human rights; blocked Iranian assets; diplomatic relations; regional security arrangements; drugs; the fight against Al Qaeda; visas and travel. Isolated, nuclear negotiations will fail. Integrated, they may not. [...] Think E.U., not Versailles.

Gary Sick has a similar stance:

The risk for the P5+1 negotiators is that they will be so filled with righteous indignation that they will overplay their hand. The purpose of the negotiations, after all, is not simply to posture, to issue impossible demands, and thereby justify moving to sanctions. [...] Sanctions have not worked after 15 years of trying, and sanctions alone are almost certainly not going to get Iran to abandon its basic nuclear program. Sanctions are and always have been more useful as a threat or a trading card than as an effective tool in practice.

I keep thinking of Iraq. Sanctions helped destroy Iraqi society and did not weaken Saddam. Invasion turned into a catastrophe whose outcome is still unknown (I fear an implosion if and when US troops leave). Would we have been better off with invasive, serious nuclear inspections? Obviously yes. This doesn't mean that the same is a good idea for Iran, which soon will have a capacity for nuclear WMDs. The complicating factor, of course, is the internal situation where a resolute opposition has the support of a hefty majority of the people, and the regime is increasingly beleaguered and internally divided.