For months, I've been hearing about shortages of drugs--ADHD drugs, cancer drugs, various other generics. The shortages have been variously attributed--crappy Chinese links in the supply chain are a perennial favorite--but Ezekial Emmanuel had an op-ed in the New York Times this weekend which offered those most compelling explanation I've yet seen for the phenomenon.
The underlying reason for this is that cancer patients do not buy chemotherapy drugs from their local pharmacies the way they buy asthma inhalers or insulin. Instead, it is their oncologists who buy the drugs, administer them and then bill Medicare and insurance companies for the costs.Things like this are the root of my skepticism about technocratic rule-making. I have no doubt that the earnest people who drafted this rule spent a lot of time thinking about whether the allowed price increase should be 5% or 7%. But they somehow overlooked a rather significant feature of the market they were regulating, and the effect that their rule would have when it interacted with market reality. The more complex your system of rules is, the harder it is to keep track of these potential unwanted side effects.
Historically, this "buy and bill" system was quite lucrative; drug companies charged Medicare and insurance companies inflated, essentially made-up "average wholesale prices." The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003, signed by President George W. Bush, put an end to this arrangement. It required Medicare to pay the physicians who prescribed the drugs based on a drug's actual average selling price, plus 6 percent for handling. And indirectly -- because of the time it takes drug companies to compile actual sales data and the government to revise the average selling price -- it restricted the price from increasing by more than 6 percent every six months.
The act had an unintended consequence. In the first two or three years after a cancer drug goes generic, its price can drop by as much as 90 percent as manufacturers compete for market share. But if a shortage develops, the drug's price should be able to increase again to attract more manufacturers. Because the 2003 act effectively limits drug price increases, it prevents this from happening. The low profit margins mean that manufacturers face a hard choice: lose money producing a lifesaving drug or switch limited production capacity to a more lucrative drug.
The result is clear: in 2004 there were 58 new drug shortages, but by 2010 the number had steadily increased to 211. (These numbers include noncancer drugs as well. )
Nevertheless, Obama administration officials are quietely trying to sell those cuts by arguing that beneficiaries won't even notice them: Politico reports that "the White House said the cuts would be limited to providers and beneficiaries would be 'protected.'" Bloomberg is reporting that the cuts "would only affect provider reimbursements, not benefits."It's certainly true that there is unnecessary treatment out there, and excessive profits for some providers. But I don't understand how the administration can be so confident that they--and there partners in congress--will be able to identify the exact right price for medical services, such that the only people affected will be greedy providers who charge too much. Since I doubt that even the providers are that certain about their profit margins, labor elasticity, and downside risks, I don't know how the administration could possibly have such information.
This article available online at: